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INTRODUCTION
In the next little while, I want to address a problem that once captured,
then somehow lost, the hearts and minds of legal scholars: to wit, the
public policy of spendthrift trusts.
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The spendthrift trust is a device whereby benefactors shield gratuitous
transfers from immediate consumption by their beneficiaries. Adorned with
a spendthrift clause (or a "disabling restraint," as it is technically known),'
a trust provides benefits that are legally inalienable. Though the trust
generates a steady income stream with an ascertainable present value, the
beneficiary is powerless to accelerate her interest by selling it for a lump
sum; the trustee will ignore the sale and continue paying over the income
to the beneficiary. Likewise, creditors cannot satisfy their claims by levying
execution against the corpus; courts will enforce no lien against the trust.2
Spendthrift trusts thus differ from ordinary income-producing trusts, whose
beneficial interests can be sold at will and used for any purpose at all. A
disabling restraint does not dictate the substantive use of trust income (that
is, it does not require one sort of spending or another),3 but it does limit
the temporal use of income to the singular purpose of periodic consump-
tion. Once a trust distribution is in her hands, the beneficiary is free to
consume it as prudently or as frivolously as she pleases. And once a trust
distribution is in her hands, the beneficiary's creditors are also empowered
to reach it-assuming they can find it, for in practice what may follow is
a game of hide-and-seek, the trustee (at the beneficiary's direction)
depositing the income each month into a different bank.4 In short, a
spendthrift trust provides a stable source of passive income, conducing to
the beneficiary's long-term support.5 If the income suffices, it can enable
1. On the linguistic origins of the term "spendthrift trust," see ERwiN N. GRISWOLD,
SPENDTHRIFT TRusTs § 33 (2d ed. 1947)..
2. For a technical discussion, see GEORGE G. BOGERT & GEORGE T. BOGERT, THE LAW OF
TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES §§ 226-27 (rev. 2d ed. 1992 & Supp. 1994). When the beneficiary of a
spendthrift trust contracts to assign her rights to future trust income, courts have refused specifically
to enforce the assignment, although many have given the assignee a right to recover for breach of
contract out of the general assets (such as there are) of the trust beneficiary. Id. § 226, at 491-94; 2A
AUSTIN W. ScoTr, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 152.6 (William F. Fratcher ed., 4th ed. 1987 & Supp. 1992);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 152 cmt. k (1955).
3. For a discussion of the public policy of trusts restricting the substantive use of trust income,
see Adam J. Hirsch & William K.S. Wang, A Qualitative Theory of the Dead Hand, 68 IND. L.J. 1, 18-
27 (1992).
4. Austin W. Scott, Protective Trusts, in HARVARD LEGAL EssAYs 419,424-25 (1934) (observing
that spendthrift trusts "introduced into the law a sporting element"). Nevertheless, if a beneficiary seeks
to avoid creditors by contriving for the trustee to retain, and simply accumulate, income that has
become due for distribution, courts have permitted creditors to reach it in the hands of the trustee. This
stratagem, at least, has been deemed ineffective. BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 2, § 227, at 514-16.
5. The spendthrift trust is not the only variety of trust that creates an inalienable interest in
property. Discretionary trusts and support trusts also feature this element, without guaranteeing the
beneficiary a fixed stream of income. Forfeiture restraint trusts (also known as protective trusts) are
another structural relative of the spendthrift trust: they provide the beneficiary a fixed income stream,
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her to live in high style, even as her creditors go empty-handed.6
Though seemingly artful, disabling restraints are hardly unusual.
Nowadays, estate planners typically (if wrongly!) add them to instruments
of trust as boilerplate.7 The general validity of the device is accepted in
virtually every American jurisdiction,' and in four states all trusts are
but are forfeited upon the occurrence of the conditions subsequent that a creditor levies execution
against, or the beneficiary seeks to alienate, the trust. Thus, interests in a forfeiture restraint trust may
be lost but not alienated. Here, debtor-creditor relations can also degenerate into a game, not of hide-
and-seek but of "chicken," wherein creditors threaten to take action against the trust both to the
beneficiary's and their own detriment, unless the beneficiary comes up with the funds to satisfy their
claims. On the game theory of "chicken," see for example DOUGLAS G. BAIRD ET AL., GAME THEORY
AND THE LAW 43-44 (1994). Strictly speaking, this Article will focus on spendthrift trusts, although
many of the policy arguments pertinent to them are also relevant to other sorts of inalienable trusts.
6. It happens. E.g., Congress Hotel Co. v. Martin, 143 N.E. 838 (Ill. 1924).
7. For the conventional estate planning wisdom, see JAMES F. FARR & JACKSON W. WRIGHT,
JR., AN ESTATE PLANNER'S HANDBOOK § 36, at 225 (4th ed. 1979 & Supp. 1992) ("[S]peaking broadly,
it seems wise to include such a [spendthrift] provision wherever the law allows. It is a natural part of
the overall protective mechanism which the trust provides."). But see Ren6 A. Wormser, Spendthrift
Trusts as Part of an Estate Plan, 5 INST. ON EST. PLAN. 71.900, at 9-1 to 9-2 (1971); infra note 166
and accompanying texL Noting the empirical fact of typical inclusion of spendthrift clauses in trusts,
see BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 2, § 222, at 385 n.7; W. BARTON LEACH & JAMES K. LOGAN,
CASES AND TEXT ON FUTURE INTERESTS AND ESTATE PLANNING 165 (1961); LAWRENCE W.
WAGGONER ET AL., FAMILY PROPERTY LAW 677-78 (1991); Willard M. Bushman, The (In)validity of
Spendthrift Trusts, 47 OR. L. REv. 304, 304 & n.4 (1968); Wormser, supra, at 9-1. This has been true
for a long time. See GRISWOLD, supra note 1, at iii (noting the frequency of spendthrift trusts as of that
writing); Lawrence M. Friedman, The Dynastic Trust, 73 YALE LJ. 547, 576 & n.105 (1964) (noting
scattered examples of spendthrift trusts dating from the Jacksonian era). As anthropologists have
observed, the idea of inalienable property has roots in primitive culture. Annette B. Weiner, Inalienable
Wealth, 12 AM. ETHNOLOGIST 210 (1985).
8. Only New Hampshire and North Carolina presently deny effectiveness to spendthrift trusts
(which are also void in Great Britain, see infra note 17). In Kansas and South Dakota, the statutes
authorizing spendthrift trusts apply only to trusts containing real property, thus perpetuating the
anachronistic distinction between realty and personalty that has lingered in many other aspects of
American property law. It is probable, however, that the common law of these states would also
acknowledge the validity of spendthrift trusts containing personalty; other American statutes mirroring
Kansas' and South Dakota's limitation have since been repealed. See Everrit v. Haskins, 171 P. 632
(Kan. 1918) (prestatutory law); First Northwestera Trust Co. of South Dakota v. Internal Revenue
Service, 622 F.2d 387 (8th Cir. 1980) (inferring state law); Farmers State Bank v. Janish, 410 N.W.2d
188 (S.D. 1987) (dicta).
In four other jurisdictions (Alaska, Idaho, Utah, and Wyoming), no statutes or cases have addressed
the validity of spendthrift trusts. In every other state, spendthrift trusts are enforceable, either by statute
or case law. (In Mississippi, the validating case law appears to conflict with the statute.) Other states
have recently reversed, by statute or case law, prior proscriptions of disabling restraints. E.g., Scott v.
Bank One Trust Co., 577 N.E.2d 1077 (Ohio 1991). There exist, however, many variations in the
minutiae of spendthrift trust doctrine. For a state-by-state analysis, see BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note
2, § 222, at 406 n.59. For additional discussions of modem spendthrift trust doctrine, see id. §§ 222-28;
WILLIAM M. MCGOVERN, JR. ET AL., WELLS, TRUSTS AND ESTATES § 8.7 (1988); 2A SCOTr, supra note
2, § 151; 4 RICHARD I- POWELL, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY §§ 42.25-.26 (Patrick J. Rohan ed., 1993
1995]
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deemed spendthrift as a rule of construction.9 A few jurisdictions limit the
size (or fraction) of the corpus that can be rendered inalienable,'0 and
most states permit special classes of creditors to prise open a spendthrift
trust." In some jurisdictions, a spendthrift provision can only encompass
an estate for life or years; it cannot prevent a beneficiary from accelerating
& Supp. 1994); LEwis M. Sm & ALLAN F. SMrrH, THE LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS § 1146 (2d ed.
1956 & Supp. 1994); 5 HERBERT T. TFFANY, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY §§ 1354-58 (Basil Jones
ed., 3d ed. 1939 & Supp. 1993); William S. Huff, Spendthrift Clauses: Legality and Effect on Post-
Transfer Estate Planning, 18 INST. ON EST. PLAN. 1200 (1984). Spendthrift trusts are also effective
in a federal bankruptcy proceeding to the extent that they would be under state law. II U.S.C. §
541 (c)(2) (1988); Adam J. Hirsch, Inheritance and Bankruptcy: The Meaning of the "Fresh Start," 45
HASTINGS LI. 175, 241-42 n.221-24 (1994).
9. In New York and Tennessee, all trusts are construed to be inalienable, whether by creditor's
levy or by voluntary sale by the beneficiary, unless the instrument of trust expresses a contrary intent.
In Illinois and Washington, all trusts are immune from creditor levy but still subject to voluntary sale.
BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 2, § 222, at 416-17, 430-34, 438.40, 443-44; 2A SCOTT, supra note
2, § 152.1, at 102-03, § 152.3, at 115; 4 POWELL, supra note 8, § 42.25[5][c] (discussing New York
law in detail). Though the Illinois and Washington statutes are silent on the matter, commentators have
assumed that the Washington enactment, like those now in effect in New York and Tennessee, is a
nonmandatoxy rule of construction, subject to a contrary provision in the trust instrument permitting
creditors to levy against it (or, e contra, barring sale by the beneficiary). Thomas W. Read, Note,
Spendthrift Trusts in Washington-the Statutory Restraint upon Involuntary Alienation, 58 WASH. L.
REv. 831 (1983); William H. Wicker, Spendthrift Trusts, 10 GONz. L. REV. 1, 8 (1974). Nevertheless,
a former statute in New York had barred alienation as a mandatory rule of law, irrespective of the
benefactor's intent. 4 POWELL, supra note 8, § 42.25[5][c][ii], at 42-426 to 42-427, § 42.25[5][c][iii],
at 42-430 to 42-431. In Minnesota, a trust for the benefit of named close relatives is rebuttably
presumed to be inalienable. BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 2, § 222, at 423 n.59. In Michigan, trusts
containing real property, but not other trusts, are by statute inalienable, a measure that again pays
homage to the feudal roots of American property law. Id. § 222, at 402-03 & na9; William F. Fratcher,
Restraints on Alienation of Equitable Interests in Michigan Property, 51 MICH. L. R'v. 509 (1953);
see supra note 8.
10. In some jurisdictions, the income a spendthrift trust can protect is limited not to a set amount
or fraction, but rather to an amount the court deems sufficient to provide for the beneficiary's necessary
support. BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 2, § 222, at 403 & n.50, § 227, at 516-19; 2A SCOTT, supra
note 2, § 152.1, at 98-104.
11. Though states that formerly proscribed spendthrift trusts have come increasingly to recognize
their general validity, see supra note 8, Professor Bogert perceives a "recent trend" in the direction of
adding to the list of creditors entitled to reach a spendthrift trust, and thereby a growing threat to their
practical effectiveness. BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 2, § 222, at 402; see also Erwin N. Griswold,
Reaching the Interest ofthe Beneficiary ofa Spendthrift Trust, 43 HA1v. L. REV,. 63, 98 (1929). Among
the creditors who may be permitted under state law to reach the corpus of a spendthrift trust are
alimony and child-support creditors, purchase-money creditors for necessary services, tax creditors, and,
in a very few jurisdictions, tort creditors. BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 2, § 224. In a few
jurisdictions, one finds the structural flip side of such limitations: statutes restricting spendthrift trusts
to certain types of debtors. These restrictions are discussed in greater depth infra notes 179,281-84 and
accompanying text.
[VOL. 73:1
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the remainder interest in a trust.12 In no jurisdiction can a person "self-
settle" a spendthrift trust, that is, create such a trust for herself,3 although
exactly what constitutes a self-settled trust is itself unsettled-for instance,
case law fails to resolve conclusively whether a structured settlement of a
tort claim wherein the tortfeasor creates a spendthrift trust for the victim
falls into this category. 4 These limitations aside, the general effectiveness
of spendthrift trusts is today unquestioned, and benefactors have poured
into them altogether hundreds of billions of dollars."
Yet, for all of that, no one seems to be thinking about spendthrift trusts
anymore. John Chipman Gray thundered his wrath against them late in the
12. BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 2, § 222, at 389-93, 395-96; 2A SCOTT, supra note 2, § 153;
see also BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 2, § 402. The modem trend and weight of authority favors the
validity of disabling restraints upon remainders. Compare RESTATEmENT OF TRUSTS § 153(b) (1935)
with RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 153(1) (1955). For recent cases, see In re Edgar's Estate,
389 N.W.2d 696 (Mich. 1986); Knight v. Knight, 589 N.Y.S.2d 195 (App. Div. 1992); Domo v.
McCarthy, 612 N.E.2d 706 (Ohio 1993).
13. BOGaERT & BOGERT, supra note 2, § 223; 2A SCOTT, supra note 2, § 156; see, e.g., In re
Brackett, 54 B.R. 57 (Bankr. D.N.M. 1985); In re Witwer, 148 B.R. 930 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1992);
Speed v. Speed, 430 S.E.2d 348 (Ga. 1993).
14, Brad J. Berkness, Comment, Abusive Discretion: Discretionary and Supplemental Trusts
Created in Settlement of Personal Injury Claims, 67 WASH. L. REv. 437, 445-47, 450-51 (1992); cf.
Rmidee K. Carson & David J. Tong, Commentary, Structured Settlements: Customized Compensation
for Personal Injury Plaintiffs, 13 STETSON L. REV. 309, 313 & n.35 (1984) (suggesting that statutes
exempting disability income benefits from creditors' claims may apply to structured settlements).
Virginia recently enacted a statute indicating that trusts funded by "claims," whether structured
settlements or not, can be reached by creditors and transferees. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-19(c) (Michie
Supp. 1994). For recent cases, see In re Morris, 144 B.R. 401 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 1992); Forsyth v. Rowe,
629 A.2d 379 (Conn. 1993); Mills v. Durst, 594 N.Y.S.2d 537 (Sup. Ct. 1993).
Similarly, a Keogh pension plan created by a self-employed individual may or may not constitute
a self-settled trust Jeffrey G. Sherman, Spendthrift Trusts and Employee Pensions: The Problem of
Creditors' Rights, 55 IND. L.J. 247, 261-71 (1980); Daniel Wise, Keogh Plans Denied Shield from
Creditors, N.Y. L.J., Jan. 29, 1993, at 1. See generally Noel C. Ice, 'hat Are Creditors' Rights in
Retrement Plan Benefits?, 21 EST. PLAN. 30 (1994); Daniel L. Skoler, The Status and Protection of
Social Security Benefits in Bankruptcy Cases, 67 AM. BANmK L.J. 585 (1993). State law also varies
on the question of whether the beneficiary of a life insurance policy can self-select a spendthrift
settlement option. STUART SCHWARzScHILD, RIGHTS OF CREDITORS IN Ltra INSURANCE POLICIES 250-
52 (1963); William A. Brackney, Creditors'Rights in Life Insurance, PROB. & PROP., Mar.-Apr. 1993,
at 52, 53. In a recent Louisiana case, an agreement to extend a spendthrift trust past the time when it
was due to expire under the terms of the instrument of trust was held void as contrary to the settlor's
intent. Albritton v. Albritton, 600 So. 2d 1328 (La. 1992). And in two recent cases, spendthrift trusts
self-settled with property held in tenancies by the entirety were held effective on the ground that
tenancies by the entirety are already exempt from creditors' claims. Bolton Roofing Co. v. Hedrick, 701
S.W.2d 183 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985); See. Pac. Bank Wash. v. Chang, 818 F. Supp. 1343 (D. Haw. 1993).
15. Modern empirical data are lacking. For an estimate, see RONALD CHESTER, INHERITANCE,
WEALTH, AND SOCIETY 125 (1982). See also Bushman, supra note 7, at 304; Anne S. Emanuel,
Spendthrift Trusts: It's Time to Codify the Compromise, 72 NEB. L. REv. 179, 182 n.16 (1993).
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nineteenth century,16 shortly after the United States Supreme Court first
endorsed their validity. 7 Gray's arguments engaged scholars for a time,
but these academic echoes died away by the 1970s, and the public policy
of spendthrift trusts has not been assayed since." For a generation the
16. JoHN C. GRAY, RESTRAINTS ON THE ALIENATION OF PROPERTY at iii-xi (2d ed. 1895).
17. Nichols v. Eaton, 91 U.S. 716 (1875) (Miller, J.) (dictum). Considered historically, the
spendthrift trust seems to have been born largely of chance and confusion, both with respect to its
statutory and common law roots. As a matter of common law, Justice Miller in Nichols cited to six
earlier Pennsylvania cases, yet Pennsylvania at the time was atypical in denying creditors' rights to
reach equitable trust interests, because it lacked a court of equitable jurisdiction. Miller apparently failed
to appreciate the peculiar procedural circumstances that surrounded his authorities (and because in
Nichols the point was dictum, it had not gone through the rigors of debate by counsel).
Prior to Nichols, English and American cases had held almost uniformly that disabling restraints
were ineffective, and commentators immediately criticized Miller's opinion for contradicting established
doctrine. It happened, however, that a number of influential treatises appeared or went through new
editions shortly after Nichols came down, and striving to keep current they picked the case up. These
treatises were frequently cited by subsequent courts. For a discussion of these coincidences and
confusions along with other ones related to the rise of the spendthrift trust, see GRISWOLD, supra note
1, §§ 25-31. On the state of the law prior to Nichols, see GRAY, supra note 16, passim, summarized
at § 213. For criticism of Nichols by the Court's contemporaries, see id. §§ 251-55 (describing the
doctrine as a "startling novelty"); Summary of Events, 10 AM. L. REV. 586, 594-96 (1876) (calling the
doctrine "novel and startling," "hav[ing] the effect of unsettling the law").
As a matter of statutory law, spendthrift trusts first arose under New York's revision of its property
code in 1828 (close to a half century before Nichols), and variations on this provision subsequently
spread to many other states. This statute appears to have been the offspring of mistake as well. The
Revisers' Notes indicate that their original intent was to increase the security of creditors and to permit
only very limited disabling restraints. That the statute proved to have the opposite effect was the result
of subsequent (mis)construction and careless amendment. "[lit [is) unbelievable that the Revisers or the
Legislature foresaw the introduction into the law of a vast system of indestructible trusts . .. ." 4
POWELL, supra note 8, § 42.25[5][c][i] (quotation at 42-409); see also GRISWOLD, supra note 1, §§ 62-
70 (stating that the construction was the result of "pure oversight or accident"). On the influence of the
New York statute in other states, see id. § 61. But for these various coincidences, Griswold speculates,
spendthrift trusts might never have gained widespread acceptance in the United States. Id. § 26, at 23.
(And, by way of comparison, they never did so in Great Britain, where disabling restraints remain void
to this day. Brandon v. Robinson, 34 Eng. Rep. 379 (Ch. 1811).) As is often said, "'tis the little things
in life"--and in the life of the law, too. Cf. Friedman, supra note 7, at 572-86 (positing a social
explanation for the rise of American spendthrift trust doctrine).
18. For recent discussions rehearsing the traditional lines of argument, see BOGERT & BOOERT,
supra note 2, § 222, at 381-89; Emanuel, supra note 15, at 186-94. A number of early courts eschewed
policy analysis altogether, some asserting that the right to alienate property was an inherent incident
of ownership that a benefactor could not strip away; to attach a disabling restraint to a gift was logically
paradoxical, "to give and not to give, in the same breath." Steib v. Whitehead, 111111. 247, 251 (1884).
See also Brandon, 34 Eng. Rep. at 379; In re Smyth, 49 R.I. 27, 31 (1927); and others asserting that
the right to restrict the alienation of property was logically an inherent incident of ownership. "Whoever
has the right to give, has the right to dispose of the same as he pleases. Cujus est dare ejus est
disponere, is the maxim which governs in such case." Ashhurst v. Given, 5 Watts & Serg. 323, 330 (Pa.
1843); see also GRISWOLD, supra note 1, § 552.
But still other early courts and commentators rejected both conceptual approaches, insisting that the
(VOL. 73:1
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issue has lain dormant, even as the methodology of legal policy analysis
has undergone a generational shift. Thus far, spendthrift trusts have entirely
escaped notice by the law-and-economics movement. Economists have
pondered certain structurally related entities, such as the limited liability
corporate form and security interests in property (a sort of mirror image of
the spendthrift trust)." These legal contrivances suggest useful parallels,
and occasionally perpendiculars, to the problem. But spendthrift trusts
themselves nowhere appear in Richard Posner's sweeping Economic
Analysis of Law,2" nor in the texts of Posner's many peers and disciples.
Even as they have striven to cover every branch of the law with their
embroidery, here the economists seem to have dropped a stitch. My
purpose in this Article is to bring to bear on spendthrift trusts some modem
analytic tools and insights, drawn especially from the disciplines of
economics and cognitive psychology. Those insights may help to open up
new vistas on the problem-and possibly will enable us to teach a few old
dogmas new tricks.
The analysis that follows will also endeavor to delve more deeply into
the spendthrift trust than hitherto, by breaking it down into its fundamental
components. In Part I, I shall explore restraints against voluntary alienation:
that is, restrictions on a beneficiary's right to terminate the arrangement-to
take the money and run. In Part II, I shall proceed to restraints against
involuntary alienation: that is, restrictions on creditors' rights to reach the
trust corpus in order to satisfy their claims. These two elements typically
form a legal compound, which most of the existing commentary treats as
irreducible.2" But they are in fact both conceptually-and doctrinal-
issue was one of policy and not of logic, a view that has grown to become the dominant wisdom:
"There is no syllogistic basis for the spendthrift trust." Id. § 554; GRAY, supra note 16, §§ 3, 257, 259;
2A ScoTT, supra note 2, § 152, at 89-90; Summary of Events, supra note 17, at 595; George P.
Costigan, Jr., Those Protective Trusts Which Are Miscalled "Spendthrift Trusts" Reexamined, 22 CAL.
L. REv. 471, 480-81 (1934); Richard E. Manning, The Development of Restraints on Alienation Since
Gray, 48 HARV. L. REV. 373, 404 (1935); Nichols, 91 U.S. at 725; Sheridan v. Krause, 172 S.E. 508,
514-15 (Va. 1934). Alas, in their modem analytic foundations, not all property doctrines have been so
fortunate: compare the "rule of repugnancy," criticized right and left by scholars but recently reaffirmed
in the same old formalistic terms in Langille v. Norton, 628 A.2d 669, 671 (Me. 1993); see also, e.g.,
Sterner v. Nelson, 314 N.W.2d 263 (Neb. 1982). But see Fox v. Snow, 76 A.2d 877, 878-85 (N.J 1950)
(Vanderbilt, C.J., dissenting).
19. Whereas a spendthrift trust protects the debtor from a levy by her creditors, a security interest
in property protects a creditor from levies by other creditors. Other relevant analogies include the
problem of exempt property and the discharge of creditors' claims in bankruptcy.
20. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (4th ed. 1992).
21. But see 2A Scorr, supra note 2, § 152.3, at 111-12 (recognizing the policy distinction
between the two elements).
1995]
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ly---distinct.' A benefactor could seek to create a trust subject to
voluntary but not to involuntary alienation-allowing the beneficiary to
terminate it at will, while disabling creditors from wresting it out of her
hands. (Some, but not all, courts have given effect to such "quasi-
spendthrift" trusts.') Alternatively, albeit weirdly, a trust could be made
impervious to voluntary termination but left susceptible to creditors' claims.
Though few if any benefactors have sought to create trusts of this sort,24
some state lottery prizes pay off in the form of income streams that disable
only the recipient from accelerating her interest.' As a practical matter,
however, the latter construct seems pointless, given that the beneficiary
determined to consolidate her interest into a lump sum could do so by
borrowing against the income stream and then letting the creditor alienate
it for her.26 At any rate, these two aspects of alienability do raise different
policy concerns and so ought to be addressed independently. Finally, in
Part Il, I take up the refinement of spendthrift trust doctrine: assuming the
expediency of a general warrant to create spendthrift trusts, should
lawmakers nonetheless carve out exceptions to their effectiveness? As
22. Mapping out the full range of alternative states of inalienability, see Margaret J. Radin,
Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1852-59 (1987).
23. For modem doctrine, compare BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 2, § 222, at 397-98 with JEsSE
DUCEMINIER & STANLEY M. JOHANSON, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 640 (5th ed. 1995); see also
Marvin D. Homer, Limited or Quasi-Spendthrift Trusts, 105 TR. & EST. 951 (1966); William G.
Williams, Partial Spendthrift Trusts, 50 DicK. L. REv. 79 (1946); Bank of New England v. Strandlund,
529 N.E.2d 394 (Mass. 1988); DeMille v. Ramsey, 254 Cal. Rptr. 573, 578-79 (Ct. App. 1989); In re
Wax, 147 B.R. 205 (Bankr. D.S.D. 1992). By statute in two jurisdictions, all trusts are construed to be
quasi-spendthrift, see supra note 9. In a still more limited variation, the benefactor could restrict a
disabling restraint to certain types of creditors. In the few cases raising the issue, courts have upheld
such limitations. BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 2, § 222, at 398 & n.33.
24. Instruments of trust restraining voluntary alienation but falling to include restraints on
involuntary alienation have been construed to intend them by implication (and, often, vice versa).
BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 2, § 222, at 397-98 & n.32; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS, supra
note 2, § 152 cmts. d & e,
25. Lottery income streams have been held not to be voluntarily alienable. Lottery Winnings
Probably Not Assignable, 73 L TAX'N 115 (1990); Zapata v. Quinn, 707 F.2d 691 (2d Cir. 1983);
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 432.25 (West Supp. 1994); see also infra note 137. Whether lottery
winnings are nonetheless subject to involuntary alienation by creditors has varied under state law.
Compare In re Brown, 86 B.R. 944 (N.D. Ind. 1988) and In re Miller, 16 B.R. 790 (Bankr. D. Md.
1982) and In re Cook, 148 B.R. 273 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1992) with Meyers v. State Lottery Comm'n,
517 N.E.2d 1029 (Ohio Ct. App. 1986). But see In re Meyers, 139 B.R. 858 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1992)
(concerning a bankruptcy proceeding involving the same party).
26. Professor Bogert argues that even a restraint against involuntary alienation without a
concomitant restraint against voluntary alienation will be functionally toothless, because creditors can
bring pressure to bear upon the beneficiary to invade the trust in order to satisfy their claims. BOGERT
& BOGERT, supra note 2, § 222, at 398.
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noted, several exceptions exist under current law, and these need examina-
tion.
I. VOLUNTARY ALIENATION
Putting aside for the time being the matter of creditors' claims, let us
begin with the problem of voluntary alienation. Should benefactors have the
right to transfer property to a beneficiary encumbered with a restriction
against its acceleration and immediate consumption?
A. Economic Perspectives
We may notice preliminarily that, all other things being equal, giving
benefactors the broadest possible license to craft their estate plans serves
the public interest. Such license encourages benefactors both to produce
more wealth and to save more of the wealth they produce." This logic has
crystallized into a core principle of inheritance law. As probate judges
never tire of repeating, "the intention of the testator is ... the pole star by
which the court must steer."' Like every legal tenet, however, this
principle has limits.29 Giving free rein to the dead hand will, on occasion,
contradict other precepts of public policy, and lawmakers have not hesitated
to navigate around these social obstacles, wherever the pole star happens
to lie-whence, for example, the Rule Against Perpetuities, limiting the
longevity of benefactor-decreed future interests, no matter how fervently
intended. Lawmakers suffer the creation of future interests, but only when
they do not hurt too much.3" To cabin in testamentary intent to this
marginal extent is unlikely to affect significantly a benefactor's propensity
to accumulate wealth. By the same token, a ban on spendthrift trusts, if
found to be in the public interest, could surely be implemented without
27, RICHARD E. WAGNER, INHERITANCE AND THE STATE 5-22, 81-85 (1977); Hirsch & Wang,
supra note 3, at 7-9.
28. The phrase originated with Chancellor Kent. 4 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON APERICAN
LAW *537. E.g., Biles v. Martin, 259 So. 2d, 258, 262 (Ala. 1972); see UNIF. PROB. CODE § 1-
102(b)(2) & prefatory note to art. 2 (1990). But see Reed v. Roberts, 26 Ga. 294, 300-01 (1858).
29. As Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes discerned:
All rights tend to declare themselves absolute to their logical extreme. Yet all in fact are
limited by the neighborhood of principles of policy which are other than those on which the
particular right is founded, and which become strong enough to hold their own when a certain
point is reached.
Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 355 (1908).
30. On the public policy of future interests, see LEWIS M. SIMES, PUBLIC POLICY AND THE DEAD
HAND 32-82 (1955); Hirsch & Wang, supra note 3.
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compromising benefactor productivity." Still, effectuation of intent is our
default position, and it remains to be seen whether restrictions on a
beneficiary's right to alienate her interest in a trust conform or conflict with
public policy.
Of course there does exist a long-standing policy, cited as early as the
thirteenth century, against making property inalienable. The medieval
judges recognized intuitively that property had to be kept "in com-
merce."32 As a modem economist would elaborate, efficiency is achieved
when property flows into the hands of its most productive users, those who
are willing (and able) to pay the most for it, and clogs on alienability
hamper this efficient reallocation.33 The point (at least among exponents
of economic analysis) is elementary and suffices to justify the general ban
on restraints against alienation.34 But, as was also recognized early, this
policy has no bearing on a trust, which encumbers only the beneficial
interest in property.35 The corpus of the trust-including that of a
spendthrift trust-remains freely alienable by the trustee; it is a revolving
31. Costigan, supra note 18, at 472-73; see Rob Atkinson, Reforming Cy Pres Reform, 44
HASTINGS L.J. 1111, 1121-23 (1993) (suggesting that limitations on the benefactor's right to restrict the
use of charitable gifts would likewise have a de minimus effect on productivity). In states where
spendthrift trusts are ineffective, no one has noticed any dampening of the acquisitive instinct. But see
Mary Bartelme, Spendthrift Trusts, 50 ALB. L.J. 6, 10 (1894) (justifying spendthrift trusts as a spur to
property acquisition by benefactors); THOMAS L. SHAFFER & CAROL A. MOONEY, THE PLANNING AND
DRAFTING OF WILLS AND TRUSTS 111 (3d ed. 1991) (same).
32. 4 POWELL, supra note 8, § 42.25[3]; McGOvERN ET AL., supra note 8, § 13.2, at 505; 6
AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY §§ 26.1, 26.3 (A. James Casner ed., 1952). This phraseology was
repeated in America. E.g., Hutchinson v. Maxwell, 40 S.E. 655, 657 (Va. 1902).
33. See POSNER, supra note 20, § 18.6, at 512-13 (discussing the problem in connection with
bequests).
34. See, e.g., Loehr v. Kincannon, 834 S.W.2d 445 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF PROPERTY: DONATrVE TRANSFERS §§ 3.1, 4.1 (1983); 2A Scorr, supra note 2, § 152, at 85 & n.1,
§ 153, at 130-32 & n.1; 6 AmERiCAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 32, §§ 26.16-.18.
35. "But the reasons of the rule [barring restraints against alienation], which apply with such force
to fee-simple or other legal titles, do not apply in the case of the transfer of property in trust."
Jourolman v. Massengill, 5 S.W. 719,725,727-28 (Tenn. 1887); Broadway Nat'l Bank v. Adams, 133
Mass. 170, 171-72 (1882); Note, Spendthrift Trusts and Sound Policy, I1 CoLuM. L. REV. 765, 766
(1911); 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 32, § 26.5. Other commentators have associated
the policy against clogs on alienability with trusts as well as legal estates, however. GRAY, supra note
16, § 257; 5 GEORGE W. THOMPSON, COMMENTARmS ON THE MODERN LAW OF REAL PROPERTY
§ 2350, at 179 (John S. Grimes ed., 1979 & Supp. 1981); Bertel M. Sparks, Policy Considerations:
Alienability of the Beneficial Interest in a Trust in New York, 9 BUFF. L. REV. 30, 34-35 (1959-60); In
re Smyth, 49 R.L 27, 31 (1927); Hutchinson, 40 S.E. at 657. Professor Scott hedges: "The policy
against taking property out of commerce.., is not so clearly applicable to an equitable interest under
a trust." 2A ScoTr, supra note 2, § 152.3, at 112; Austin W. Scott, Control of Property by the Dead
(pt. 2), 65 U. PA. L. REv. 632, 643-44 (1917).
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investment fund that she can trade to whoever will pay top dollar.36 Only
the fungible income that the corpus yields is subject to alienability
restrictions. Thus, in creating an inalienable trust, the benefactor's dead
hand will not obstruct the invisible hand.
Indeed, in requiring beneficiaries to ration their consumption over time,
spendthrift trusts may hold out public benefits. Injunctions against
accelerated spending help to ensure that the individuals they constrain, if
unable to support themselves, will always be sustained privately. Several
early courts upholding spendthrift trusts invoked this rationale: without a
disabling restraint, the beneficiary might dissipate her inheritance and
become a "public charge."37 By keeping beneficiaries off the welfare rolls,
spendthrift trusts serve to hold down the cost of government.
This argument is undeniable but also of limited significance. Considered
from the standpoint of economic efficiency, the problem that here confronts
us is twofold. One aspect is the social cost externality created by rights to
public support. Like an insurance company, the welfare state cushions its
citizens against risk-in this instance the risk of poverty-but in the
process offers them a perverse incentive to expose themselves to inefficient
levels of risk, because they reap its benefits without bearing its full
costs.38 Just as insured motorists can drive with greater abandon, so too
36 Some commentators have argued that trusts hinder the market for resources by withholding
their assets from speculative ventures. The trustee, bound by a fiduciary duty to invest the corpus
prudently, will eschew venture capital. This argument was always tenuous, but it is even more so today
given changes in the modem prudent investor rule. See the discussion in Hirsch & Wang, supra note
3, at 30 & n. 116, 52 & n.208. At any rate, whatever market distortions arise in this connection are
associated equally with ordinary private trusts and spendthrift trusts. Disabling restraints in no wise
aggravate the distortion of the market for trust assets.
37. Canfield v. Security-First Nat'l Bank of L.A., 87 P.2d 830, 835 (Cal. 1939); Matthews v. Van
Cleve, 221 S.W. 34, 37 (Mo. 1920). For commentary making the same point, see Thomas W.
Christopher, A Comment on Spendthrift Trusts, 39 U. COLO. L. REv. 297, 298 (1967); Costigan, supra
note 18, at 483, 487, 489, 493; Manning, supra note 18, at 406. One commentator compared spendthrift
trusts to charitable trusts with respect to their public benefits and argued that spendthrift trusts be
accorded the same favored status on that account. Calvert C. Little, Note, Alternatives to Spendthrift
Trusts in Kentucky, 37 KY. L.J. 426, 433 (1949). See also MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND
FREEDOM 188-89 (1962) (discussing, by analogy, the same argument as a justification for compulsory
purchase of inalienable annuities).
38. Such observations are centuries old, originating in the political theory of poor relief. For a
further discussion of the social consequences of welfare protection, see Hirsch & Wang, supra note 3,
at 45 & n. 174-76. To some extent, of course, the cost of the welfare state is internalized in the form
of ex ante taxation of its citizens; but because that taxation is imposed on unwilling as well as willing
participants in the welfare-insurance scheme (including future generations who participate by virtue of
deficit spending), an externality does arise. Cf WILLIAM M. LANDES & RIcHARD A. PosNER, THE
ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW 13 (1987) (discussing the efficiency of liability insurance).
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can insured citizens spend (or speculate) in the confident assurance that
when in need, the state will provide. By obliging citizens to conserve
enough private resources to provide for themselves, disabling restraints
inhibit them from yielding to this "moral hazard."39 Barring that inhibi-
tion, society also faces a second inefficiency: namely, the need to construct
a costly state bureaucracy to minister to the impoverished. When disabling
restraints constrain citizens to save enough to put food onto their own
tables, that bureaucracy has less to do, and the social machinery of material
endowment can potentially become more cost-effective.
Yet, there are ways to avoid or at least to control these several costs
without the aid of spendthrift trusts. One way insurance companies
counteract perverse incentives is by placing limits on coverage, such as the
deductibility feature of automobile collision insurance. Complete (or
"perfect") insurance is not available in the marketplace. Similarly, in the
welfare state, coverage is limited to minimal support, not necessarily at the
level to which the recipient is accustomed or wishes to become accustomed.
39. Calabresi and Melamed make a related observation: external costs arise simply from the
displeasure persons experience when they see paupers, and inalienability rules that preclude individuals
from falling into pauperism can function to control those costs. Calabresi and Melamed label external
costs of this sort "momlisms." Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules,
and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1111-12 (1972). To the extent
that moralisms exist, they provide a justification for spendthrift trusts whether or not created within a
welfare state. Once the welfare state materializes, however, its benefits make erstwhile paupers less poor
and hence relieve offenses to the moral eye. Thus, the welfare state may be said to reflect momlisms
and its costs tend to substitute for theirs. See also JOHN S. MILL, ON LIBERTY 146.49 (Gertrude
Himmelfarb ed., Penguin Classics 1985) (1859) (asserting that behavior causing merely subjective injury
to the public is too imperceptible to be significant). For commentary justifying mandatory saving within
the Social Security system on the basis of the externality created by the remainder of the welfare state,
see Laurence J. Kotlikoff, On the Contribution ofEconomics to the Evaluation and Formation of Social
Insurance Policy, AM. ECON. REV. 184, 184-86 (May 1989) (separately paginated Papers and
Proceedings issue); Laurence J. Kotlikoff et al., The Adequacy of Savings, 72 AM. ECON. REV. 1056,
1057 (1982), reprinted in LAURENCE J. KoTuKOFF, WHAT DETERMINES SAVINos? 429 (1989); Walter
Dolde & James Tobin, Mandatory Retirement Saving and Capital Formation, in THE DETERMINANTS
OF NATIONAL SAVING AND WEALTH 56, 62 (Franco Modigliani & Richard Hemming eds., 1983).
Suggesting generally that externalities can provide an efficiency rationale for restraints on alienability,
see Richard A. Epstein, Why Restrain Alienation?, 85 COLum. L. REV. 970, 970-88 (1985); Susan Rose-
Ackerman, Inalienability and the Theory of Property Rights, 85 COLuM. L. REv. 931, 938-39 (1985)
(noting also that restraints on alienability in this connection are second-best solutions to external costs
that could, but for market failures, be avoided via bargaining or taxation). On the theory of moral
hazard, see Mark V. Pauly, The Economics of Moral Hazard: Comment, 58 AM. ECON. REV. 531
(1968); Kenneth J. Arrow, The Economics of Moral Hazard: Further Comment, 58 Am. ECON. REV.
537 (1968); see also James M. Buchanan, The Samaritan's Dilemma, in ALTRUISM, MORALITY, AND
ECONOMIC THEORY 71 (Edmund S. Phelps ed., 1975) (extending the concept to human interaction
generally).
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For heirs to substantial fortunes, and for prosperous beneficiaries generally,
the opening of access to welfare benefits that follows reckless investment
or riotous living is plainly a Pyrrhic victory. The moral hazard posed by the
prospect of state support in these instances will be slight.40
Of course, this assumes (as economists are wont to do) that beneficiaries
will act rationally; in reality, some may have an irrational tendency to
overspend (a point to which we shall return shortly41), and consumption
rationing for these individuals would again preserve the state from the
expense of supporting them. When the state does bear the cost, however,
the net expense of its bureaucracy can be reduced if it takes advantage of
economies of scale. When disabling restraints operate through the agency
of trusts, by comparison, administrative processes may be unnecessarily
duplicated. Either way, administrative expenses must be borne, and a
single, streamlined support bureaucracy could even prove more cost-
effective, per capita, than a host of miniscule trusts.42 But the larger
limitation that applies to the instant rationale for disabling restraints,
whether or not imposed on rational persons, and whether or not operating
in the shadow of relatively cost-effective bureaucracies, is that it suffices
only to justify inalienability of income up to the basic level of welfare
support.43 To the extent trusts provide income above that level, the
welfare state remains indifferent to beneficiaries' consumption decisions,
because those decisions will not render them public charges.'
40. Because the social safety net is set so low, it is likely to affect risk-taking only at the furthest
margin. See DOUGLAS G. BAIRD, THE ELEMENTS OF BANKRuPTCY 33-34 (rev. ed. 1993) (arguing that
the right to a discharge in bankruptcy presents only a minimal moral hazard because "individuals have
so much to lose when they go broke"). But see RICHARD E. WAGNER, To PROMOTE THE GENERAL
WELFARE 170-76, 196-98 (1989) (arguing that the welfare state is poorly equipped to combat moral
hazard because it cannot, like a private organization, act "strategically" to cancel or threaten to cancel
the benefits of those who act in financially reckless ways).
41. See infra notes 58-111 and accompanying text.
42. The matter has yet to be studied empirically. Discussing generally economies of scale in the
welfare state, see ROBERT E. GOODIN, REASONS FOR WELFARE 239-41 (1988). One diseconomy of the
scale of the welfare state is that it is more susceptible to "agency costs" (i.e., shirking or stealing by
the third-party agent) than a smaller entity, such as a trust. In the case of a trust, beneficiaries have an
incentive to monitor the trustee, thereby reducing agency costs. In the case of a government, no one
citizen has a sufficient incentive to undertake the cost of monitoring, and so the citizenry may succumb
collectively to "rational apathy." Hirsch & Wang, supra note 3, at 29 & n.l 10; Jonathan R. Macey,
Private Trusts for the Provision of Private Goods, 37 EMORY L.J. 295, 315-21 (1988).
43. Some state statutes in fact limit the effectiveness of spendthrift trusts to approximately this
level. See supra note 10.
44. See Thomas H. Jackson, The Fresh-Start Policy in Bankruptcy Law, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1393,
1401-04 (1985), reprinted with minor modifications in THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMnTS
OF BANKRUPTCY LAW ch. 10 (1986) (discussing by analogy the utility of the discharge in bankruptcy
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A less conspicuous (but equally equivocal) public benefit of a restraint
against voluntary alienation, covering any amount of property, is simply
that it provides a means of forced saving for the economy. Just as future
interests in property prescribe long-term, intergenerational conservation of
wealth,45 a spendthrift trust enforces a regimen of saving over the short
term, for the lifetime of the beneficiary (or whatever period of years the
benefactor selects). An economic by-product of this restriction is that it
frees up more investment capital and hence tends to promote economic
growth. Whether that will serve the interests of the economy, however,
remains unclear. In the related context of government policies to stimulate
investment, economists have debated the virtues of managed growth. While
some favor incentives to promote economic expansion, others respond that
such policies can lead to overinvestment and that individual decisions to
conserve or spend, made in a neutral tax environment, will lead to optimal
levels of capital formation. 6 The same competing analyses would
presumably apply a fortiori to disabling restraints which compel, rather than
merely cultivate, private saving.
Critics of the spendthrift trust have not questioned the social utility of
external prods to economic investment. On the contrary, they have accused
spendthrift trusts of depressing investment. Because each beneficiary must
settle for dollops of income instead of a lump sum, critics have argued,
each has less opportunity to invest her inheritance in a productive
to reduce reliance on the welfare state); William T. Vukowich, Debtors' Exemption Rights Under the
Bankruptcy Reform Act, 58 N.C. L. REV. 769, 770-71 (1980) [hereinafter Vukowich, Exemption Rights
in Bankruptcy] (discussing by analogy the utility of exemption law to reduce reliance on the welfare
state); William T. Vukowich, Debtors' Exemption Rights, 62 GEO. L.J. 779, 786, 876-78 (1974)
[hereinafter Vukowich, Debtors' Exemption Rights] (same).
45. Hirsch & Wang, supra note 3, at 37-38.
46. The literature on this subject is vast. Taking the first view, see, for example, IRA C.
MAGAZiNER & ROBERT B. REICH, MINDING AMERICA'S BUSINESS 319-42 (1982); Martin S. Feldstein,
National Saving in the United States, in CAPITAL FOR PRODUCTIVITY AND JOBS 124 (American
Assembly ed., 1977). Taking the second view, see, for example, W. ALLEN WALLIS, AN
OVERGOVERNED SocIETY 175-96, 218-30 (1976); POSNER, supra note 20, §§ 17.6, 18.1. Questioning
more fundamentally the social utility of economic growth, see E.J. MISHAN, THE ECONOMIC GROWTH
DEBATE: AN ASSESSMENT (1977). Some of the principal threads in the debate are surveyed briefly in
DAVID COLANDER, MACROECONOMICS: THEORY AND POLICY 512-20 (1986). See generally SAVINoS
AND CAPITAL FORMATION: THE POLICY OPTIONS (F. Gerard Adams & Susan M. Wachter eds., 1986);
THE ECONOMICS OF SAVING (James H. Gapinski ed., 1993). For an early discussion of the impact of
private saving on economic growth, see 1 ADAM SMITH, AN ENQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES
OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 358-76 (Edwin Cannon ed., Univ. of Chicago Press 1976) (1776).
[VOL. 73:1
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol73/iss1/1
SPENDTHRIFT TRUSTS AND PUBLIC POLICY
enterprise."7 Professor Frederick Stimson went so far as to blame
spendthrift trusts for the commercial decline of Massachusetts!48 Mere
common sense suggests the whimsy of such assertions: the spendthrift trust,
sheltering a tiny fraction of the nation's capital, must stand as one of
history's unlikeliest scapegoats for economic recession. But even in its
more modest form, the argument fails to withstand analysis. Of course, it
is true that the beneficiaries of spendthrift trusts will have less capital at
their disposal to consume or invest as they see fit. But the point is that the
trustees of those trusts will have that much more capital at their disposal,
and under fiduciary law all of it will be invested. Like everyone else,
would-be entrepreneurs who are trust beneficiaries can still seek to borrow
venture capital. In the aggregate, more capital should exist, available at
lower interest rates.
Still, these macroeconomic consequences of spendthrift provisions,
widely diffused, are probably of small practical consequence. More salient
may be the microeconomic (or picoeconomic) consequences for the
beneficiaries themselves. Let us turn, then, to the matter of whether
spendthrift trusts help or harm individual beneficiaries.
For a neoclassical economist, the answer seems clear: beneficiaries enjoy
the greatest welfare when they decide for themselves how much to
consume and how much to save. John Stuart Mill's utilitarian theory of
autonomy 49-which in the modem economic literature goes by the name
of consumer sovereigntyQ--holds that the individual knows better than
others what will make her happy and always acts rationally to advance her
own self-interest." In the context of spending, saving, and borrowing
47. E.g., Edward C. Lukens, Trust Estates and Character, 18 A.B.A. J. 137, 138-39 (1932); Peter
J Wiedenbeck, Missouri's Repeal of the Claflin Doctrine-New View of the Policy Against
Perpetuities?, 50 MO. L. REV. 805, 829 (1985).
48. On Stimson's assertion (which was chronologically faulty), see Costigan, supra note 18, at
489-91; Friedman, supra note 7, at 575-76. Others have parroted Stimson's charge, blaming spendthrift
trusts for ruining the economies of various other states in and around New England. GRISWOLD, supra
note 1, § 555, at 635-37 & n.20; 2A ScoTrr, supra note 2, § 152, at 91.
49. MILL, supra note 39, at 68-69, 141-43 passim. Utilitarianism is not, of course, the only
perspective from which to view the ideal of autonomy, but it is the one taken by economists. For other
perspectives, see infra note 169.
50. The principle was explored at some length in the essay that coined the phrase. W.H. HtTrr,
ECONOMISTS AND THE PUBLIC 257-72 (1936). One skeptical economist calls it "[t]he classical theory
of omniscient rationality." Herbert A. Simon, Rational Decision Making in Business Organizations, 69
Am. ECON. REv. 493, 496 (1979), reprinted in 2 HERBERT A. SIMON, MODELS OF BOUNDED
RATIONALITY 474 (1982).
51. This behavioral assumption has also insinuated itself into law and economics. E.g., POSNER,
supra note 20, § 1.1, at 3-4.
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decisions, human persons (or "consumer units," in the warm and friendly
language of economics) follow what has come to be called a "consumption
function," whereby they weigh the benefits of present against future
spending at any given level of income.52 Those who favor future con-
sumption will save more; those who prefer present consumption will save
less or even borrow against future earnings." A spendthrift trust ties the
beneficiary to a suboptimal consumption function. It may be that she is
able to compensate for the restriction by adjusting the use of her other,
unencumbered assets: she could, for example, spend a larger fraction of her
earned income or liquid capital to make up for the saving compelled by a
spendthrift trust. But if the trust is sufficiently large relative to her other
resources, she will not be able fully to offset its misplaced discipline.54
The benefactor's effort paternalistically to do the beneficiary good
(assuming that is her intention)5 only does her harm, by distorting her
52. The concept (though not the term) was introduced to the field of economics by Lord Keynes.
JOHN M. KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT, INTEREST AND MONEY 96-97 (Harbinger
1964) (c. 1936). Keynes discussed the psychology of saving in id. at 107-08.
53. In the neoclassical model, debt functions to adjust and smooth expenditures over time in
anticipation of uneven flows of resources. IRVING FISHER, THE THEORY OF INTEREST AS DIETEMINED
BY IMPATmENCE TO SPEND INCOME AND OPPORTUNITY TO INVEST IT 104-12 (n.d.) (c. 1930); William
C. Dunkelberg & Frank P. Stafford, Debt in the Consumer Portfolio: Evidence from a Panel Study, 61
AM. ECON. REV. 598, 599 (1971).
54. Given a perfect capital market, persons with unencumbered present assets insufficient to
compensate for a disabling restraint could still do so by borrowing funds and then paying off those
loans out of the future income provided by a spendthrift trust. In practice, however, market
imperfections will often hinder borrowing against future income streams. See Kotlikoffet al., supra note
39, at 1057-58 (discussing citizens' abilities to circumvent mandatory saving under the Social Security
system); Dolde & Tobin, supra note 39, at 62-63 (same).
55. Conceivably, a benefactor might impose a disabling restraint on beneficiaries simply because
she herself attaches an abstract moral value to thrift, or because she would be personally gratified by
the thrifty conduct of beneficiaries with whom she identifies or by the thrifty use of property with which
she identifies. Her utility, in other words, might derive from egoistic rather than altruistic considerations.
See GARY S. BECKER, A TREATISE ON THE FAMILY 298 (rev. ed. 1991) (discussing gifts used to control
conduct and consumption generally); Hirsch & Wang, supra note 3, at 19 (same); Robert A. Pollak,
Tied Transfers and Paternalistic Preferences, AM. ECoN. REv. 240, 242 (May 1988) (separately
paginated Papers and Proceedings issue) (same); David R. Unruh, Death and Personal History:
Strategies of Identity Preservation, 30 Soc. PROBS. 340, 344-45 (1983) (discussing the incidental use
of estate plans to highlight and preserve the benefactor's own identity). Psychology suggests still
another possible egoistic motive for a disabling restraint-it represents an exercise of control by the
benefactor, and some benefactors may find satisfaction in exercising control over beneficiaries or
properties for its own sake. MYLES I. FRIEDMAN & GEORGE H. LACKEY, JR., THE PSYCHOLOGY OF
HUMAN CONTROL 3-19 (1991). For an early discussion in connection with dead hand control, see
ARTHuR HOBHOUSE, THE DEAD HAND 183 (London, Chatto & Windus 1880) (noting that dead hand
control "is very commonly exercised to its fullest extent, merely because it exists, and without the
slightest reason beyond the pleasure of exercising power").
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rational economic decisions. 6 At that point, we find ourselves in the
unenviable position of having to measure the utility gained by the
benefactor from imposing a disabling restraint against the utility lost by the
beneficiary from bearing the same restraint-optimality being achieved at
the (very, very) hypothetical point at which the marginal utility to the
benefactor of extending the restraint equals the marginal utility to the
beneficiary of terminating it. 7
B. The Psychology of Saving
That would seem to be the neoclassical perspective on all of this. It is
not, of course, the end of the story. Economists aside,5" human persons
are not necessarily rational beings-for many folk, economic nonsense
56. Thus, by analogy, Mill opposed the imposition of usury laws upon an individual borrower who
"must be presumed to be a sufficient guardian of his pecuniary interests." 2 JOHN S. MILL, PRINCIPLES
OF POLITICAL ECONOMY bk. 5, ch. 10, § 2, at 542 (5th ed. Appleton 1897) (1848). For a similar
discussion, see Jeremy Bentham, Defence of Usury, in 3 THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 1, 5, 8
(John Bowring ed., 1962) (1787). Similarly, Adam Smith, who (contrary to popular mythology)
harbored no belief in the perfect rationality of mankind, nonetheless preferred to leave saving and
spending decisions to individuals and opposed state sumptuary laws: "It is the highest impertinence and
presumption, therefore, in kings and ministers, to pretend to watch over the ceconomy of private people,
and to restrain their expence, either by sumptuary laws, or by prohibiting the importation of foreign
luxuries. They are themselves always, and without any exception, the greatest spendthrifts in the society.
Let them look well after their own expence, and they may safely trust private people with theirs. If their
own extravagance does not ruin the state, that of their subjects never will." 1 SMITH, supra note 46, at
367 (plus qa change!). Smith developed his theory of human psychology in an earlier essay, The Theory
of Moral Sentiments, discussed in Ronald H. Coase, Adam Smith's View of Man, 19 J.L. & ECON. 529
(1976).
Across the Atlantic, Thoreau put the matter with his usual aplomb: "If I knew for a certainty that
a man was coming to my house with the conscious design of doing me good, I should run for my life."
HENRY D. THOREAU, WALDEN OR, LIFE IN THE WOODS 118 (Houghton Mifflin 1906) (1854).
57. A collaborator and I have discussed this problem elsewhere in greater detail, in connection
with restrictions on the use of bequeathed property generally. Hirsch & Wang, supra note 3, at 20-27.
For an early discussion, urging broad legal limits on dead hand control on the ground "that people are
the best judges of their own concerns," see HoBHOUSE, supra note 55, at 184-85.
58. "The problem seems to be that while economists have gotten increasingly sophisticated and
clever, consumers have remained decidedly human.... [A] couple years ago I explained the difference
between my models and Robert Barro's by saying that he assumes the agents in his model are as smart
as he is, while I portray people as being as dumb as I am. Barro agreed with this assessment." Richard
H. Thaler, Anomalies: Saving, Fungibility, and Mental Accounts, J. ECON. PERSP., Winter 1990, at 193,
203, reprinted in RICHARD H. THA.ER, THE WINNER's CURSE 107 (1992); see also Ralph Lattimore,
Correspondence: Are Economists Different?, J. ECON. PERSP., Spring 1992, at 199 (who, unlike
Professor Thaler, insists that he is serious). But see George Stigler. "Economists possess their fall share
of the common ability to invent and commit error .... Perhaps their most common error is to believe
other economists." Quoted in Steven N.S. Cheung, The Fable of the Bees: An Economic Investigation,
16 J.L. & ECON. 11, 11 (1973).
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often makes psychological sense. In this century, H.L.A. Hart criticized
Mill's vision of human rationality as "fantastic," and he remarked "a
general decline in the belief that individuals know their own interests
best,"59 but this suggestion is ahistorical. While the modem cognitive
psychologists have demonstrated and elaborated human irrationality more
rigorously than their predecessors, the fallibility of human reason is an
ancient theme, tracing back to the early Christian textsf and still earlier
to the Greeks."' John Calvin was hardly more optimistic than Amos
59. H.L.A. HART, LAW, LIBERTY AND MORALrIY 32-33 (1963). Even some economists have
begun to see the light. E.g., TIBOR SCrrOvsKY, THE JOYLESS ECONOMY (rev. ed. 1992); HERBERT
SIMON, REASON IN HuMAN AFFAIRS (1983); 2 SIMON, supra note 50, at 203-494; RICHARD H. THALER,
QuASI RATIONAL ECONOMICS (1991); Kenneth J. Arrow, RiskPerception in Psychology and Economics,
20 ECON. INQUIRY 1 (1982); Aniartya Sen, Behavior and the Concept of Preference, 40 EcONOMICA
241 (1973), reprinted in RATIONAL CHOICE 60 (Jon Elster ed., 1986) [hereinafter RATIONAL CHOICE];
Herbert A. Simon, Rationality in Psychology andEconomics, 59 J. Bus. S209 (1986). But others remain
unrepentant, e.g., Gary S. Becker, Nobel Lecture: The Economic Way of Looking at Behavior, 101 J.
POL. ECON. 385, 402 (1993) ("[N]o approach of comparable generality has yet been developed that
offers serious competition to rational choice theory.... My work may have sometimes assumed too
much rationality, but I believe it has been an antidote to the extensive research that does not credit
people with enough rationality."), and the overall climate of opinion within the discipline is clear: as
one astute critic has observed, "the economist has a moment of triumph each time he succeeds in
showing up the rational logic of some behavior previously believed to be irrational." JON ELSTER,
ULYSSES AND THE SIRENS: STUDmS IN RATIONALITY AND IRRATIONALITY 142 (rev. ed. 1984); see also
id. at 153-56; DAVID D. FRIEDMAN, PRICE THEORY 495 (1986) ("As an economist, I would like to find
an economic explanation even for 'anti-economic' behavior.'). See generally RATIONAL CHOICE: THE
CONTRAST BETWEEN ECONOMICS AND PSYCHOLOGY (Robin M. Hogarth & Melvin W. Reder, eds.,
1986). Yet, recognition of psychological tendencies to irrationality should not undermine economics as
a methodology. Rather, economists need to vary their assumptions (an exercise Kenneth E. Boulding
called "non-Euclidian economics'). KENNETH E. BOULDING, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 13-14 (rev. ed.
1948). Criticizing the assumption of rationality in the allied field of law and economics, see Robert C.
Ellickson, Bringing Culture and Human Frailty to Rational Actors: A Critique of Classical Law and
Economics, 65 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 23 (1989); Jeffrey L. Harrison, Egoism, Altruism, and Market
Illusions: The Limits of Law and Economics, 33 UCLA L. REv. 1309 (1986); Paul J. Heald & James
E. Heald, Mindlessness and Law, 77 VA. L. REv. 1127 (1991); Bailey Kuklin, The Gaps Between the
Fingers of the Invisible Hand, 58 BROOK. L. REv. 835 (1992); Arthur A. Leff, Economic Analysis of
Law: Some Realism About Nominalism, 60 VA. L. REV. 451 (1974); Thomas S. Ulen, Cognitive
Imperfections and the Economic Analysis of Law, 12 HAMLINE L. REV. 385 (1989).
60. The Christian vision of human reason corrupted by original sin appeared in scripture: "For that
which I am doing, I do not understand, for I am not practicing what I would like to do, but I am doing
the very thing I hate .... For the good that I wish, I do not do; but I practice the very evil that I do
not wish." Romans 7:14-25. Among the early Christian theologians, see especially ST. AUGUSTINE, THE
CITY OF GOD 443-45 (Marcus Dods, trans., The Modem Library 1950) (426 A.D.); ST. AUOUSTINE,
FAITH, HOPE, AND CHARrrY 33-36, 81-82, 109-11 (Louis A. Arand trans., Newman Press 1947) (420-23
A.D.)
61. ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS bk. I, ch. 13, at 30-32, bk. 3, chs. 10-12, bk. 6, ch. 5
(Martin Ostwald trans., The Bobbs-Merrill Co., Inc. 1962) (c. 334-23 B.C.); ARISTOTLE, ON THE SOUL
bk. 3, ch. 3, at 161-62, bk. 3, ch. 9, at 183 (W.S. Hert trans., Harvard Univ. Press 1936) (c. 334-23
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Tversky about the mental powers of Adam's corrupt seed.62 And no
sooner had Mill posited his utilitarian theory of autonomy than other
Utilitarians rushed forward to attack it.63 If, in fact, persons do not
invariably make rational judgments, then they may fail to maximize their
overall welfare.' When they decide wrongly' (or even when they decide
rightly, given their preferences of the moment, but fail to take evolving
preferences into account6), they experience subsequent regret. By
B.C)
62. "[M]an was stripped and deprived of all wisdom .... As a consequence, nothing was left to
him save ignorance .... For what could men's mind produce but all carnal and fatuous things which
truly resemble their authors?" JOHN CALVIN, INSTITUTES OF THE CHRISTIAN RELIGION 16, 203 (Ford
L Battles trans., William B. Eerdman's Pub. Co. rev. ed., 1986) (1536); cf. THOMAS HOBBES,
LEVIATHAN 110-18 (C.B. Macpherson ed., Penguin Books 1981) (1651) (asserting the fallibility of
human reason from a secular perspective). Calvin's Puritan disciples acknowledged the power of human
reason (especially when sanctified by saving grace), but they nonetheless distrusted it, no less than
Augustine and Calvin, as tarnished by original sin. "'Sin,' as Increase Mather put it, 'makes the Rational
Soul to become a slave to the Sensual Soul in men."' PERRY MILLER, THE NEW ENGLAND MIND: FROM
COLONY To PROVINCE 428 (1953). On reason in Puritan theology, see id. at 417-36. Lift away the
cosmological embellishments, and early Christian visions of human irrationality bear a resemblance to
modem cognitive theories of myopia, discussed infra notes 76-77 and accompanying text.
63. E.g., JAMES F. STEPHEN, LIBERTY, EQUALITY, FRATERNITY 67-81 (R.J. White ed., Cambridge
Umv. Press 1967) (1873). Some utilitarians distinguished between "sensible" and "insensible" beings:
whereas ordinary persons were able to calculate accurately their self-interest, adverse environmental
stimuli could impair that ability, leading "disordered" persons into senseless behavior. Jeremy Bentham
distinguished criminals from honest citizens on this basis. ADAM J. HIRSCH, THE RISE OF THE
PENITENTIARY 21-22 (1992). Mill himself acknowledged the potential for human irrationality, and he
limited his theory of autonomy to "human beings in the maturity of their faculties," thereby excluding,
in Mill's view, children, demented persons, and the entire populations of "backward states." MILL,
supra note 39, at 69, 147-49, 166; see also infra note 77.
64. How this could have come to pass in an evolutionary sense has engaged the attention of
behavioralists. Some suggest that irrational thought processes such as heuristics, see text accompanying
note 88 infra, assist the organism overall, though not in every circumstance. E.g., Lee Ross & Craig
A Anderson, Shortcomings in the Attribution Process: On the Origins and Maintenance of Erroneous
Social Assessments, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 129, 135 (Daniel
Kahneman et al. eds., 1982)[hereinafter JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY]; J. RICHARD EISER, SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY 226-27 (1986). Others question the sufficiency of natural selection to weed out cognitive
biases that do not in general threaten the organism's survival. E.g., Thomas Russell & Richard Thaler,
The Relevance of Quasi Rationality in Competitive Markets, 75 AM. ECON. REV. 1071, 1074 (1985),
reprinted in THALER, supra note 59, at 239.
65. Here one should distinguish wrong decisions produced by the irrational calculus of the
decisionmaker from losing gambles that reflected a rational assessment of the risk and potential return
to the decisionmaker. The latter sort of speculation can lead to disappointment at the outcome as
opposed to the process whereby the decision was taken. So long as that process was rational, there is
no reason for a paternalist to preempt it. For a discussion of this distinction, see Anthony T. Kronman,
Paternalism and the Law of Contracts, 92 YALE L.. 763, 780-82 (1983).
66. For an early recognition, see HOBBES, supra note 62, at 216. The classic modem example, with
which many of us can relate personally, is teenage orthodontic braces.
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overthrowing consumer sovereignty, the paternalist spares the individual
subsequent regret and ensures her happiness over time, leaving both parties
with greater utility.' Thus can paternalism and utilitarianism prove
conceptually complementary68 (even if the argument is a bit too pat).69
In the present context, the question becomes whether individuals are
67. For a related discussion, see Hirsch & Wang, supra note 3, at 23-24.
68. For discussions of this proposition, see, for example, ROBERT E. GOODIN, POLITICAL THEORY
AND PUBLIC POLICY 39-56 (1982); JOHN KLEINiG, PATERNALISM 45-48 (1983); DONALD VANDEVEER,
PATERNALISTIC INTERVENTION 66-70, 95-163 (1986); ELSTER, supra note 59, at 65-85; Jackson, supra
note 44, at 1405-07; Derek Parfit, Later Selves and Moral Principles, in PHILOSOPHY AND PERSONAL
RELATIONS 137 (Alan Montefiore ed., 1973). Notions of imperfect rationality have been applied to
subvert more than just consumer sovereignty; many political theorists over the centuries have
condemned popular sovereignty on the same basis. Thus did the Puritans, whose views of human
irrationality were remarked supra note 62, justify a political system under which the principal leaders
(known as "magistrates") did not represent, and were not responsible to, the people (although they were
elected by them). EDMUND S. MORGAN, THE PUurTAN DILEMMA 156-57 (1958). Other political theorists
have pointed to human irrationality on occasion to justify monarchy, dictatorship of the proletariat-and
chattel slavery. V.L LENIN, STATE AND REVOLUTION 12-24 (2d ed. International Publishers 1932)
(1918); MILL, supra note 39, at 69; BENEDICTUS DE SPINozA, ON FREEDOM OF THOUGHT: SELECTIONS
FROM TRACTATuS THEOLoGICO-POLIICUS AND TRACTATUS POLITICUS 39-55 (T.E. Jessop ed. & trans.,
Mario Casalini Ltd. 1962) (1670 & 1677); LARRY E. TISe, PROSLAVERY: A HISTORY OF THE DEFENSE
OF SLAVERY IN AMERICA 1701-1840, at 29, 32, 61 (1987). The same theme can be found even today
within the writings of civic republican theorists to justify the dismissal of private political preferences.
Steven G. Gey, The Unfortunate Revival of Civic Republicanism, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 801, 822-33
(1993); Cass R. Sunstein, Preferences and Politics, 20 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 3 (1991).
69. Too pat, I say, for two reasons: (1) a priori, the paternalist can only guess at her object's
subsequent sentiments; and (2) the very act of paternalizing may produce those subsequent sentiments.
Raising these difficulties, see JOHN ELTER, SOUR GRAPES: STUDIES IN THE SUBVERSION OF
RATIONALITY 22-23, 109-40 (1983); KLEINIG, supra note 68, at 47, 204; VANDEVEER, supra note 68,
at 69-70; Pollak, supra note 55, at 242; Danny Scoccia, Paternalism and Respect for Autonomy, 100
ETHICS 318 (1990); see also Donald H. Regan, Justifications for Paternalism, in THE LIMITS OF LAW:
NOMOS XV 189, 189-92 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1974) (arguing that freedom
of choice is in itself a value that competes with utility). Whereas conventional analysis assumes that
personal preferences are exogenous, the paternalist may in fact inculcate values and preferences (which
is, indeed, an ordinary and obvious aspect of being a parent). To the extent, then, that preferences are
malleable and endogenous within a decisionmaking system, the paternalist's anticipation of her object's
subsequent gratitude may become a self-fulfilling prophecy. From a utilitarian standpoint, that may not
matter- gratitude is gratitude (although the object might have been equally happy otherwise). Philosophi-
cally, however, it raises a question as to the moral legitimacy of coercive value-indoctrination. While
this is not the place to resolve this issue, an obvious distinction might be drawn between the
indoctrination of a child (upon whose tabula rasa something must be written) and an adult (whose
tabula scripta must be erased before it can be revised), although there still remains the troublesome gray
area of adolescence (where coercive paternalism bridges the "generation gap"). All of these issues may
be placed in sharp relief by the problem of religious indoctrination and the case of cult members, who
are often happy and grateful following coercive "deprogramming" but who would also have been happy
and grateful to have been left alone. For discussions, see KLEmnao, supra note 68, at 213-17; JOHN
RAwLs, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 249-50 (1971).
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prone to irrationality when they come to make saving, borrowing, and
consumption decisions." If so, we have a ready justification for the
spendthrift trust. And, as common experience would indicate, the answer
appears to be: some are, and others are not. In an influential article on the
bankruptcy discharge, then-Professor, later-Dean, now-University President
Thomas H. Jackson sifted through the literature of cognitive psychology in
an effort to demonstrate that persons tend systematically to overspend and
overborrow. On that basis, he justified a universal, nonwaivable (hence
paternalistic) right to a discharge. 1 Were Jackson correct, an argument
could be made for attaching a disabling restraint to all trusts as a rule of
construction, or even as a rule of law.72 But a second look at the cognitive
literature, which has multiplied in the decade since Jackson wrote,73
70. Also potentially relevant is the beneficiary's propensity to diminish her resources by making
donative transfers to others. Some recent scholars have argued that financial generosity, and altruism
generally, may be "rational" (and, by the same token, pure selfishness or "egoism" irrational), in the
sense that it will lead others to respond in cooperative ways that in toto increase the altruist's own,
narrowly defined welfare. Gary S. Becker, Altruism, Egoism, and Genetic Fitness: Economics and
Sociobiology, 14 J. EcoN. Ln'ERATuRE 817 (1976), reprinted in GARY S. BECKER, THE ECONOMIC
APPROACH TO HuMAN BEHAvIOR 282 (1976); Amartya K. Sen, Rational Fools: A Critique of the
Behavioral Foundations of Economic Theory, 6 PHIL. & PUn. AFF. 317 (1977), reprinted in BEYOND
SE-INTERT 25 (Jane J. Mansbridge ed., 1990). But see ELSTER, supra note 59, at 141-46. See
generally The Economics of Altruism, AM. ECON. REv. 143 (May 1993) (collection of three papers
within separately paginated Papers and Proceedings issue). At the same time, it would seem possible
for one to be too generous--to love others too much-for one's "own" good. Is "overgenerosity," as
we might call altruistic behavior that leaves the individual with a net loss in her welfare, narrowly
defined, despite the cooperation that it fosters, a fit object for paternalistic restraint? Not necessarily:
overgenerosity may still increase the altruist's welfare, broadly defined. Because she takes pleasure in
assisting the objects of her concern (the phenomenon of "interdependent utilities," as the economists
say), or simply in giving per se, or because she feels bound by a moral duty to give, the altruist may
never regret her acts of self-sacrifice. Arguendo, there is no paternalistic justification for restraining
overgenerosity where it causes no pain. The Mother Teresas of the world, who give until it hurts
(including large sums derived from the production of explosives in Scandinavia), in truth endure a sweet
agony. (On Mother Teresa herself, see The Nobel Prizes: "I Accept in the Name of the Poor," Tm,
Oct. 29, 1979, at 87.) Nevertheless, as discussed in the pages following, persons may come to regret
consumption decisions generally, and to the extent that gift-giving is simply an alternative form of
pleasure-generating consumption, the two problems are symmetrical.
71. Jackson, supra note 44, at 1404-18.
72. In some jurisdictions, such rules have prevailed: all trusts have been construed to include, or
have been deemed to include as a matter of law, a disabling restraint. See supra note 9.
73. For surveys of the historical evolution and modern literature of psychological theories of
saving and consumption, see Gery M. van Veldhoven & A.G. Groenland, Exploring Saving Behaviour:
A Framework and a Research Agenda, 14 J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 507 (1993); Karl-Erik Wdrneryd, On the
Psychology of Saving: An Essay on Economic Behavior, 10 J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 515 (1989). For recent
surveys of the psychology of decisionmaking generally, see PAUL ANAND, FOUNDATIONS OF RATIONAL
CHOICE UNDER RISK (1993); JONATHAN BARON, THINKING AND DECIDING (2d ed. 1994); EISER, supra
note 64; RoBIN M. HOOARTH, JUDoEmENT AND CHOICE (2d ed. 1987); STEPHEN E.G. LEA ET AL., THE
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suggests that he overstated his case. There are, in fact, psychological
crosscurrents at work.74
Without plumbing all of the literature's complexities, let us touch on a
few points. Consider the problem of time preference. Perfectly rational
persons will in general save for the future. They thereby furnish resources
to their later selves at a time when those later selves are unable fully to
satisfy their own financial needs.' Psychological evidence suggests,
however, that many persons are "myopic" in outlook: left to their own
devices, they attend insufficiently to their long-term welfare, either because
they selfishly (if that is the right word76) focus on present gratification, or
INDIVIDUAL IN THE ECONOMY (1987); ScoTr PLous, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUDGMENT AND DECISION
MAKING (1993). For a recent philosophical discussion, see ROBERT NOZICK, THE NATURE OF
RATIONALITY (1993).
74. Which is not, of course, to say that the economists were right all along. Psychological biases
may or may not operate systematically; when they do not, they still may fail to neutralize each other,
resulting in less pronounced tendencies to a particular behavior or in a statistical variance of observed
behaviors. Debating other arguments for the behavioral insignificance of cognitive biases, compare
Vernon L. Smith, Rational Choice: The Contrast Between Economics and Psychology, 99 J. POL. ECON.
877 (1991) (asserting a dichotomy between irrational behavior in the laboratory and rational behavior
in society stemming from learning and market forces) with Richard H. Thaler, The Psychology and
Economics Conference Handbook: Comments on Simon, on Einhorn and Hogarth, and on Tversky and
Kahneman, 59 J. Bus. S279 (1986) (challenging this assertion), reprinted in THALER, supra note 59,
at 189; Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Rational Choice and the Framing of Decisions, 59 J. Bus.
S251, S275 (1986), reprinted in THE LIMITS OF RATIONALITY 60 (Karen S. Cook & Margaret Levi eds.,
1990) (same).
75. The classical theory of saving as an aspect of the life cycle of the household is developed in
Franco Modigliani & Richard Brumberg, Utility Analysis and the Consumption Function: An
Interpretation of Cross-Section Data, in POST-KEYNESIAN ECONOMICS 388 (Kenneth K. Kurihara cd.,
1955). The extent to which bequest motives also stimulate saving remains controversial. For references
to the principal discussions, see Hirsch & Wang, supra note 3, at 9 n.28, and George Loewenstein, The
Fall and Rise of Psychological Explanations in the Economics of Intertemporal Choice, in CHOICE
OVER TIE 3, 23 (George Loewenstein & Jon Elster eds., 1992). For further discussions, see
KOTLiKOFF, supra note 39, at 37-162; Andrew B. Abel, Precautionary Saving and Accidental Bequests,
75 AM. ECON. REV. 777 (1985); Joseph J. Cordes, Socio-Economic Perspectives on Household Saving
Behavior, 19 J. BEHAV. ECON. 273 (1990); Benjamin M. Friedman & Mark J. Warshawsky, The Cost
ofAnnuities: Implicationsfor SavingBehavior and Bequests, 105 Q.J. ECON. 135 (1990); Benjamin M.
Friedman & Mark Warshawsky, Annuity Prices and Saving Behavior in the United States, in PENSIONS
IN THE U.S. ECONOMY 53 (Zvi Bodie et al. eds., 1988) [hereinafter PENSIONS]; Paul L. Menchik &
Martin David, Income Distribution, Lifetime Savings, and Bequests, 73 AM. ECON. REV. 672 (1983);
Gian S. Sahota, Saving and Distribution, in THE ECONOMICS OF SAVING, supra note 46, at 193.
76. One pair of theorists has felicitously dubbed the phenomenon of preference of the present self
over the later self an "internality." CHOICE OVER TIME, supra note 75, at xx. Addressing the larger
philosophical question of whether it is meaningful to speak of a person at different times as having
different identities, see DEREK PARFIT, REASONS AND PERSONS 197-347 (1984); Jackson, supra note
44, at 1406-07, and the sources cited therein.
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because they "deny" the inevitability of their old age." Some theorists
have defended mandatory saving within the Social Security system on this
basis,7" and Jackson also points to it to justify the discharge.79 Neverthe-
less, the prevalence of myopia remains unclear. Scholars who assert that it
reflects the natural state of mind also acknowledge that individuals can, and
77. Discussing myopia (also known as "impulsiveness," "impatience," or"akrasia") generally, see
CHOICE OVER TIME, supra note 75; GEORGE AINSLiE, PICOECONOMCS 56-95 (1992); A.C. PIGOu, THE
ECONOMICS OF WELFARE pt. 1, ch. 2, § 3 (4th ed. 1932); George Ainslie, Specious Reward: A
Behavioral Theory oflmpulsiveness and Impulse Control, 82 PSYCHOL. BULL. 463, 463-73 (1975); T.
Michael Kashner, Present-Future Gratification Tradeoffs: Does Economics Validate Psychometric
Studies9, 11 J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 247 (1990); Stephen J. Hoch & George F. Loewenstein, Time-
Inconsistent Preferences and Consumer Self-Control, 17 J. CONSUMER RES. 492 (1991); George
Loewenstein & Richard H. Thaler, Anomalies: Intertemporal Choice, J. ECON. PERSP., Fall 1989, at 181,
reprinted in THALER, supra note 58, at 92; Richard H. Thaler, Some Empirical Evidence on Dynamic
Inconsistency, 8 ECON. LETTERS 201 (1981), reprinted in THALER, supra note 59, at 127. (For some
early discussions in the writings of John Stuart Mill, see MILL, supra note 39, at 150; JOHN S. MILL,
UTILITARIANISM 14-15 (Oskar Piest ed., Macmillan 1957) (1863).) Specifically in connection with
financial planning, see FISHER, supra note 53, at 61-98; Kotlikoffet al., supra note 39, at 1057. For an
evolutionary perspective, see Alan R. Rogers, Evolution of Time Preference by Natural Selection, 84
AM. ECON. REv. 460 (1994). In some behavioral models, myopia follows not from serial changes of
perspective, but rather from a simultaneous internal tension between a short-term and long-term
perspective (the phenomenon of "ambivalence"). AINSLIE, supra, at 24-55; Gregory S. Kavka, Is
Individual Choice Less Problematic Than Collective Choice?, 7 ECON. & PHIL. 143 (1991); Richard
H. Thaler & H.M. Shefrin,An Economic Theory of Self-Control, 89 J. PoL. ECON. 392 (1981), reprinted
in THALER, supra note 59, at 77. As economists point out, discounting future benefits is rational in
those cases where the consumer expects to have greater resources in the future, given diminishing
marginal utilities. Robert E. Goodin, Discounting Discounting, 2 J. PUB. POL'Y 53, 57-58 (1982);
Mancur Olson & Martin J. Bailey, Positive Time Preference, 89 J. POL. ECON. 1 (1981). See also Amos
Tversky & Dale Griffin, Endowment and Contrast in Judgments of Well-Being, in STRATEGY AND
CHOICE 297 (Richard J. Zeckhauser ed., 1991) (suggesting that one's subsequent sense of well-being
is affected by one's memories of prior gratification). For a further philosophical discussion of
decisionmaking over time, see PARFIT, supra note 76, at 149-94.
78. George A. Akerlof & William T. Dickens, The Economic Consequences of Cognitive
Dissonance, 72 AM. ECON. REv. 307, 317 (1982); P.A. Diamond, A Framework for Social Security
Analysis, 8 J. PUB. ECON. 275, 281-82 (1977); Kotlikoffet al., supra note 39, at 1056-57; Deborah M.
Weiss, Paternalistic Pension Policy: Psychological Evidence and Economic Theory, 58 U. CHi. L. REV.
1275, 1299, 1317-18 (1991). Cf. Robert H. Frank, Positional Externalities, in STRATEGY AND CHOICE,
supra note 77, at 25, 38-39 (suggesting utilities in mandatory Social Security stemming from its
universality); supra note 39 and infra note 141 (referring to economic justifications premised on perfect
rationality). But see infra note 169. The legislative history of the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act of 1974 (ERISA) justifies private pension inalienablility only briefly, as necessary to "ensure that
the employee's accrued benefits are actually available for retirement purposes." H.R. REP. No. 807, 93d
Cong., 2d Sess. 68 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4670, 4734.
79. Jackson, supra note 44, at 1408-10.
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often do, learn to overcome it."0
Even among those persons who do focus relentlessly on their temporary
welfare, some may be expected to defer consumption and to avoid or retire
debt. Persons can derive present satisfaction out of knowing that greater
consumption awaits them in the future. Psychologists call this phenomenon
savoring. (Thus, some persons prefer to be the last ones to open their
Christmas presents, or they leave their rarest bottles of wine in the cellar,
reserved for later occasions.) By the same token, persons can suffer present
dissatisfaction out of knowing that something unpleasant (such as debt
payments) awaits them in the future-the phenomenon of dread. (To
minimize dread, some individuals try to move up surgery or a dental
appointment.) These psychological impulses, which incidentally are
common enough to find expression not only in the professional literature
but also in lay colloquialisms,"1 could incline persons either to accelerate
or to delay consumption, to borrow or to pay off debts.82
In the same vein, while persons may derive pleasure from spending, they
may also derive certain present satisfactions out of saving. As Lester
Thurow has argued, the conservation of wealth does facilitate present
consumption of a sort (though not acknowledged in conventional consump-
tion economics)-namely, the consumption of power, which wealth
disparities within interpersonal relationships permit the wealth holder to
80. AINSLm, supra note 77, at 57-60, 79; FISHER, supra note 53, at 66, 89-91; Ainslie, supra note
77, at 467-69 (reviewing studies on animal behavior); Modigliani & Brumberg, supra note 75, at 430;
see also George F. Loewenstein, Frames of Mind in Intertemporal Choice, 34 MOMT. Sci. 200 (1988)
(suggesting that the individual discount rate can be influenced by framing an intertemporal choice
alternatively as an acceleration or a delay). Individuals conscious of their myopia can overcome it by
various self-imposed cognitive devices. Ainslie, supra note 77, at 473-89; George Ainslie & Nick
Haslam, Self-Control, in CHOICE OVER TIME, supra note 75, at 177; Hoch & Loewenstein, supra note
77, at 498-503; Walter Mischel, Processes in Delay of Gratification, 7 ADVANCES EXPERIME AL SOC.
PSYCHOL. 249 (1974); T.C. Schelling, Self-Command: A New Discipline, in CHOICE OVER TIm, supra
note 75, at 167; Thaler & Shefrin, supra note 77, at 396-98; see also Infra notes 323-32 and
accompanying text. Indeed, such devices can lead to overcompensation and turn a natural squanderer
into a miser. AINSLIE, supra note 77, at 236-37. That lay persons recognize intuitively the phenomenon
of myopia is indicated by certain colloquial expressions that have crept into the language: viz., when
"I can't wait" to do something. Yet, as often in semantics, the phrase "I can't wait" has a deeper,
contradictory meaning, for what I really mean when I say "I can't wait," is that while I do not want to
wait, I have developed sufficient willpower to control myself, and so I actually can wait
81. Savoring: "saving the best for last." Dread. "getting it over with."
82. On savoring and dread, see PARFrr, supra note 76, at 160-61; Jon Elster & George
Loewenstein, Utility from Memory and Anticipation, in CHOICE OVER TIME, supra note 75, at 213;
George Loewenstein, Anticipation and the Valuation of Delayed Consumption, 97 ECON. J. 666 (1987).
For an early discussion, see KEYNES, supra note 52, at 108. Compare the converse phenomenon of
retrospection discussed in Tversky & Griffin, supra note 77; Elster & Loewenstein, supra.
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project." (The argument actually originated with Marx. 4) And apart
from these dynamics, wealth conservation can also provide present benefits
in the form of personal ego gratification, as investigators have observed. 5
For some lost souls, net worth contributes to a sense of sef-worth. 6 Like
Silas Marner, they may be driven to amass and conserve wealth for its own
83. LESTER C. THtIROw, GENERATING INEQUALITY 131-42 (1975). For related discussions, see
OTTo FENICHEL, The Drive to Amass Wealth, in THE COLLECTED PAPERS OF OTTO FENICHEL: SECOND
SERIES 89, 91, 94-96 (1938); JOHN K. GALBRAITH, THE ANATOMY OF POWER 47-53 (1983); HENRY
C, LINDGREN, GREAT EXPECTATIONS: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF MONEY 58-82 (1980).
84. KARL MARX, Money, in MARX'S CONCEPT OF MAN 163 (Erich Fromm ed., rev. ed. 1966) (ms.
1844). Antecedents of the idea expressed in connection with the social value of the right to bequeath
trace back at least to Bracton, writing in the thirteenth century. Hirsch & Wang, supra note 3, at 9-11.
85. Thaler & Shefrin, supra note 77, at 396 ("In this case doer myopia does not inhibit saving.").
86. FENICHEL, supra note 83, at 94-102; LEWIS H. LAPHAM, MONEY AND CLASS IN AMERICA 84
(1988); LINDGREN, supra note 83, at 83-99; PHILIP SLATER, WEALTH ADDICTION 34-36 (1980);
THORSTEIN VEBLEN, THE THEORY OF THE LEISURE CLASS 37-39 (Houghton Mifflin 1973) (1899);
David W. Krueger, Money, Success, and Success Phobia, in THE LAST TABOO: MONEY AS SYMBOL
AND REALITY IN PSYCHOTHERAPY AND PSYCHOANALYSIS 3 (David W. Krueger ed., 1986); Russell W.
Belk, Possessions and the Extended Self, 15 J. CONSUMER RES. 139, 155 (1988); David W. Krueger,
A Self-Psychological View of Money [hereinafter Krueger, View of Money] in THE LAST TABOO, supra,
at 24; Melvin Prince, Self-Concept, Money Beliefs and Values, 14 J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 161 (1993); Carin
Rubenstein, Money andSelf-Esteem, Relationships, Secrecy, Envy, Satisfaction, PSYCHOL. TODAY, May,
198 1, at 29; see also Frances L. Feldman, Money: An Index to Personal Problems in Adolescents, 25
MARRIAGE & FAM. LIVING 364, 365-66 (1963) (discussing the development of this attitude during
childhood); ADRIAN FURNHAM & ALAN LEWIS, THE ECONOMIC MIND 46-67 (1986) (discussing
variations in attitudes toward money); Russell W. Belk & Melanie Wallendorf, The Sacred Meanings
of Money, II J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 35 (1990) (same); Adrian Fumham, Many Sides of the Coin: The
Psychology of Money Usage, 5 PERSONALITY & INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES 501 (1984) (same); Paul F.
Wernimont & Susan Fitzpatrick, The Meaning of Money, 56 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 218 (1972) (same).
Likewise, wealth may win the esteem of others, which is itself an aspect of its value to the wealth-
holder. Adam Smith emphasized the point early on. ADAM SMITH, THE THEORY OF MORAL
SENTIMENTS 212-13 (D.D. Raphael & A.L. Maefie eds., Clarendon Press 1976) (1759). Then again, of
course, individuals may also derive present ego gratification from spending, especially on "prestige"
items that conspicuously signal the benefactor's success. A Porsche can lift esteem, both self- and other-
(a point constantly reinforced by product advertising). MIHALY CSiKSZENTMIHALYI & EUGENE
ROCHBERG-HALTON, THE MEANING OF THINGS 29-32 (1981); HELGA DrrrMAR, THE SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY OF MATERIAL POSSESSION 9-17, 41-64, 95-121, 155-84 (1992); JAMES S. DUESENBERRY,
INCOME, SAVING, AND THE THEORY OF CONSUMER BEHAVIOR 28-37, 50-52 (1967); ARTHUR A. LEFF,
SWINDLING AND SELLING 167-69, 172-75 (1976); Ottmar L. Braun & Robert A. Wicklund,
Psychological Antecedents of Conspicuous Consumption, 10 J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 161 (1989); Grant
McCracken, Culture and Consumption: A Theoretical Account of the Structure and Movement of the
Cultural Meaning of Consumer Goods, 13 J. CONSUMER RES. 71 (1986); Marsha L. Richins & Floyd
W. Rudmin, Materialism and Economic Psychology, 15 J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 217 (1994). Adam Smith
recognized this point as well. I SMITH, supra note 46, at 192. The impulse to raise self-esteem has also
been associated with compulsive spending (and so presumably could also lead to compulsive saving
among those individuals for whom wealth and self-esteem are linked). Alice Hanley & Mari S.
Wilhelm, Compulsive Buying: An Exploration into Self-Esteem and Money Attitudes, 13 J. ECON.
PSYCHOL. 5 (1992); see also infra notes 107-10.
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sake, without any regard to future consumption.17 In short, myopia can
lead to different behavioral sequelae, to spending or to saving.
Consider another psychological process upon which Jackson laid great
emphasis: heuristic devices to simplify strenuous cognitive tasks, in
particular "anchoring," whereby decisionmakers tend to focus on an initial
value or probability and insufficiently adjust their calculus to take account
of other ones. In the context of risk perceptions, this tendency leads persons
consistently to underestimate disjunctive probabilities, that is, probabilities
that any one of a number of independent chance events will occur (say, to
cause financial default), because the probability that at least one of several
events will occur exceeds the probability that any particular one, upon
which an individual has anchored, will occur. By the same token, persons
tend to overestimate the corresponding conjunctive probability that none of
the chance events that could cause something to occur (such as a default)
will materialize, because the probability that each one of the events that
could go wrong will in fact go right is less than the probability that any
one of those events that has been anchored upon will go right.88 On this
basis, Jackson suggests that persons tend systematically to underestimate
the risk of borrowing money and to overestimate the corresponding chance
of success in that endeavor.8 9 Yet, it would seem that credit risk could just
as easily be (and be anticipated to be) conjunctive as disjunctive-that is,
several independent events could have to occur in unison, say, loss of a job
87. "But at night came his revelry: at night he closed his shutters, and made fast his doors, and
drew forth his gold .... He spread them out in heaps and bathed his hands in them. . . ." GEORGE
ELioT, SmAS MARNER 70 (Q.D. Leavis ed., Penguin Books 1967) (1861). For some real examples of
legendary misers, see KENNEru LAMoTr, THE MoNEYmAKERs 185-203 (1969). Jon Elster also posits
"mixed cases" where misers pinch their pennies "in order to become a spendthrift." ELsTER, supra note
59, at 67. Though Elster fails to develop the idea, this seemingly paradoxical scenario could arise where
an individual's utility vision extends into the near future ("mild myopia," we might say), and so she
resolves to save for a Porsche, or it could arise where an individual suffers from a syndrome literally
the opposite of myopia ("hyperopia," we could call it) and focuses overly or exclusively on her
subsequent welfare. (Postulating this last possibility, see PARFIT, supra note 76, at 161.)
88. Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahmeman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 185
Sci. 1124, 1128-30 (1974), reprinted in JUDGMENT UNDER UNC ERTAIrN, supra note 64, at 3. Tversky
and Kahneman reached the same conclusion in subsequent and more focused studies. Indeed, postulating
the involvement of another cognitive process known as the representativeness heuristic, whereby persons
tend to stereotype other individuals and situations, they found that persons may anticipate a conjunctive
probability to be even higher than that of its least likely constituent probability, a phenomenon they call
the "conjunction fallacy." Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgments of and byRepresentativeness,
in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY, supra note 64, at 84, 90-98; Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman,
Extensional Versus Intuitive Reasoning: The Conjunction Fallacy in Probability Judgment, 90 PSYCHOL.
REV. 293 (1983).
89. Jackson, supra note 44, at 1410-12 & n.60 (citing, inter alia, to several of the studies by
Kahneman and Tversky).
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and inability to find another one, for a default to follow. 90 In that case,
anchoring would lead persons to overestimate credit risk, when they
focused on one of those probabilities, whereas they would underestimate
the corresponding disjunctive probability of success, which would require
only that one of the several alternative hazards be overborne. In short, the
effect of anchoring on financial decisions is ambiguous: it may lead persons
toward evaluations of risk that are long or short of the mark.91
Take still another thought process, one not heretofore considered in
connection with saving and spending but which is certainly germane to the
problem. That is the proclivity to irrational optimism. Persons tend to
believe that "it won't happen to them." They may leave seat belts
unfastened, they may lie out in the sun, with serene confidence in their own
invulnerability.92 In the context of individual consumption functions,
irrational optimism could lead in the direction of greater present consump-
tion and borrowing, in the (false) assurance that the future will take care of
itself.93 But again, this current of thought does not flow only in one
direction. For one thing, evidence suggests that irrational optimism can
90. See DAvID CAPLOVITZ, CONSUMERS IN TROUBLE: A STUDY OF DEBTORS IN DEFAULT 50
(1974) ("[C]areful probing by the interviewers often elicited more than one reason for the default In
fact, almost half the debtors [surveyed] mentioned more than one reason [for default] and quite a
number offered three reasons.").
91. Similarly, evaluations of the amount an individual needs presently to save in order to sustain
future consumption, by virtue of the very complexity of the calculation, may be inaccurately high or
low; heuristic processes do not clearly bias the calculation. For discussions, see Richard H. Thaler,
PsYchology and Savings Policies, AM. ECON. REv. 186 (May 1994) (separately paginated Papers and
Proceedings issue); STEPHEN JOHNSON ET AL., CAN PEOPLE COMPUTE? AN EXPERIMENTAL TEST OF
THE LIFE CYCLE CONSUMPTION MODEL (National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No.
2183, 1987) (finding a general tendency of persons to overestimate the need for saving by
underestimating the power of compound interest).
92. For a general discussion, see Neil D. Weinstein, Unrealistic Optimism About Future Life
Events, 39 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 806 (1980). Adam Smith noticed the phenomenon long
ago. I SMITH, supra note 46, at 120-23. Discussing the phenomenon in connection with business, as
opposed to saving, decisions, see Jakob B. Madsen, Tests of Rationality Versus an "Over Optimist"
Bias, 15 J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 587 (1994) (speculating also that the bias may help to explain market
"bubbles" and "manias"). Psychologists have argued over the origins of this phenomenon, debating
whether it stems, once again, from denial or from an illusion of control. Frank P. McKenna, It Won't
Happen to Me: Unrealistic Optimism or Illusion of Control?, 84 BRIT. J. PSYCHOL. 39 (1993);
Weinstein, supra, at 807, 818-19. On psychological illusions of control, see EllenJ. Langer, The Illusion
of Control, 32 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 311 (1975), excerpted in JUDGMENT UNDER
UNCERTAINTY, supra note 64, at 231.
93. It is not, in fact, certain that irrational optimism is maladaptive, for it could conceivably lead
to greater effort and persistence: the power of positive thinking, if you will. For discussions, see
McKenna, supra note 92, at 41-42, 44, 47; Linda S. Perloff, Perceptions of Vulnerability to
Victimization, J. Soc. ISSUES, at 41, 47-50 (1983).
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reverse itself following adverse experience.94 Automotive accident victims
rarely forget to buckle up; melanoma victims hug the shadows. And, at
least in connection with financial decisions, there is a contrary bias with
which any economist is familiar-namely, the tendency toward risk
aversion.95 As the market confirms, investors demand a risk premium for
common stocks as compared to bonds. (While this phenomenon is usually
associated with the decreasing marginal utility of wealth,9 6 innate predis-
positions may also be involved-clinical studies show that rats are also risk
averse!97) Again, aversion to risk could forestall undue present consump-
tion and borrowing.9"
94. Neil D. Weinstein, Effects ofPersonalExperience on Self-Protective Behavior, 105 PSYCHOL,
BULL. 31 (1989). Professor Weinstein has argued that the representativeness heuristic, by which persons
tend to engage in stereotyping, could lead to irrational optimism if they fail to fit the vulnerable
stereotype; but as Professor Perloff points out, the representativeness heuristic in this respect is double-
edged, for it could also lead to unrealistic pessimism (quite apart from adverse experience) if an
individual perceived herself to fall within the vulnerable stereotype. Compare Weinstein, supra note 92,
at 808 with Perloff, supra note 93, at 46-47. See also Dariusz Dolinski et al., Unrealistic Pessimism,
127 . Soc. PSYCHOL. 511 (1987) (arguing that under other special conditions, not present in connection
with debt, persons may have an initial tendency toward unrealistic pessimism).
95. Aversion to financial risk is not universal, but the empirical evidence for general risk aversion
is conclusive. (It does not necessarily follow, however, that a risk averse investor will also be averse
to other sorts of risks.) For discussions and further references, see RISK-TAKING BEHAVIOR (J. Frank
Yates ed., 1992); Hirsch & Wang, supra note 3, at 31 n.117; Donald P. Judges, Of Rocks and Hard
Places: The Value of Risk Choice, 42 EMORY L.J 1, 8-26 (1993); for an early analysis, see SMITH,
supra note 86, at 212-17 (referring to risk aversion as "prudence"). Jackson, however, downplays the
significance of risk aversion. Jackson, supra note 44, at 1413.
96. E.g., ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 58-65 (1988). Adam Smith
drew this conclusion. SMITH, supra note 86, at 213.
97. Ratonomics, THE ECONOMIST, Sept. 14, 1991, at 76. Of men as of mice? See Paul H. Rubin
& Chris W. Paul l, An Evolutionary Model ofTasteforRisk 17 ECON. INQUIRY 585 (1979) (discussing
homo sapiens). In an earlier essay, a collaborator and I also speculated that risk aversion was tied to
the "endowment effect," discussed infra note 118 and accompanying text, whereby persons tend
psychologically to value losses of personal property (with which they personally identify) above gains
(with which they do not yet identify). Hirsch & Wang, supra note 3, at 31 n. 117. A pair of economists
has recently offered precisely such an argument to explain the magnitude of the risk premium existing
within the securities market. SHLOMO BENARTZI & RICHARD H. THALER, MYOPIC Loss AVERSION AND
THE EQUITY PREMIuM PUZZLE (National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. 4369,
1993). For a discussion of other possible psychological components of risk aversion, see David E. Bell,
Disappointment in Decision Making Under Uncertainty, 33 OPERATIONS RES. 1 (1985).
98. See OlofDahlbick, Saving and Risk Taking, 12 J. ECoN. PSYCHOL. 479 (1991) (finding that
risk aversion strongly affects borrowing decisions and investment decisions but not saving decisions);
Karen E. Dynan, How Prudent Are Consumers?, 101 3. POL. ECON. 1104 (1993) (finding less
precautionary saving than expected, given accepted beliefs about risk aversion). Adam Smith tied
frugality to risk aversion, and he surmised that as an empirical matter "the principle of frugality seems
not only to predominate but to predominate very greatly." SMITH, supra note 86, at 213-15; 1 SMITH,
supra note 46, at 362-64 (quotation at 363). On the other hand, risk aversion may be more pronounced
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Finally, to point to the most glaring lacuna in Jackson's analysis (I dare
say, one that the cognitive psychologists should also bear in mind), social
forces play an important role here. As Max Weber taught us, some cultures
and subcultures attach normative significance to thrift-it is exalted for its
own sake.9 More recent sociological studies confirm that tendencies
toward thrift and caution vary among families and among different national,
cultural, attitudinal, and socioeconomic groups."r The point is sufficiently
manifest to have bred social stereotyping--one can, for example, find a
commentator playfully contrasting the Scots with unmarried sailors to
illustrate two behavioral extremes."' Modem American culture has been
later in life, which could again provide a paternalistic justification for enforced caution during youth.
Discussing risk aversion as a function of age, see Baruch Fischhoff, Risk Taking: A Developmental
Perspective, in RISK-TAKING BEHAVIOR, supra note 95, at 133.
99, MAX WEBER, THE PROTESTANT ETHIC AND THE SPIRIT OF CAPITALISM (Talcott Parsons trans.,
Charles Scribners Sons 1958) (1904-05).
100. For varied discussions, see FURNHAM & LEWIS, supra note 86, at 154-77; GEORGE KATONA,
PSYCHOLOGICAL ECONOMICS 233-39, 247-51, 271-83 (1975); GEORGE KATONA ET AL., ASPIRATIONS
AND AFFLUENCE 88-105 (1971); LEA ET AL., supra note 73, at 214-16; CONSTANTINO LLUcH ET AL.,
PATTERNS OF HOUSEHOLD DEMAND AND SAVING 240-42 (1977); JAMES N. MORGAN ET AL., INCOME
AND WELFARE IN THE UNITED STATES 427-44 (1962); JAMES N. MORGAN ET AL., PRODUCTIVE
AMERICANS 234-49, 299-317 (1966); DUESENBERRY, supra note 86 (formulating the general theory that
persons' wants are dependent on the wants of their neighbors); Ainslie, supra note 77, at 465-67; B.
Douglas Bernhein & John K. Scholz, Do Americans Save Too Little?, Bus. REV., Sept.-Oct. 1993, at
3, Evelio Freire et al., Temporal Span, Delay of Gratification, and Children's Socioeconomic Status,
137 J. GENETIC PSYCHOL. 247 (1980); Adrian Furnham, Why Do People Save? Attitudes to, and Habits
of Saving Money in Britain, 15 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 354 (1985); Philip Kotler, Mathematical
Models of Individual Buyer Behavior, 13 BEHAVIORAL Sm. 274 (1968); Stephen E.G. Lea et al., The
Economic Psychology of Consumer Debt, 14 J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 85, 116-18 (1993); Sonia M.
Livingstone & Peter K. Lunt, Predicting Personal Debt andDebt Repayment: Psychological, Social and
Economic Determinants, 13 J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 111 (1992); Pierre Martineau, Social Classes and
Spending Behavior, 23 J. MARKETING, 121 (1958); H. Lee Mathews & John W. Slocum, Jr., Social
Class and Commercial Bank Credit Card Usage, J. MARKETING, Jan. 1969, at 71; Walter Mischel,
Preference for Delayed Reinforcement: An Experimental Study of a Cultural Observation, 56 J.
ABNORMAL & SOC. PSYCH. 57 (1958); Dennis W. Rook, The Buying Impulse, 14 J. CONSUMER RES.
189, 190, 196 (1987); Louis Schneider & Sverre Lysgaard, The Deferred Gratification Pattern: A
Preliminary Study, 18 AM. SOC. REv. 142 (1953); John W. Slocum, Jr. & H. Lee Mathews, Social
Class and Income as Indicators of Consumer Credit Behavior, J. MARKETING, Apr. 1970, at 69; Chester
R. Wasson, Is It Time to Quit Thinking of Income Classes?, J. MARKETING, Apr. 1969, at 54; see also
Elizabeth S. Moore-Shay & Richard J. Lutz, Intergenerational Influences in the Formation of Consumer
Attitudes and Beliefs About the Marketplace: Mothers and Daughters, 15 ADVANCES CONSUMER RES.
461 (1988) (suggesting that children tend to mimic the observable consumer habits of their parents);
Susan E. Heckler et al., Intergenerational Influences in Adult Buying Behaviors: An Examination of
Moderating Factors, 16 ADVANCES CONSUMER RES. 276 (1989) (suggesting factors that can inhibit
intergenerational mimicking).
101. FISHER, supra note 53, at 84, 87; see also DrITMAR, supra note 86, at 136-54 (discussing
social stereotyping in connection with material possessions).
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much maligned for fostering a "buy now, pay later" philosophy, t°' but
recent investigations suggest that cultural changes may be afoot-more
Americans are expressing negative attitudes toward conspicuous consump-
tion and credit."0 3 Be this as it may, the clearest implication of the
sociological studies is that propensities to save and to avoid risk tend to
rise with levels of education and with socioeconomic statust--an
observation that may, however, be more economic than social, given the
greater ease with which the wealthy can save.0 '
102. DANIEL HOROWrITZ, THE MORALITY OF SPENDING (1985); MARTHA L. OLNEY, BuY Now PAY
LATER 118-84 (1991); ROBERT B. SETTLE & PAMELA L. ALREcK, WHY THEY BUY 221-43 (1986);
DAVID M. TUCKER, THE DECLINE OF THRIFT IN AMERICA (1991); Rook, supra note 100, at 189. See
also B. DOUGLAS BERNHEIM, THE VANISHING NEST EGG: REFLECTIONS ON SAVING IN AMERICA 2, 72-
75 (1991) (suggesting that the baby boom generation's attitude toward saving has been marked by post-
war prosperity and ignorance of the Great Depression).
103. Richard A. Feinberg, The Social Nature of the Classical Conditioning Phenomena in People:
A Comment on Hunt, Florsheim, Chatteree, and Kernan, 67 PSYCHOL. REp. 331 (1990); Anne B.
Fisher, It's A Great Time to Trade Up (If You Have the Cash), FORTUNE, Apr. 6, 1992, at 112; Hoch
& Loewenstein, supra note 77, at 503; Bill Kelley, The New Consumer Revealed, SALES & MARKETING
MGMT., May 1993, at 46; cf. Hoch & Loewenstein, supra note 77, at 502. For a recent popular diatribe
against credit and the American credit industry, see TERRY GALANOY, CHARGE IT (1980). Suspicion
of credit and a taste for the simple life and frugality are, needless to say, enduring themes in American
cultural history, threading through seventeenth-century Puritanism, eighteenth-century republicanism,
and nineteenth-century transcendentalism. E.g., MILLER, supra note 62, at 40-52; EDMUND S. MORGAN,
The Puritan Ethic and the American Revolution, in THE CHALLENGE OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION
88 (1976); THOREAU, supra note 56, at 15-18, 35-36, 3-88; GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE
AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787, at 52, 65, 416-18 (1969). These themes are also reflected in the
credos of certain current philosophical and religious movements such as the Amish sect. E.g., ELMER
SCHWIEDER & DOROTHY SCHWEEDER, A PEcULR PEOPLE: IOWA'S OLD ORDER AMISH 51-53 (1975).
Suggesting modem cultural ambivalence toward materialism, see DITTMAR, supra note 86, at 185-201.
104. See supra note 100.
105. Noting the relative ease of saving by the wealthy, see, for example, Sahota, supra note 75, at
203. Put another way, saving has the attributes of a luxury good. Nevertheless, economists have
disagreed over whether the marginal propensity to consume diminishes with wealth. Adam Smith
thought not: though "[t]he desire of food is limited in every man by the narrow capacity of the human
stomach," still
the desire of the conveniencies and ornaments of building, dress, equipage, and houshold [sic]
furniture, seems to have no limit or certain boundary.... What is over and above satisfying
the limited desire, is given for the amusement of those desires which cannot be satisfied, but
seem to be altogether endless.
I SMITH, supra note 46, at 183. Lord Keynes, by contrast, inferred as a "fundamental psychological law,
upon which we are entitled to depend with great confidence... that men are disposed, as a rule and
on the average, to increase their consumption as their income increases, but not by as much as the
increase in their income." KEYNES, supra note 52, at 96; FISHER, supra note 53, at 72-73. For modem
discussions, see 2 JAMES TOBIN, ESSAYS IN EcONOMICs 61-318 (1975); Hersh M. Shefrn & Richard
H. Thaler, The Behavioral Life-Cycle Hypothesis, 26 ECON. INQUIRY 609, 621-22, 628-29 (1988),
reprinted in THALER, supra note 59, at 91; see also THUROw, supra note 83, at 136 (asserting that
possessors of large fortunes literally lack sufficient time to consume all their wealth).
[VOL. 73:1
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol73/iss1/1
1995] SPENDTHRIFT TRUSTS AND PUBLIC POLICY
At any rate, if nothing else, empirical evidence on saving and borrowing
in America demonstrates the heterogeneity of individual behavior.' 16 At
one edge of the spectrum lies a fringe of compulsive (or "addictive")
spenders and borrowers," 7 persons who suffer from a recognized psycho-
logical disorder.'18 And at the other edge lies a scattering of "money
106. James N. Morgan, The Structure ofAggregate Personal Saving, 59 J. POL. EcON. 528 (1951).
107. AINSLIE, supra note 77, at 13, 1-23; Karl Abraham, The Spending of Money in Anxiety States,
in ERNEST BORNEMANN, THE PSYCHOANALYSIS OF MONEY 99 (1976); Caroline Arthur, Fifteen Million
Americans Are Shopping Addicts, AM. DEMOGRAPHICS, Mar. 1992, at 14 (1992) (presenting statistics);
Ronald J. Faber et al., Compulsive Consumption, 14 ADVANCES CONSUMER RES. 132 (1986); Ronald
J. Faber & Thomas O'Guinn, Compulsive Consumption and Credit Abuse, 11 J. CONSUMER POL'Y 97
(1988) (noting, inter alia, that compulsive shoppers share character traits with persons displaying other
compulsive behaviors); Max M. Glatt & Christopher C.H. Cook, Pathological Spending as a Form of
Psychological Dependence, 82 BRrT. J. ADDICTION 1257 (1987); Hanley & Wilhelm, supra note 86;
Elizabeth C. Hirschman, The Consciousness of Addiction: Toward a General Theory of Compulsive
Consumption, 19 J. CONSUMER RES. 155 (1992); William Kaufman, Some Emotional Uses of Money,
in BORNEMANN, supra, 227, 237-42, 247-50; David W. Krueger, On Compulsive Shopping and
Spending: A Psychodynamic Inquiry, 42 AM. J. PSYCHOTHERAPY 574 (1988) (noting, inter alia, that
compulsive shopping often accompanies other forms of compulsive or frenzied behavior); Lauren
Lawrence, The Psychodynamics of the Compulsive Female Shopper, 50 Am. J. PSYCHOANALYSIS 67
(1990); Thomas C. O'Guinn & Ronald J. Faber, Compulsive Buying: A Phenomenological Exploration,
16 J. CONSUMER RES. 147 (1989); Dennis W. Rook & Stephen J. Hock, Consuming Impulses, 12
ADVANCES CONSUMER RES. 23 (1984); Howard Tokunaga, The Use and Abuse of Consumer Credit:
Application of Psychological Theory and Research, 14 J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 285 (1993); Gilles Valence
et al., Compulsive Buying: Concept and Measurement, 11 J. CONSUMER POL'Y 419 (1988). See
generally JIM ORFORD, EXCESSIVE APPETITES: A PSYCHOLOGICAL VIEW OF ADDICTIONS (1985).
Credit cards may aggravate the problem, by facilitating (or even serving as a cue that triggers)
impulse buying, and by serving psychologically to divorce the benefits of purchase from the costs of
payment. TERESA A. SULLIVAN ET AL., AS WE FORGIVE OUR DEBTORS: BANKRUPTCY AND CONSUMER
CREDIT IN AMERICA 178 (1989); Richard A. Feinberg, Credit Cards as Spending Facilitating Stimuli:
A Conditioning Interpretation, 13 J. CONSUMER RES. 348 (1986); Hoch & Loewenstein, supra note 77,
at 501-02; Rook, supra note 100, at 189, 196; see also Ainslie, supra note 77, at 479 (discussing
impulse facilitation generally). But see James M. Hunt et al., Credit Cards as Spending-Facilitating
Stimuli: A Test and Extension of Feinberg's Conditioning Hypothesis, 67 PSYCHOL. REP. 323 (finding
no evidence that credit cards trigger spending); Feinberg, supra note 103 (questioning Hunt's
methodology, but admitting Feinberg's own inability to replicate his prior results); David J. Burman,
Do People Overspend with Credit Cards?, 5 J. CONSUMER CREDIT MGMT. 98 (1974) (finding that
consumers do not in general overspend with credit cards). See generally Elizabeth C. Hirschman,
Differences in Consumer Purchase Behavior by Credit Card Payment System, 6 J. CONSUMER RES. 58
(1979) (discussing the place of credit cards in traditional economic models); Gillian Garcia, Credit
Cards: An Interdisciplinary Survey, 6 J. CONSUMER RES. 327 (1980) (reviewing the literature on credit
cards generally).
Evidence on the empirical prevalence of compulsive shopping is conflicting. Cf. CAPLOVITZ, supra
note 90, at 53, 64-67; SULLIVAN ET AL., supra, at 188-89; Roger D. Blackwell et al., Americans' Use
of Credit Cards: A Nationwide Study of Female and Male Attitudes, BULL. BUS. RES., Feb. 1975, at
5, 7-8; Rook, supra note 100, at 196.
108. Appreciation of the fact that persons may suffer from a wide variety of money psychoses has
spawned a new branch of psychiatry: money therapy. Rachel Englehart, Debt Anxiety? Credit Crisis?
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addicts" and "debt averse" persons, the first saving compulsively,109 the
second eschewing or retiring even subsidized loans, below the market rate
of interest, in defiance of the classical laws of economic gravity.
10
Spared of these pathologies, the bulk of the population of consumer units
also varies, though in less pronounced ways. In matters of the pocketbook,
just about everyone (to quote an old curmudgeon) is "either a little liberal
or else a little conservative."'' The point is perhaps too obvious even to
merit the ink we have devoted to it, for it is the lesson of everyday life.
Tell It to a Money Shrink WALL ST. J., Feb. 7, 1994, at B1.
One possibility that has not been addressed in the psychological literature is addictive gift-giving,
as opposed to spending, although the notion that "altruism may ... have some of the properties of an
addictive taste" has been suggested in passing by a pair of economists. Gary S. Becker & Kevin M.
Murphy, The Family and the State, 31 J.L. & ECON. 1, 4 (1988), reprinted with modifications In
BECKER, supra note 55, at 362. At the same time, another mental debility, often ending in self-
destitution via gift-giving, is well documented. that is, the exaggerated psychological dependency and
conformism associated with membership in a cult. On the psychology of cult membership, see ARTHUR
J. DEIKMAN, THE WRONG WAY HOME: UNCOVERING THE PATrERNS OF CULT BEHAVIOR IN AMERICAN
SOCIETY (1990); MARC GALANTER, CULTS: FAITH, HEALING, AND COERCION (1989). On the financial
repercussions, see Richard Delgado, Religious Totalism: Gentle and Ungentle Persuasion Under the
First Amendment, 51 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 24-25, 94 (1977). See generally MONEY AND POWER IN THE
NEW RELIGIONS (James T. Richardson ed., 1988). This danger has been noted by estate planners. JOHN
R. PRICE, PRICE ON COmEPORARY ESTATE PLANNING § 10.21, at 896 (1992). For still another gift-
giving neurosis noted in some adolescents, see Feldman, supra note 86, at 365 (discussing
overgenerosity to gain friendships).
Conceivably, a benefactor faced with a compulsive spender or donor could seek to establish a trust
disabling the beneficiary only narrowly from the compulsive activity-the trust could be made
inalienable by sale but not by donation if the beneficiary were (merely) a compulsive spender, or vice
versa. Such would probably be held valid. See supra note 23. In practice, however, such a limited
disabling restraint would likely prove ineffective: a trust alienable only by gift could be donated to a
reliable donee who promises informally to return the funds for spending by the original beneficiary;
whereas a trust alienable only by sale could be sold by the beneficiary for cash and the proceeds then
donated at will.
109. The phenomenon was discussed by Freud. Sigmund Freud, Character and Anal Erotism, in
BORNEMANN, supra note 107, at 73. For more recent discussions, see AINSLIE, supra note 77, at 237
(associating the phenomenon with psychological forces other than addiction); EDMUND BERGLER,
MONEY AND EMOTIONAL CoNFLICTs 3-19, 129-49 (1959); HERB GOLDBERG & ROBERT T. LEWIS,
MONEY MADNE$$: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SAVING, SPENDING, LOVING, AND HATING MONEY 104-08
(1978); ROBERT E. LANE, THE MARKET EXPERIENCE 102-04 (1991); Krueger, View of Money, supra
note 86, at 26-28; see also supra notes 86-87. The possibility has even been raised that there exists in
human persons a biological saving drive related to the hoarding instinct found in some other mammals,
though the idea has been rejected as implausible. LEA ET AL., supra note 73, at 227-29.
110. "Many people pay off mortgages and student loans quicker than they have to, even when the
rate they are paying is less than they earn on safe investments." Loewenstein & Thaler, supra note 77,
at 187. No clinical studies of debt aversion appear to have been undertaken as yet, however.
111. J.H. HEXTER, REAPPRAISALS IN HISTORY 75 (1961) (quoting in turn, though out of context,
Gilbert and Sullivan's Private Willis).
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C The Psychology of Inheritance
We are not quite done spilling ink, however, for there remains an
additional element yet to consider-an element impertinent to the general
problem of spending and borrowing that Jackson studied, but one that
figures directly into the problem of spendthrift trusts. For the corpus of
property that we deal with in this instance-the corpus that the beneficiary
may too-readily deplete or borrow against-comprises not general assets,
but rather a gratuity. The resources involved are the product not of the
beneficiary's own sweat and toil, accumulated in gradual accretions, but
rather of a spontaneous gift or bequest bestowed by someone else. Should
we expect this circumstance to change the psychodynamics of the
beneficiary's conduct in a systematic way?
An interesting question, this. Yet it has prompted only a trickle of
analytic and empirical studies, leaving far too much to the imagination. The
standard economic model that applies to the problem was developed nearly
forty years ago by Professor (and Nobel laureate) Milton Friedman. Under
his "permanent income hypothesis," a consumer unit's consumption
function varies with its permanent income, not its transitory income.
Consumption is supposed to follow from "long-term considerations," and
saving is assumed to be a "residual" category. Under this model, transitory
income will not prompt transitory spending; rather, consumption is
smoothed over time, and saving soaks up the extra revenue. Consumption
thereafter will rise only to the extent that the infusion of saving raises
permanent income, by generating a stream of passive earnings."1 Thus,
Friedman's model predicts, consumer units will be more disposed to
conserve inherited wealth than earned wealth, and its arrival should not
trigger a "spending spree.''..
112. MILTON FRIEDMAN, A THEORY OF THE CONSUMPTION FUNCTION 20-31 passim (1957).
Friedman's work is one of many offering refinements to Lord Keynes's original concept of the
consumption function (discussed supra note 52 and accompanying text). Professor Modigliani, for
example, posits that the consumption function is temporally dynamic, evolving over the life cycle of
the individual. In Modigliani's model, it is agedpersons who tend systematically to dissave-but as
a rational response to impending death, not irrational tropisms meriting paternalistic intervention.
Modigliani & Brumberg, supra note 75; Franco Modigliani, Life Cycle, Individual Thrift, and the
Wealth of Nations, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 297 (1986) (and the sources cited therein). For a recent criticism
of the permanent income hypothesis as it relates to consumer units' consumption patterns in response
to changes in permanent, expected future income, see Alan D. Viard, The Productivity Slowdown and
the Savings Shortfall: A Challenge to the Permanent Income Hypothesis, 31 ECON. INQUIRY 549 (1993).
113. FRIEDMAN, supra note 112, at 28-29. Friedman argues that consumption is smoothed,
irrespective of whether an inheritance is anticipated or not; if anticipated, however, the inheritance will
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Psychologically, as usual, the problem appears far more complex, and
ultimately more enigmatic,' than this economic model allows; but the
collected works on cognitive responses to gratuitous transfers take up
disappointingly little shelf space,' 4 and so one must scavenge the
adjoining shelves in search of enlightenment. One potentially relevant
consideration, well documented in the literature, is the phenomenon of
framing. Evidence suggests that persons conceptually pigeonhole different
assets into different "mental accounts" and assign different consumption
functions to each-hence violating psychologically the economically
inviolate principle of wealth fungibility. Persons tend, for example, to
exhibit a relatively high marginal propensity to consume current income,
but are loath to "dip into capital."' 5
The question then becomes how persons frame gratuitous transfers. Do
they associate them in general with income, with capital, or with something
else again? Here, unfortunately, the experimental and empirical evidence
is wafer thin but suggests that the mental classification of an inheritance
may depend upon its characteristics. Smaller inheritances are likely to be
framed as income and spent relatively easily or even "splurged" within a
separate category of minor windfalls (manna from heaven or, as the Irish
say, "money from America"). By contrast, larger, lump-sum inheritances
are more commonly conceptualized as capital and set aside for a rainy
day.16 In addition, the form of an inheritance may affect its treatment.
be reflected in the consumer unit's consumption function ex ante. For evidence on anticipation,
confirming Friedman's hypothesis in some cases but noting the risk that the expectancy will fail to
materialize as a deterrent to ex ante consumption, see MARVIN B. SussMAN ET AL., THE FAMILY AND
INHEnrrANCE 159, 170-71 (1970); see also Shefrin & Thaler, supra note 105, at 619-20 (reporting that
in an experimental test, beneficiaries of a hypothetical expectancy of inheritance indicated that they
would not adjust their spending ex ante).
114. The sociological and anthropological literature of gratuities is far more ample, emphasizing
their function within a social fabric of implicit reciprocity. E.g., DAVID CHEAL, THE GIFT EcoNoMY
(1988); DrrrMAR, supra note 86, at 24-30, 87, 97-98, 109-12; and the references cited in Adam J.
Hirsch, The Problem of the Insolvent Heir, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 587, 630 nn.203-05 (1989); Hirsch,
supra note 8, at 211-14 nn.ll1-21; Hirsch & Wang, supra note 3, at 9-10 nn.30-32.
115. AINSLI, supra note 77, at 234; Shefrin & Thaler, supra note 105, at 610-11, 614-15; Thaler,
supra note 58, passim.
116. ROBIN BARLOw ET AL., ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR OF THE AFFLUENT 95-96 (1966); SussMAN ET
AL., supra note 113, at 160-61; see AINSLIE, supra note 77, at 234-35 (suggesting that small windfalls
are spent more easily than larger, lump-sum transfers, though not dealing specifically with inheritances);
Shefrin & Thaler, supra note 105, at 633-35 (same); Thaler, supra note 58, at 193, 197-98 (same);
Michael Landsberger, Windfall Income and Consumption: Comment, 56 AM. ECON. REV. 534 (1966)
(drawing this conclusion on the basis of statistical data, though not involving inheritances); R. Conrad
Doenges, Transitory Income Size and Savings, 33 S. ECON. J. 258 (1966) (same, data based on
transitory income generally). But see Ronald G. Bodkin, Windfall Income and Consumption: Reply, 56
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Specific bequests of securities or real estate resemble capital and hence are
liable to be framed accordingly, whereas general bequests of money have
the look and feel of income and are more apt to be treated as such.117 In
short, framing theory suggests that spendthrift clauses are more likely to
make a difference in the case of less sizeable bequests (where, ironically,
the added administrative expense of a trust may outweigh the benefits) or
in the case of larger, liquid ones.
Another related and possibly significant cognitive process is the observed
tendency of persons to give greater weight to losses than to gains. Out-of-
pocket (or sunk) costs matter more to people than opportunity costs, and
they are significantly more averse to losing their existing endowment than
to forgoing a chance to obtain more. The cognitive roots of this disparity
may trace to a psychological identification with property that a person
conceives to be "hers." The loss of "her" property induces a stronger
feeling of loss and regret than forgoing an equivalent gain of property with
which she does not personally identify, a phenomenon psychologists call
the "endowment effect.""18
AM ECON. REv. 540 (1966) (responding to Landsberger, seeing no such correlation in the American
data alone); Mordechai E. Kreinin, Windfall Income and Consumption-Additional Evidence, 51 AM.
ECON. REv. 388, 389-90 (1961) (finding no evidence, in a study of restitution payments to Israelis from
Germany in 1957-58, that the propensity to save varied with the size of the transfer).
117. Sec Shefrin & Thaler, supra note 105, at 637 (hypothesizing this result); Thaler, supra note
58, at 197-98 (looking by analogy to studies of other windfalls). The psychological theory of framing
may have implications not only for legal policy but also for practical estate planning. Some estate
planners advise against making specific bequests of capital assets because they fluctuate in value before
the will matures and often raise construction problems. E.g., McGOvERN ET AL., supra note 8, § 10.1,
at 405. But instructions to liquidate and dispose of capital assets in the form of general bequests could
raise other sorts of problems: they may tend to encourage more rapid consumption by beneficiaries!
118. Much of the large literature on the endowment effect (also referred to as "status-quo bias,"
"loss aversion," or the "offer-ask disparity") is surveyed in Elizabeth Hoffman & Matthew L. Spitzer,
Willingness to Pay vs. Willingness to Accept: Legal and Economic Implications, 71 WASH. U. L.Q. 59
(1993). See also DirrMAR, supra note 86,passim (discussing persons' psychological attachment to and
identification with their property); Belk, supra note 86, at 155 passim (same, including money);
Margaret J. Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957 (1982) (same, but distinguishing
.personal property" from "fungible property," a distinction called into doubt by empirical evidence of
the endowment effect).
Interestingly, Justice Holmes noticed the endowment effect long ago and pointed to it to justify the
doctrine of adverse possession. Oliver W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457,476-77
(1897). Judge Posner in his treatise on law and economics remarks Holmes' analysis but traces the
phenomenon to the diminishing marginal utility of wealth! POSNER, supra note 20, § 3.11, at 79 & n.5.
Well, yes, diminishing marginal utilities distinguish opportunity costs from sunk csts---the marginal
utility of additional accretions of wealth will be less than that of existing wealth-but that is an unlikely
explanation for the catastrophic discontinuity between the value persons assign to existing assets and
potential assets. An economist at heart, Posner cannot bring himself to admit that irrational
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How might the endowment effect affect the treatment of inherited
wealth? Well, that depends. If the beneficiary fails to conceptualize an
inheritance as really being "her" property, she might be less averse to
risking or dissipating it-rather like the spectator in a casino who
approaches the gaming tables only after running across a loose chip on the
floor. This phenomenon, I suspect, may help to explain the high frequency
of disclaimers of inheritances. These can produce tax efficiencies, of
course, but still it is easier psychologically to forgo an inheritance for this
purpose than to make annual gift-tax free transfers out of one's "own"
pocket.119 A spendthrift clause assures that the corpus of a gift will not
be treated as if it lies apart from the beneficiary's endowment. 20 Never-
theless, the beneficiary's conceptualization of an inheritance-whether she
frames it immediately as "hers" or not, and how long it takes her to
reconceptualize it as "hers"-is unclear and probably will vary from case
to case."2 Here, the origin of the property could well be significant,
psychological forces may be at work! Discussing possible explanations for the endowment effect, both
psychological and economic, see Hoffman & Spitzer, supra, 85-98.
119. Assignments and gifts of just-inherited property, to which no tax benefits attach, are also
common enough. The psychology at work here is, I think, understood intuitively by legislators, who
sense that they can likewise withhold taxes from income with less pain (or political unrest) than if the
tax is demanded after income has been received. Tax withholding would seem a classic political
exploitation of the endowment effect. (Withholding has not traditionally been justified on this basis,
however, but rather has been premised on inexperienced taxpayers' inability to plan for annual taxation,
see Richard L. Doernberg, The Case Against Withholding, 61 TEX. L. REV. 595, 601-02 (1982).)
120. While a spendthrift clause prevents the dissipation of a trust corpus, in most jurisdictions it
does not prevent disclaimer of the corpus to an alternative beneficiary. Hirsch, supra note 114, at 608
n.111.
121. No focused research has yet addressed the psychological processes whereby persons develop
a sense of endowment-a necessary step to fleshing out the full significance of the endowment effect.
The existing empirical evidence is ambiguous. One study, postulating "an instant endowment effect...
as soon as [an] individual is given the object," suggests that "It]he impression gained from informal
pilot experiments is that the act of giving the participant physical possession of the good results in a
more consistent endowment effect. Assigning subjects a chance to receive a good, or a property right
to a good to be received at a later time, seemed to produce weaker effects." Kahneman et al.,
Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect and the Coase Theorem, 98 . POL. ECON. 1325, 1342 &
n.7 (1990). (Compare the reflection of one of my colleagues that when he receives an honorarium he
can readily endorse the check over to charity, but when it is deposited into his bank account, even for
a single day, that is it-he keeps it!) Yet, another study (sharing a co-author with the first, but failing
to remark the contradiction!) found evidence that persons who won an initial gamble preferred more
risk in a second gamble with the proceeds than they did with only a single gamble, because they are
able to edit their frame to make the second gamble appear not to risk a loss, but rather to risk
diminution of a gain--'as if losing some of '[the house's] money' doesn't hurt as much as losing one's
own cash,"--a phenomenon the authors call the "house money effect." While they failed to explore how
long it takes for the effect to wear off, the authors speculate that it may lead managers of profitable
enterprises toward greater risk seeking, a suggestion assuming a protracted psychological process.
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slowing the process of reconceptualization: think of the proverbial child
who spends promiscuously so long as her parents give her money but
grows frugal the moment she begins to earn it." But it may also happen
that this reconceptualization occurs rapidly or even takes root before the
will matures, if the beneficiary is familiar with the bequeathed property,
anticipates its receipt, and already identifies with it as a marital right or a
"birthright."' ' Such concepts (or conceits) could lead a beneficiary to
Richard H. Thaler & Eric J. Johnson, Gambling with the House Money and Trying to Break Even: The
Effects of Prior Outcomes on Risky Choice, 36 MGMT. Sc. 643, 644,657 (1990), reprinted in THALER,
supra note 59, at 48; see also Jack L. Knetch, The Endowment Effect and Evidence of Nonreversible
Indifference Curves, 79 AM. ECON. REV. 1277, 1282 (1989) (suggesting that experimental evidence on
the endowment effect may underestimate its extent because the subjects may view the property given
to them for the experiment as a "windfall"). (Also suggesting that a sense of endowment builds over
time, see the early discussion in Holmes, supra note 118, at 477.)
For a general discussion of the relativity of characterizations of changes in one's property, which
can be framed alternatively as losses or forgone gains with significant consequences for individual
choice, see Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of
Choice, 211 SCI. 453 (1981) [hereinafter Tversky & Kahneman, Framing], reprinted in RATIONAL
CHOICE, supra note 59, at 123; Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Loss Aversion in Riskless Choice:
A Reference-Dependent Model, 106 Q.J. ECON. 1039 (1991) (including an interesting discussion of the
rationality of the endowment effect); Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 74, at 8260-62 (dubbing this
alternative framing phenomenon "the money illusion"). According to Tversky and Kahneman, lay
persons are ordinarily unaware of alternative frames and will accept passively the frame offered by an
experimenter, whereas "in everyday life ... [t]he reference outcome is... sometimes set by social
norms and expectations." Tversky & Kahneman, Framing, supra, at 456, 456-58; see also Baruch
Fischhoff, Predicting Frames, 9 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: LEARNING, MEMORY, & COGNMON 103
(1983).
122. Russell W. Belk, Adolescents' Reported Saving, Giving, and Spending as a Function of
Sources of Income, 12 ADVANCES CONSUMER RES. 42 (1984). See also the brief psychological
speculation in LAWRENCE C. BECKER, PROPERTY RIGHTS 48-49 (1977). For evidence that some
beneficiaries take a careless attitude toward inheritances that they did not anticipate or sense that they
did not work for, see the anecdotes reported in SUSSMAN Er AL., supra note 113, at 167. Again, the
psychological literature is curiously scant, but historians have appreciated the heightened possessiveness
of early American settlers toward the property they laboriously carved out ofthe wilderness. E.g., ALAN
TAYLOR, LIBERTY MEN AND GREAT PROPRIETORS: THE REVOLUTIONARY SETTLEMENT ON THE MAINE
FRONTIER, 1760-1820, at 24-29 (1990); EDMUND S. MORGAN, THE BIRTH OF THE REPUBLIC, 1753-89,
at 73-74 (rev. ed. 1977); EDMUND S. MORGAN, Revisions in Need of Revising, in THE CHALLENGE OF
THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 43, 54-56 (1976). For my own prior thoughts, see Adam J. Hirsch, From
Pillory to Penitentiary: The Rise of Criminal Incarceration in the New Republic 273-74 (1987)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University). For a recent philosophical examination of the labor-
desert theory of property, see STEPHEN R. MUNzER, A THEORY OF PROPERTY 254-91 (1990). See also
Hirsch & Wang, supra note 3, at 44 n.170 (noting the recognition by "self-made" persons that
inheritances can be demoralizing).
123. Surely it cannot be doubted that some persons feel a strong attachment to the property they
inherit, possibly because it holds sentimental value to them, or possibly because they do conceive they
have "earned" it, by virtue of spousal or filial devotion if not by dint of their wage labor. On the
sentimental value of inherited wealth, see SUSSMAN Er AL., supra note 113, at 156-58. But see John
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treat inherited property as the equivalent of self-made assets.
Still another psychological factor to consider involves not the nature or
source of the property received, but rather the circumstances under which
it is acquired. Unlike inter vivos gifts, inheritances typically are accompa-
nied by intense (and often prolonged'24) grief at the loss of the benefac-
tor.'2' Just how this mental condition can affect financial decisions is yet
another issue overdue for inquiry, but one can again find entwined in the
existing literature a few suggestive threads. Students have recognized that
the physical shock of grief can leave beneficiaries vulnerable to outside
influence-and, presumably, to financial exploitation. 26  Studies also
indicate that grief (and negative mood states generally) can trigger
impulsive and compulsive behavior--such as excessive shopping-possibly
H. Langbein, The Twentieth-Century Revolution in Family Wealth Transmission, 86 MICH. L. REV. 722,
737-38 (1988) (arguing that most inherited property today lacks sentimental value). On the frequency
with which beneficiaries anticipate their inheritances, see SUSSMAN ET AL., supra note 113, at 159, 170-
71; on beneficiaries' sense of entitlement, see id. at 121-53. For a general discussion of the notion that
inheritances operate to reciprocate the beneficiary for social services performed during the benefactor's
life, see id. at 83-120; Hirsch, supra note 8, at 211-14; Hirsch, supra note 114, at 630-31; Hirsch &
Wang, supra note 3, at 9-11. I would add that such senses of entitlement appear more defensible from
a moral point of view in the spouse than in the child, given the former's more manifest contribution
to the commonweal of the family (a conclusion with which American lawmakers apparently concur,
having established a forced share for the spouse but not for descendants), but this fact fails to alter the
reality that some children, rightly or wrongly, do develop attachments to their parents' property that
could affect the psychology of inheritance. (On the moral claims of children, see also Succession of
Lauga, 624 So. 2d 1156 (La. 1993); Deborah A. Batts, IDidn't Ask to Be Born: The American Law of
Disinheritance and a Proposalfor Change to a System ofProtected Inheritance, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 1197
(1990).)
124. On the persistence of grief, see ROBIN A. HAIG, THE ANATOMY OF GRIEF 10 (1990);
REHABILITATION PSYCHOLOGY 133-35 (David W. Krueger ed., 1984).
125. Typically, though not invariably: some inheritances are received by distant relatives in lieu of
closer survivors--the so-called "laughing heirs." But laughing heirs almost always take by right of
intestacy, to which spendthrift trust policy is inapplicable. (For a rare example of a "laughing legatee,"
see Hirsch, supra note 8, at 211 n. I10.) For a discussion of inheritance by laughing heirs, suggesting
that the term is in fact a misnomer, see SUSSMAN ET AL., supra note 113, at 138-42. Of course, some
beneficiaries under wills may have feigned their affection for the deceased benefactors and so too will
be unaffected by their deaths.
126. HAIG, supra note 124, at 7-12,26-28; CATHINE M. SANDERS, GRIEF: THE MOURNINo AFTER
46-56, 76-79, 118-20, 182-86 (1989); Cym H. Lowell & Terry IL Abel, Estate Planning for the
Instantly Wealthy Including Resident and Non-Resident Aliens, 23 INsT. ON EST. PLAN. 1603, at 16-
16. Shock may also follow simply from a sudden dramatic change in wealth, again leaving the recipient
vulnerable to exploitation or indiscipline. Mark Abrahamson, Sudden Wealth, Gratification and
Attainment: Durkheim'sAnomie ofAffluence Reconsidered, 45 AM. Soc. REv. 49, 49-51 (1980); Lowell
& Abel, supra, 1601.1, at 16-4; William Simon & John H. Gagnon, TheAnomie of Affluence: A Post-
Mertonian Conception, 82 AM. J. Soc. 356 (1976); infra notes 136-37.
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as a relief to emotional distress.127 But at the same time, evidence
suggests that negative mood states heighten risk aversion. Grievers thus
could be less inclined to take financial risks than those in a happier frame
of mind. 8 Finally, it is possible that inheritances received under mourn-
ful circumstances will induce in beneficiaries a sense of guilt.'29 But the
behavioral consequences of such feelings are unclear: possibly they could
prompt in the beneficiary a wish to be rid of property received as a
consequence of personal tragedy, 30 or possibly they could awaken in her
a desire to bequeath to her own children in turn, since it is too late to offer
due gratitude to the benefactor herself.'31 Guilt at the receipt of an
inheritance thus appears double-edged, conceivably leading the beneficiary
either to dissipate the property or to salt it away in order to facilitate
127. "Shopping therapy," as the lay colloquialism has it. For professional discussions, see DAVID
W. KRUEGER, BODY SELF AND PSYCHOLOGICAL SELF 104-06 (1989); P.S. Fry, Affect and Resistance
to Temptation, I 1 DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 466 (1975) (child study); Hoch & Loewenstein, supra
note 77, at 502; Bert S. Moore et al., The Role of Affect in Delay of Gratification, 47 CHILD DEV. 273
(1976) (child study); O'Guinn & Faber, supra note 107, at 148. See generally Meryl P. Gardner, Mood
States and Consumer Behavior: A Critical Review, 12 J. CONSUMER RES. 281 (1985); Haim Mano,
Emotional States and Decision Making, 17 ADVANCES CONSUMER REs. 577 (1990); William R.
Swinyard, The Effects of Mood, Involvement, and Quality of Store Experience on Shopping Intentions,
20 J. CONSUMER RES. 271 (1993); Masanao Toda, Emotions and Decision Making, 45 ACrA
PSYCHOLOGICA 133 (1980).
128. Christopher Dewberry et al., Anxiety and Unrealistic Optimism, 130 J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 151
(1990); Eric J. Johnson & Amos Tversky, Affect, Generalization, and the Perception of Risk, 45 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 20 (1983); William F. Wright & Gordon H. Bower, Mood Effects on
Subjective Probability Assessment, 52 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAv. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 276
(1992) (see also the earlier studies reviewed therein); Leon Mann, Stress, Affect, and Risk Taking, in
RISK-TAKING BEHAVIOR, supra note 95, at 201 & especially 223-25 (discussing risk-taking in
depression).
129. EDWARD MYERS, WHEN PARENTS DIE 113-14 (1986); Kenneth J. Doka, The Monkey's Paw:
The Role of Inheritance in the Resolution of Grief, 16 DEATH STUD. 45, 54-57 (1992) (speculating that
guilt is most likely when the inheritance is unexpected); see SANDERS, supra note 126, at 64-67, 183-84
(suggesting that the mourning process itself can engender guilt).
130. See MYERS, supra note 129, at 113 (anecdote of beneficiary who allowed that she "did not
handle. . . well" an inheritance about which she felt guilty); SUSSMAN ET AL., supra note 113, at 167
(anecdote of beneficiary who gave away his inheritance because he wanted nothing from the deceased).
But see Roy F. Baumeister, The Self Against Itseyl. Escape or Defeat?, in THE RELATIONAL SELF 238,
240 (Rebecca C. Curtis ed., 1991) (questioning in general the assumption that guilt is connected to self-
destructive behavior).
131. Discussing this possibility in the abstract, see KENNETH E. BOULDING, THE ECONOMY OF
LOVE AND FEAR 26-27 (1973). For some concrete data, see SUSSMAN Er AL., supra note 113, at 160-62,
167-68, 171. Economists have debated the extent to which persons save in order to provide bequests,
see supra note 75, but they (or somebody!) ought to explore more precisely the extent to which
inheritances themselves induce in beneficiaries bequest motives for saving.
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subsequent acts of "serial reciprocity."''
I can speculate about these matters-and so can you. Ultimately, it is up
to the cognitive psychologists to address them rigorously.
Leaving all of this behind in the black (or at least very dark) box where
it must remain for the time being, we may simply take note of the
behavioral fact that rapid dissipation of inheritances is a distinct possibility
and a legitimate concern. Though the empirical evidence is slim, it
confirms at least that much.' Apart from the psychological consider-
ations already remarked, beneficiaries of sudden infusions of wealth may
simply be unpracticed money managers, easily victimized, and they may
know no better than to terminate a terminable trust. The latter possibility
presents an additional concern, in that the beneficiary of a stream of income
132. Professor Boulding coined the phrase. BOULDING, supra note 131, at 26-27.
133. For a sociological study of responses to windfall gains, suggesting that their treatment is
dictated by cultural values, see Ronald Gallimore et al., Cultural Differences in Delay of Gratification:
A Problem of Behavior Classification, 30 J. PERSONALITY & SoC. PSYCHOL. 72 (1974).
For empirical studies of the use of inheritances, suggesting a diversity of beneficiary behaviors, see
BARLOw ET AL., supra note 116, at 95-96; STANLEY LEBERGOTr, WEALTH AND WANT 190-92 (1975),
reprinted in Stanley Lebergott, Are the Rich Getting Richer? Trends in U.S. Wealth Concentration, 36
J. ECON. HST. 147, 155-57 (1976); SussMAN ET AL., supra note 113, at 158-70; L.R. Klein et al.,
Savings and the Finances of the Upper Income Classes, 18 BULL. OXFORD UNIV. INST. STAT. 303
(1956); L.R. Klein & N. Liviatan, The Significance of Income Variability on Savings Behavior, 19
BUiL. OXFORD UNIv. INST. STAT. 151 (1957); Paul L. Menchik, Is the Family Wealth Squandered? A
Test of the Merry-widow Model, 44 J. ECON. HIST. 835 (1984). For studies of the propensity to save
or consume other sorts of lump-sum gains of wealth, testing Professor Friedman's permanent income
hypothesis, see GEORGE KATONA & EVA MUELLER, CONSUMER RESPONSE TO INCOME INCREASES 100-
06, 127-29 (1968); Roger C. Bird & Ronald G. Bodkin, The National Service Life-Insurance Dividend
of 1950 and Consumption: A Further Test of the "Strict" Permanent-Income Hypothesis, 73 J. POL.
ECON. 499 (1965) (positing a "loose" variant of the permanent income hypothesis under which the
marginal propensity to consume transitory income is above zero, but less than the marginal propensity
to consume permanent income); Ronald G. Bodkin, Windfall Income and Consumption, 49 AM. ECON.
REV. 602 (1959); Ronald G. Bodkin, WindfallIncome and Consumption: Comment, 53 AM. ECON. REV.
445 (1963); Carson & Tong, supra note 14, at 312; Robert C. Jones, Transitory Income and
Expenditures on Consumption Categories, AM. ECON. REV. 584 (May 1960) (separately paginated
Papers and Proceedings issue); Kreinin, supra note 116, at 388; Mordechai E. Kreinin, WindfallIncome
and Consumption: A Further Comment, 53 AM. ECON. REv. 448 (1963); James S. Marello, Comment,
Periodic Payment Plans: Are Annuities Adequately Protecting the Personal Injury Plaintiff from
Inflation, Providing Accurate Attorney's Fees and Promoting the Compensatory Goal of Our Tort Law
Sstem?, 12 Oino N.U. L. REv. 271,271 & n.6 (1985); Margaret G. Reid, Consumption, Savings and
Windfall Gains, 52 AM. ECON. REv. 728 (1962) (including in her study inheritances along with other
gains); supra note 116; see also Roger C. Bird, Consumption, Savings and Windfall Gains: Comment,
53 AM. ECON. REV. 443 (1963) (questioning whether inheritance spending data tests the permanent
income hypothesis, given the anticipation of expectancies); Margaret G. Reid, Consumption, Savings
and Windfall Gains: Reply, 53 AM. ECON. REV. 444 (1963) (responding to Bird); H. RoY KAPLAN,
LOTTERY WINNERS 154-73 (1978) (discussing the spending behavior of lottery winners); H. Roy
Kaplan, Lottery Winners: The Myth and Reality, 3 J. GAMBLING BEHAV. 168, 176 (1987) (same).
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in trust may misjudge the present value of her interest. Even before she
decides what to do with her inheritance, she could be enticed to liquidate
it for less than its true actuarial value-a "catching bargain" of the sort that
British courts of equity used to set aside as a matter of course. 134 General
concern for financial inexperience has led many commentators to
recommend the use of spendthrift trusts, 35 just as, by analogy, insurance
agents have urged the use of spendthrift installment options for life
insurance proceeds, t36 lottery commissions have opted for mandatory
periodic payouts of prizes,'37 and tort lawyers have advised structured
settlements of accident claims. 3
And there is one final use to which a restraint against voluntary
alienation can be put, though whether the problem here identified is more
theoretical than real I am not prepared to say. That is, a spendthrift trust
134. See GRAY, supra note 16, § 124n (recognizing the danger in a different context). On the
historical development of the treatment of sales of future interests by the Chancery Courts in Great
Britain and America, see John P. Dawson, Economic Duress-An Essay in Perspective, 45 MicH. L.
REv. 253,267-76 (1947); Russell D. Niles, Matter of Vought's Will: A Tighter Grip By the Dead Hand,
45 N Y.U. L. REv. 421, 437-39 (1970); Provident Life & Trust Co. v. Fletcher, 237 F. 104, 109-10
(S.D.N.Y. 1916); see also Friedman & Warshawsky, supra note 75, at 135 (discussing the premiums
charged for transactions with annuity companies); Friedman & Warshawsky, in PENSIONS, supra note
75, at 53-60 (same); infra note 210 and accompanying text.
135. Costigan, supra note 18, at 487 n.36, 489, 493; Richard R. Powell, The Rule Against
Perpetuities and Spendthrift Trusts in New York Comments and Suggestions, 71 CoLUM. L. REv. 688,
704 (1971); Note, A Rationale for the Spendthrift Trust, 64 COLUM. L. REv. 1323, 1326-27 (1964);
Steib v. Whitehead, 111 Ill. 247,251-52 (1884); see also Lowell & Abel, supra note 126, % 1601.1,
1603 (suggesting other expedients when no spendthrift trust has been imposed).
136. HARRY S. REDEKER & CHARLES K. REID, I, LiFE INSURANCE SETrLEMENT OPTIONS 6-7
(1957) (suggesting that "[lt is unusual for an individual not to be thrown off balance by sudden
affluence").
137. McCabe v. Director of N.J. Lottery Comm'n, 363 A.2d 387, 390 (N.J. Super. Ct. Div. 1976)
(suggesting the prize winner's need to be "insulated from his own human frailties and the possible
excesses to which he would otherwise be subjected by suddenly coming into possession of an enormous
amount of cash"); In re Brown, 86 B.R. 944, 948 (N.D. Ind. 1988) (noting that periodic payments
protect prize winners "from a short-lived misuse of their windfall"). Other ostensible functions of
periodic payments are tax savings and the utility of reducing the actual payout cost to the state.
McCabe, 363 A.2d at 390; Brown, 86 B.R. at 948. The former justification has lost much of its force
with the compression of tax rates in the 1980s, however, and the latter justification seems a rather
precise description of fraud.
138. JAMES R. ECK & JEFFREY L. UNGERER, STRUCrURING SETTLEMENTS §§ 5.04-.06 (1987);
Carson & Tong, supra note 14, at 309, 312-13; Vasilios B. Choulos, Structured Settlements: Cure or
Curse?, TRIAL, Nov. 1980, at 73, 74; Gayla R. Harrison, Note, The Ethics of Structuring Settlements,
34 DRAKE L. REv. 1045, 1051 (1985-86); Charles F. Krause, Structured Settlements for Tort Victims,
66 A.B.A. J. 1527, 1527-28 (1980); Claudia MacLachlan, IRS Clears Question on Structured Payouts,
NAT'L L.J., Sept. 27, 1993, at 10; Marello, supra note 133, at 271-72; Structured Settlements: A
Roundtable, TRIAL, Jan. 1983, at 70, 72.
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can operate to mitigate moral hazard within a communal family.13 9 If
altruistic parents will rescue children who overspend, those children have
a rational incentive to do so: they can thereby capture further shares of the
family wealth that would otherwise go to their more responsible siblings.
Parents can combat this incentive by threatening parasitic children with
strategic retaliation, but strong benevolence (or "softheartedness") may
dissuade them from this course. 40 An alternative course is to transfer to
children assets that they find more difficult to dissipate. A pair of
economists predicts on this basis that parents concerned about moral hazard
will overinvest in the housing and education of their children, because
"children cannot run down human capital [and other illiquid assets] as
readily as marketable wealth.' ' 41 But a disabling restraint serves this end
more efficiently, preventing parasitic overspending without simultaneously
narrowing the use of the transferred wealth to suboptimal purposes. 42
This may be designated the socializing (as opposed to the paternal) function
of spendthrift trusts.
In sum, for the right individuals-the nearsighted, the reckless, the
fragile, the inexperienced, the parasitic-a spendthrift trust provides the
ideal financial vehicle, offering safe passage to the future without fully
revoking their license to drive. 43 But the overall point I do hope to have
139. On the problem of moral hazard within the family, see generally Laurence J. Kotlikoff& Avia
Spivak, The Family as an IncompleteAnnuities Market, 89 J. POL. ECON. 372 (1981) (equating family
economy with a mutual insurance pool), reprinted in KOTKor, supra note 39, at 88; Neil Bruce &
Michael Waldman, The Rotten-Kid Theorem Meets the Samaritan's Dilemma, 105 Q.J. ECON. 155
(1990) (specifically addressing moral hazard); Assar Lindbeck & Jbrgen W. Weibull, Altruism and Time
Consistency: The Economics of Fait Accompli, 96 J. POL. EcON. 1165 (1988) (same).
140. On strategic retaliation, see LAURENCE J. KoTLIKoFF & ASSAF RAZtN, MAKING BEQUESTS
WITHOUT SPOILING CHILDREN: BEQUESTS AS AN IWPLICrr OPTIMAL TAX STRucruRE AND THE
PossmmTY THAT ALTRUISTIC BEQUESTS ARE NOT EQUALIZING (National Bureau of Economic Research
Working Paper No. 2737, 1988). On soft-heartedness, see Buchanan, supra note 39, at 74-75, 83-84.
141. Becker & Murphy, supra note 108, at 7. In a similar vein, other economists justify mandatory
saving within the Social Security system as a means of mitigating parasitic overeonsumption within the
family, Lindbeck & Weibull, supra note 139, at 1180-81, and within the larger altruistic social
community, see supra note 39.
142. Of course, with respect to inter vivos transfers, a parent fearful of parasitical dissipation of a
corpus of property could retain the corpus herself and simply make periodic transfers of income to her
children. But in the testamentary setting, a spendthrift trust could have greater strategic use, granting
a child her inheritance while ensuring that it is not dissipated in order to gain a larger bequest later from
the surviving parent.
143. Other inalienable variants of the spendthrift trust, such as the discretionary trust, can also play
this role-and indeed are often superior to the simple spendthrift provision as estate planning devices.
For a discussion, see Jon J. Gallo & Eileen F. Gallo, Estate Planning for the Postponed Generation,
PROB. & PROP., Sept.-Oct. 1989, at 6. Whereas some commentators have taken the position that
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substantiated is that when it comes to the treatment of wealth (however
acquired), there is nothing, absolutely nothing "systematic" about human
behavior. Lump-sum inheritances can facilitate both spending and
saving-and are apt in practice to produce either one.
This conclusion, incidentally, need not spell the end of Thomas Jackson's
theory of the discharge.1" He could posit that, as an empirical matter,
applying the discharge to every contract for credit serves the "greatest good
for the greatest number"-a Kaldor-Hicks move, as opposed to a Paretean
-good with harm to none" move. It seems unlikely, though, that lawmakers
could justify a legal rule mandating that all trusts be spendthrift even on
that basis.'45 Trusts are generally created by and for persons accustomed
to affluence,'46 and if one gives credence to the sociological evidence,
affluent persons are the ones least inclined to financial irresponsibility or
a "live for the present" mentality. 47 But of course in the context of
spendthrift trusts (unlike the discharge), we need not establish rules that
beneficiaries unable to attend rationally to their financial affairs can be judged incompetent and made
subject to guardianship, this would entail an unnecessary intrusion into the personal concerns of those
who are not fully incapable of managing their own affairs. In this respect, a spendthrift trust functions
as a via media between a full-fledged guardianship and untrammelled autonomy. Compare BOGERT &
BOGERT, supra note 2, § 222, at 385 n.6 and Bushman, supra note 7, at 317-18 with Note, supra note
135, at 1326-27. See also Note, The Disguised Oppression of Involuntary Guardianship: Have the
Elderly Freedom to Spend?, 73 YALE L.J. 676, 691 (1964) (arguing that court-ordered trusts or
annuities would in many instances be preferable to involuntary guardianship, "[assuring] financial
security.., while allowing the individual a maximum of integrity and freedom.").
144. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
145. Nor, by the same token, does a rule of construction seem wan-anted. Nonetheless, a few
jurisdictions have adopted rules of these sorts. See supra note 9. For a defense of the presumption that
benefactors would not create trusts unless they intended to include disabling restraints, see 4 POWELL,
supra note 8, § 42.25[5][c][iii], at 42-431. But see Sparks, supra note 35, at 35.
146. See infra note 249 and accompanying text.
147. See supra notes 100-05 and accompanying text. In a similar vein, Professor Scott argued
against the desirability of legally mandating disabling restraints: whereas these could benefit "the person
of weak intellect... [who] is not actually mentally incompetent," they were of no use to "a man of
ability," and "as a matter of law it is hardly possible to make one rule for the one type of beneficiary
and another for the other." 2A SCOTT, supra note 2, § 152, at 91-92. Compare the rule-based mandatory
inalienability of Social Security and ERISA pension benefits defended by some theorists on paternal
grounds, see supra note 78 and accompanying text. As with the bankruptcy discharge, such universal
protection may be more defensible when it covers wage earners in general (despite its costs to persons
"of ability"), for the interests of those who do benefit from protection could be deemed to outweigh the
costs to those who do not. See B. DOUGLAS BERNHEIM, IS THE BABY BOOM GENERATION PREPARING
ADEQUATELY FOR RETIREMENT? (1993) (presenting empirical evidence of widespread inadequacy of
saving among the baby boom generation); BER1HEIM, supra note 102 (same); Beruheim & Scholz,
supra note 100 (same). But see FRIEDMAN, supra note 37, at 188-89 (asserting that the cost to
responsible savers of mandatory purchase of inalienable pensions far exceeds the benefits). Trust
beneficiaries, by contrast, do not comprise a cross-section of American society.
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operate across the board. Under current law in most jurisdictions, individual
benefactors can discriminate, choosing whether or not to attach disabling
restraints to each bequest. (To borrow a distinction from utilitarian theory,
we might call this "act paternalism," as opposed to "rule paternalism."'48)
But this element of discretion raises another concern, does it not? For if
beneficiaries vary in their need for disabling restraints, the question remains
whether the typical benefactor can be counted on to impose them
judiciously, so that they turn up mainly in the estate plans where they
belong.
D. The Problem of Paternalism
Put otherwise, the question is whether benefactors know what they are
doing when they create spendthrift trusts. If so, they serve to compensate
for the poor judgment of beneficiaries, earning their eventual gratitude; if
not, the benefactors simply interpose their own poor judgment, and we are
back to square one.1 49
Now, we may notice that as a general proposition, theorists have held to
the conviction that freedom of testation promotes intelligent estate
planning.50 Certainly, benefactors can be expected to possess the infor-
mation and insight into their families' affairs necessary to distribute their
wealth in a rational manner. Parents know their children pretty well, and
because of natural ties of affection and consanguinity, parents can also be
expected to plan their estates with their children's interests at heart.
Still, when benefactors decree not only a testamentary division of their
wealth but also attach long-term restrictions on its use, there is cause for
some concern. Putting aside for just a moment the core problem of
prognostication, a benefactor's detailed judgments about her family could
be clouded by certain failings, predicted by cognitive psychologists and
often observed by down-to-earth estate planners. 5' Here, the pertinent
subdiscipline is "attribution theory," the study of cognitive processes by
148. Noting the distinction without applying this terminology, see Regan, supra note 69, at 207 n.2.
Compare act- and rule-utilitarianism, as outlined in W=uAM K. FRANKENA, ETMIcs 30-35 (1963).
149. Or, more precisely, we are back to supra note 57 and accompanying text.
150. This proposition, which a collaborator and I have dubbed the "father knows best" hypothesis,
is one of the traditional justifications for freedom of testation. For a recent statement of the hypothesis,
see McGOVERN Er AL., supra note 8, § 3.1, at 88-89. For additional references and a critical discussion
of the hypothesis, see Hirsch & Wang, supra note 3, at 12-13, 15.
151. In some cases though, it is the estate planners themselves who are at fault, by recommending
disabling restraints reflexively, without inquiring into the particular needs of beneficiaries. See supra
note 7.
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which people infer the state of the world around them. Research in this area
suggests that human inference is often irrational, falling prey to a variety
of "attribution errors. 152
As we would expect, researchers have discovered that emotion and
kinship sometimes color our assessment of others: parents may cling to an
unduly rosy image of their children. 53 On the other hand, individuals
who recognize shortcomings in themselves (such as financial irresponsibili-
ty) may be disposed to tar others with the same brush, in order to maintain
their relative self-esteem;'- more generally, studies suggest that individu-
als tend to perceive the rest of the world through a glass darkly, assessing
others as less capable than themselves. 55 Other attribution errors could
152. For general discussions, see EISER supra note 64, at 171-213; RICHARD NISBErr & LEE Ross,
HUMAN INFERENCE: STRATEGIES AND SHORTCOMINGS OF SOCIAL JUDGMENT (1980); KELLY G.
SHAVER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ATTRIBUTION PROCESSES (1975).
153. Discussing the impact of emotions and closeness on assessment, see Abraham Tesser, Some
Effects of Self-Evaluation Maintenance on Cognition and Action, in 1 HANDBOOK OF MOTIVATION AND
COGNITION 435, 437-43 (Richard M. Sorrentino & E. Troy Higgins eds., 1986); Carol R. Glass &
Thomas V. Merluzzi, Cognitive Assessment of Social-Evaluation Anxiety, in COGNITIVE ASSESSMENT
388, 427-28 (Thomas V. Merluzzi et al. eds., 1981) (noting as well that the causal sequence is unclear,
and that persons may maintain illusory appraisals in order to produce positively toned emotions); see
also SHAVER, supra note 152, at 23 (suggesting generally the difficulty of remaining objective in
perceptual judgments when the perceiver has a stake in the outcome). The phenomenon of ego defenses
such as denial, whereby persons suppress an external reality in conflict with their emotions in order to
reduce anxiety, could also presumably lead parents to overestimate the capabilities of their offspring.
See generally ANNA FREUD, THE EGO AND THE MECHANISMS OF DEFENCE (Cecil Baines trans.,
International Universities Press 1946). And parental identification with their children could have the
same effect: in a noncompetitive relationship, a positive assessment of one's children enhances one's
self-image. For discussions, see Jonathon D. Brown, Evaluations of Self and Others: Self-Enhancement
Biases in Social Judgments, 4 SOC. COGNITION 353, 370-73 (1986); Shelley E. Taylor & Judith H.
Koivumaki, The Perception of Self and Others: Acquaintanceship, Affect, and Actor-Observer
Differences, 33 J. PERSONALrIY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 403 (1976); see also Abraham Tesser & Jennifer
Campbell, Self-Definition andSelf-Evaluation Maintenance, in 2 PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTrvES ON THE
SELF 1, 5-12 (Jerry Suls & Anthony G. Greenwald eds., 1983) (discussing the effect of a relation's
success on one's self-evaluation). For a general discussion of the irrational persistence of beliefs and
the psychological mechanisms involved, see BARON, supra note 73, at 256-80.
154, HOWARD B. KAPLAN, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF SELF-REFERENT BEHAVIOR 115-16 (1986). At
the same time, recognition of a failing in oneself might lead one to downgrade the significance of that
attribute relative to other attributes, in oneself and in others. Thus, an irresponsible spender might come
to minimize or even to disdain thrift. Id. at 106, 112-15; Tesser, supra note 153, at 440, 448-52. These
phenomena are both manifestations of what is known in the literature as "self-protective-self-
enhancing responses" within the attribution process. For a further discussion, see KAPLAN, supra, 101-
76 (and the references noted therein). See also ELSTER, supra note 69, at 109-24 (discussing the more
general phenomenon of "sour grapes").
155. This phenomenon is known technically as the "self-other bias." For a recent discussion
referring to prior studies, see Brown, supra note 153. For an early discussion, see I SMITH, supra note
46, at 120. The self-other bias may well be enhanced in those situations where the trait being assessed
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also operate to skew perceptions in either direction. 56 Estate planners
have dwelled little on instances of overassessment of beneficiaries, but they
have often been impressed with the vanity of their clients (particularly those
who have achieved personal financial success), both in inflating their own
ability to plan for others and in deprecating the qualifications of those
around them, including their own offspring.'57 But a still more common
failing involves what might be dubbed the "static attribution error":
benefactors often appear to forget that they inhabit a changing world.
Whether or not they look down on their children, they tend to look
backward, ignoring or even resisting the idea that their children grow up
as well as grow older and that their children's needs-and their facul-
ties-evolve over time.'58 Once again, the psychological evidence is
is ambiguous (such as frugality?), and in those situations where the assessment is communicated
privately (such as within wills, which remain private documents so long as the benefactor
lives-although wills do become public after they mature, a prospect that could be troubling to some
benefactors contemplating provisions manifesting negative assessments of beneficiaries). Herbert H.
Blumberg, Communication of Interpersonal Evaluations, 23 3. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 157
(1972); Brown, supra note 153, at 372-73.
156. It has been hypothesized that persons tend to attribute the behavior of others to stable trait
dispositions rather than to situational pressures, whereas they judge their own conduct as relatively more
influenced by environmental circumstances. This phenomenon, known as the "fundamental attribution
error," has been attributed in turn to a number of heuristic devices. For discussions, see EISER, supra
note 64, at 183-89; NISBETT & Ross, supra note 152, at 122-27; David Watson, The Actor and the
Observer: How Are Their Perceptions of Causality Divergent?, 92 PSYCHOL. BULL. 682 (1982); see
also Taylor & Koivumaki, supra note 153 (finding that close acquaintanceship does not appear to
neutralize the error). But cf. Langer, supra note 92 (discussing the illusion of control); KAPLAN, supra
note 154, at 109, 155 (discussing self-deceptive attribution of negative consequences to forces beyond
the self). Discounting situational pressures seemingly could lead benefactors either to under- or to
overestimate the frugality of their beneficiaries, depending upon whether those pressures promoted
current spending or saving.
Evidence also suggests that transient mood states (along with more stable emotional attachments)
can affect our judgments of others, possibly because "material stored in memory that is congruent with
that feeling state will be more accessible." Margaret S. Clark, A Role for Arousal in the Link Between
Feeling States, Judgments, and Behavior, in AFFECT AND COGNITION 263, 265 (Margaret S. Clark &
Susan T. Fiske eds., 1982); Alice Isen et al., Affect, Accessibility of Material in Memory, and Behavior:
A Cognitive Loop?, 36 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1 (1978); Russell Veitch & William Griffitt,
Good News-Bad News: Affective and Interpersonal Effects, 6 3. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 69 (1976).
Again, the benefactor's mood during the estate planning process cannot be predicted, for her (negative?)
attitude toward death and her (positive?) attitude toward giving are both likely to be implicated. For a
discussion, see THOMAS L. SHAFFER, DEATH, PROPERTY, AND LAWYERS: A BEHAVIORAL APPROACH
107-46 (1961).
157. LEACH & LOGAN, supra note 7, at 241-42; Lukens, supra note 47, at 137-38; see also Brown,
supra note 153 (finding that the self-other bias is particularly pronounced among persons with high self-
esteem).
158. LEACH & LOGAN, supra note 7, at 241-42; SHAFrER, supra note 156, at 123-24; SHAFFER &
MOONEY, supra note 31, at 13-14; Paul B. Sargent, Drafting of Wills and Estate Planning, 43 B.U.L.
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suggestive: just as persons form habits of behavior, so do they develop
habits of perception (concerning, for example, the dependency of their
progeny159), and they often engage in the ego defense of denial of an
unhappy future in which they are old or deceased.' 6°
It would be going too far to assert that benefactors misperceive their
beneficiaries' aptitudes in a systematic way. Still, the possibility that a
benefactor may (in spite of her insight) underrate her beneficiaries'
prospects for personal responsibility, and hence may be overeager to
proclaim or prolong spendthrift restrictions, seems sufficiently tangible.
What is more, not even clear-sighted benefactors can forecast their
beneficiaries' future capabilities and exigencies with any degree of
assurance. So long as a benefactor lives, she can (and often does) tailor her
gratuitous transfers to her beneficiaries' particular needs, subsidizing those
activities or purchases which she deems advisable at any given time-but
these judgments are made on the spot, with information near at hand. Even
an inter vivos spendthrift trust could be terminated or modified with the
benefactor's consent.161 Once the benefactor dies, such impromptu
refinements become impossible (death being the ultimate disabling
restraint), and beneficiaries must thenceforth make do with testamentary
restrictions premised on the benefactor's final evaluation of their interests
and financial judgment. The dead have their say, but lives go on. With each
passing day, even the best-laid estate plan is bound to grow increasingly
obsolescent.16
2
Of course, existing law does limit the grasp of the dead hand. Under the
Rule Against Perpetuities, benefactors can (loosely speaking) control their
property for no longer than lives in being plus twenty-one years, a temporal
boundary imposed with precisely this problem in mind. Still, the solution
offered by the Rule lacks sufficient refinement. 163 Some forms of dead
hand control are more invasive than others: restrictions on the use of
property, for instance, directly impair its value to beneficiaries, whereas
REv. 179, 191-92 (1963); Lukens, supra note 47, at 138. For an early observation along these lines, see
Duke of Norfolk's Case, 22 Eng. Rep. 931, 949 (Ch. 1682).
159. J. RICHARD EISER & J. VAN DER PLIGT, ATrrrun)s AND DECisioNs 29-32, 41 (1988).
160. FREUD, supra note 153, at 133-34. The classic modem discussion is ERNEST BECKER, THE
DENIAL OF DEATH (1973).
161. 4 SCOTT, supra note 2, § 338.
162. The point has been often made as a criticism of dead hand control in general; still, it becomes
less salient as benefactors add elements of discretion to their estate plans. Hirsch & Wang, supra note
3, at 15 & n.53, 23-24, 36-37 & n.144, 38-43.
163. For an extended criticism of the Rule Against Perpetuities on this basis, see id. passim.
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provisions for the allocation of property among alternative beneficiaries
have no comparable impact upon total wealth." Of such distinctions the
Rule takes no account. Though a disabling restraint fails to dictate how
money must be spent, it does dictate when it can be spent. To the extent
that a spendthrift trust cramps the beneficiary's elbow room to modify her
consumption behavior in light of events as they happen to unfold, the
subjective value of her inheritance is again affirmatively degraded. In this
respect, a disabling restraint is only marginally less invasive than other use
restrictions, 65 whose costs could set in long before the trust runs up
against the Rule Against Perpetuities.166
All of this being the case, lawmakers would do well to build into the
system a safety valve. If the law enforces restrictions against voluntary
alienation, it should give beneficiaries the right to petition for their
termination on grounds of manifest unsuitability or unforeseen condi-
tions-a sort of cy pres authority for private trusts. 167  Such a legal
164. See the discussion in id. at 18-27, 34-38, 50.
165. Whereas a use restriction requires the beneficiary to use the inheritance for a specy7c (possibly
less desired) purpose, a disabling restraint will rather foreclose the beneficiary from putting the
inheritance to certain (possibly more desired) purposes that cannot be paid for in small increments.
166. For an early criticism of spendthrift trusts along these lines, see Overman's Appeal, 88 Pa.
276, 281 (1879). In connection with use restrictions in general, see Hirsch & Wang, supra note 3, at
50-51, 54-55.
167. A number of commentators have proposed giving courts authority to extinguish disabling
restraints if and when it finds that the beneficiary possesses full competency. CHEsTER, supra note 15,
at 139-40; Bushman, supra note 7, at 313-15; Manning, supra note 1, at 405-06 (noting that it would
be against public policy "to enforce the capricious whims of an owner of property"); Note, supra note
35, at 767; see also 4 POWELL, supra note 8, § 42.2515][c][iii], at 42-438 to 42-447 (discussing
deliberations over the creation of cy pres powers to modify spendthrift trusts in New York); BOGERT
& BOGERT, supra note 2, § 222, at 385 (suggesting that the application of spendthrift trusts to the fully
capable is overbroad); 6 AmERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 32, § 26.100, at 545 (same);
Brahmey v. Rollins, 179 A. 186, 194 (N.H. 1935) (same). But see 2A SCOTr, supra note 2, §152, at
91-92 (suggesting that "it is hardly possible" to draw such a legal distinction). (Still, given the
socializing, in addition to the paternal, function of spendthrift trusts, discussed supra notes 13942 and
accompanying text, courts should also take concerns about overall family welfare into account, waiving
disabling restraints upon beneficiaries who prove clever, but not upon those who are too clever by half.)
At one time, several jurisdictions implemented limitations on spendthrift trusts based on judicial
determination of suitability, but such provisions no longer exist in any state. BOGERT & BOGERT, supra
note 2, § 222, 407 n.59, 416 n.59 (citing Arizona and Georgia provisions); 4 POWELL, supra note 8,
§ 42.25[5][c][i, 42-410; 42-447; see also id. § 42.25[3][g] (discussing the prior enforceability in
England of disabling restraints only for married women on the assumption that they were subject to
suasion by their husbands, a special suitability-based distinction); 2A ScoTT, supra note 2, § 146.1
(same). Nevertheless, several jurisdictions today grant courts authority to nullify use restrictions on
trusts generally, whether or not they take the form of disabling restraints. For statutory references and
commentary, see Hirsch & Wang, supra note 3, at 51 & n.205.
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response can be envisioned as an exercise, so to say, of "meta-paternal-
ism"-a means of protecting beneficiaries against misguided paternalistic
impulses of the benefactor. 6
There remains, however, a more fundamental critique of trust paternalism
that cannot go unanswered. The whole exercise can be challenged from a
moral point of view. 69 Professor Gray assailed the spendthrift trust from
this direction. To insist that beneficiaries live on the income from a trust
rather than dispose of the corpus all at once was, said Gray, to abandon the
principle of "individual liberty," and to coddle "the weaker... portion of
the community."'7 Such a moral vision, he concluded in his most
colorful of many purple passages, was infused "by that spirit, in short, of
paternalism, which is the fundamental essence alike of spendthrift trusts
and of socialism."''
Penned at the height of legal formalism, Gray's diatribe must, if nothing
else, have been refreshing-an effusion of bluntness in an age of bland-
168. For a further discussion, see Hirsch & Wang, supra note 3, at 21-27. Of course, this analysis
assumes that courts will judge the interests of beneficiaries more acutely than the benefactor. Debating
the virtues of judicial determination of suitability, compare Manning, supra note 18, at 405 with Note,
supra note 135, at 1333-34 and Note, supra note 35, at 767. At least when judicial judgments are
premised on changed circumstances, the court will be rendering its assessment on the spot, with the
benefit of hindsight. Still, there does exist here an inescapable "Who guards the bevy of Platonic
guardians?" problem.
169. See by analogy FREDmAN, supra note 37, at 187-88 (criticizing mandatory purchase of
inalienable annuities on grounds of individual autonomy); Gregory S. Alexander, Pensions and
Passivity, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 1993, at 111, 120-22, 130-31 (suggesting that the case for
paternalistic pension law is "uneasy" given political ideals of individual responsibility). On moral
justifications for autonomy, see generally, for example, GERALD DWORKIN, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE
OF AUTONOMY (1988); 2 RALPH W. EMERSON, Self-Reliance, in THE COLLECTED WORKS OF RALPH
WALDO EMERSoN 25 (Joseph Slater ed., 1979); GOODIN, supra note 42, at 332-59; LAWRENCE
HAwoRTH, AUTONOMY (1986); KLEINIG, supra note 68, at 27-36; Regan, supra note 69, at 189-92; see
also MARTIN HEIDEGGER, BEING AND TIME 157-59 (John Macquarrie & Edward Robinson trans.,
Harper & Row 1962) (1927) (setting out the existential view that making hard choices is an essential
aspect of the human condition); Duncan Kennedy, Distributive and Paternalist Motives in Contract and
Tort Law, with Special Reference to Compulsory Terms and Unequal Bargaining Power, 41 MD. L.
REv. 563, 588-90, 63849 (1982) (setting out the Critical Legal Studies view that a tension lies between
the need for paternalistic intervention and its perverse tendency to reinforce preexisting hierarchies).
170. GRAY, supra note 16, at viii-x; see also id. § 258, at 243 ("[l]t is not the function of the law
to join in the futile effort to save the foolish and the vicious from the consequences of their own vice
and folly."). Extending to dead hand control in general the criticism that "it is better for [people], on
moral grounds, that they should manage their own concerns for themselves," see HOBHOUSE, supra note
55, at 184-85.
171. GRAY, supra note 16, at ix (emphasis added); cf. ELSTER, supra note 59, at 84-85 (asserting
that welfarism often entails, but does not necessarily imply, paternal restriction of citizens' autonomy).
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ness. 2 But the reasoning is another matter. To exalt the "individual
liberty" of beneficiaries was obviously to consider only half of the
equation. To the extent that lawmakers preserve that liberty, they tread
upon the freedom of benefactors to do with their own property as they
please."73 One way or the other, someone has to lose a portion of her
liberty. In connection with spendthrift trusts, this particular moral road
leads to the dead end of philosophical antinomy.' 74
As for Gray's apostrophe to socialism, one can only offer posthumous
congratulations on his foresight-for the fact is that, since Gray's passing,
socialism in the guise of the welfare state has won respectability and is
widely approved in its fundamental aims, even by neoconservatives. 75
But what appears particularly startling about Gray's dictum is that he here
decried not socialism by the state but rather socialism within the family.
And whatever one's moral view of the state as guardian ad litem, it takes
a hard heart to condemn a parent for bringing her own children under her
wing.176 In this respect, Gray surely was as much out of step with his
own time as with ours. By contrast, judicial contemporaries of Gray
applauded spendthrift trusts as following from "the best feelings of our
nature,"' 7 7 fulfilling "the most sacred instincts of regard and affec-
172. Certainly, Gray was capable of formalizing with the best of them; see his other major work,
JoHN C. GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPEI'UrnEs (Roland Gray ed., 4th ed. 1942) (1886), 833 tedious
pages through which not even the redoubtable W. Barton Leach could persevere. W. Barton Leach,
Perpetuities in a Nutshell, 51 HARV. L. REV. 638, 638 (1938). But the spendthrift trust brought out
another side of Gray. See GRAY, supra note 16, §§ 3, 257, 259 (emphasizing the importance of policy
analysis).
173. As one early court put the matter, not to enforce a disabling restraint interposed by a
benefactor "would be a fraud on his generosity." Holdship v. Patterson, 7 Watts 547, 551 (Pa. 1838).
A federal court recently made the point more coldly: "Pennsylvania enforces spendthrift provisions
solely to protect the property right of the donor in the execution of the trust and not out of any concem
for the beneficiary ...." Schreiber v. Kellogg, 849 F. Supp. 382, 390 (E.D. Pa. 1994).
174. For discussions, see 2A ScoTr, supra note 2, § 152, at 90-91; Richard R. Powell, Freedom
of Alienation-For Whom?, 2 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 127 (1967). For a historical account of
jurisprudential wrestling with this dilemma, see Gregory S. Alexander, The Dead Hand and the Law
of Trusts in the Nineteenth Century, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1189 (1985).
175. "Certainly [Gray's] ideas are less convincing at a time when social security and unemployment
insurance are accepted facts, medicare a more than likely possibility, and a war on poverty a tenet of
national policy." Note, supra note 135, at 1335; McGOVERN, supra note 8, § 8.7, at 342; see also 2A
ScoTr, supra note 2, § 152, at 91 (asserting cryptically that the spendthrift trust upholds "capitalistic
paternalism rather than socialistic paternalism."). On the modem moral consensus for welfarism, see,
for example, GOODIN, supra note 42, at 16. For further references, see Hirsch & Wang, supra note 3,
at 44 & n.169.
176. Gray at one point described the spendthrift trust as a reflection of "family pride, and
sentimentalism." GRAY, supra note 16, § 168, at 162.
177. Buckman v. Wolbert, 9 Phila. Rep. 207, 207 (Dist. Ct. 1874).
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tion."'78 Surely, paternalism was and remains a fundamental moral
responsibility of parenthood. 7 9
But perhaps Gray's point was that this effort at paternalism, once again,
is misguided. Granting that parents are morally bound to come to the aid
of their children, a spendthrift trust will not in fact inure to their benefit.
Gray himself spoke of spendthrift trusts as having an "irritating and
demoralizing" effect on their subjects, who were "not likely to become...
valuable citizen[s],"'"8 and other commentators and judges have chimed
in with similar assessments. Spendthrift trusts, we are told, encourage
weakness of character and idleness (the latter charge carrying economic as
well as moral implications)."' Instead of motivating a free-spending
178. Jourolman v. Massengill, 5 S.W. 719, 728-29 (Tenn. 1887). For similar commentary, see
Guernsey v. Lazear, 41 S.E. 405, 410 (W.V. 1902); Matthews v. Van Cleve, 221 S.W. 34, 37 (Mo.
1920) (citing in turn to scripture, I Timothy 5:8); Nichols v. Eaton, 91 U.S. 716, 727 (1875); Steib v.
Whitehead, 111 I11. 247, 252 (1884); Bartelme, supra note 31, at 10.
179. Philosophers have specifically justified parental paternalism (as distinct from paternalism
generally) on several grounds: (1) the child's helplessness and resulting need for assistance, (2) the
parent's detailed knowledge of her child's situation and needs, and (3) our assurance that when a parent
(as opposed to the state) acts "paternalistically," she actually does have her child's interests at heart.
For discussions, see KLEINIG, supra note 68, at 143-56; MILL, supra note 39, at 69; Jack D. Douglas,
Cooperative Paternalism Versus Conflicyful Paternalism, in PATERNALISM 171, 172 (Rolf Sartorius ed.,
1983); Tziporah Kasachkoff, Paternalistic Solicitude and Paternalistic Behavior: Appropriate Contexts
and Moral Justifications, in FREEDOM, EQUALITY, AND SociAL CHANGE 79, 80-82 (Creighton Peden
& James Sterba eds., 1989); see also GOODIN, supra note 42, at 341-59 (asserting a moral contradiction
between opposition to the welfare state and advocacy of family dependency). One early commentator
emphasized these points in order to justify disabling restraints: "None can know the incapacity of a
child to support or protect himself, better than a parent, and certainly none should have a better right
to provide against his weakness." Bartelme, supra note 31, at 10. In implicit recognition of these
arguments, and the negative inferences that follow from them, several state statutes have confined
spendthrift trusts to persons related by blood or marriage to the benefactor, a position endorsed (without
analysis) by Professor Powell. BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 2, § 222, at 406 n.59, 407 n.59, 435 n.59
(citing law in Alabama, and prior law in Arizona and North Carolina); Powell, supra note 135, at 706;
see also 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 32, § 26.100, at 545 (suggesting that, in light of
its justify'ing theory, the application of spendthrift trusts to beneficiaries who are not close relatives is
overbroad). But see Note, supra note 135, at 1333 (arguing that a restriction to family member
beneficiaries is "arbitrary... insofar as no correlation exists between kinship and disability.").
180. GRAY, supra note 16, §§ 124o, 263.
181. E.g., 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 32, § 26.100, at 546; Lukens, supra note
47, at 139; Hutchinson v. Maxwell, 40 S.E. 655, 658 (Va. 1902); Seidenberg v. Seidenberg, 126 F.
Supp. 19, 21 (D.D.C. 1954); Smith v. Towers, 15 A. 92, 96 (Md. 1888) (dissent). This criticism has
been made of paternalism generally. Jon Elster, Selfishness and Altruism, in BEYOND SELF-INTEREST,
supra note 70, at 44, 47 ("[T]he opportunity to choose-including the right to make the wrong
choices-is a valuable, in fact, indispensable, means to self-improvement"); Joel Feinberg, Legal
Paternalism, in PATERNALISM, supra note 179, at 3, 3 ("If adults are treated as children they will come
in time to be like children. Deprived of the right to choose for themselves, they will soon lose the
power of rational judgment and decision.").
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beneficiary to take greater personal responsibility, a spendthrift trust will
confirm her in her habits-a sort of reverse-Pygmalion effect. Many
psychologists (and historians too) have noticed a tendency for individuals
and groups to take on the characteristics that others, particularly those in
positions of authority, ascribe to them-what is known in the psychological
literature as a "self-fulfilling prophecy.""' To the extent that parents
"pamper" or "overprotect" their children, reinforcing their childishness, they
may again deserve moral censure-for surely one of the central responsibil-
ities of parental paternalism is to prepare children for the eventual
autonomy of adulthood. 3
Of course, even assuming that spendthrift trusts are properly viewed as
concealing beneficiaries from the hard lessons of financial life, parental
protectiveness can be justified, at least for a time. Though sentencing a
child to a lifelong disabling restraint skates close to the line of willful
infantilization, a lesser term of protective custody may well be desirable
simply in order to age her sufficiently to survive in the schoolhouse.'84
Just how long a spell is necessary, and whether parents are ethically bound
to let go of their children as soon as they reach the age of majority, is less
clear. Though the sociologists have proclaimed the end of childhood
innocence,'85 we do live in an age of prolonged adolescence.'86 When
called for, parental protection can arguably be extended further into a
child's life.
87
182. For a recent discussion also reviewing prior literature, see Lee Jussim et al., Teacher
Expectations and Student Achievement: Self-Fulfilling Prophecies, Biases, and 4ccuracy, in
APPLICATIONS OF HEImsnTcs AND BIASES TO SOCIAL ISSUES 303 (Linda Heath et al. eds., 1994). For
a historian's observation, see EDMUND S. MORGAN, AMERICAN SLAVERY, AMERICAN FREEDOM: THE
ORDEAL OF COLONIAL VmiOINIA 326 (1975). For a suggestion that acceptance of a gift entails
acceptance of the identity imposed by the gift (or trust?), see DITTMAR, supra note 86, at 98.
183. KLE IIG, syupra note 68, at 143, 147-54; MILL, supra note 39, at 69, 175-76; Douglas, supra
note 179, at 173-75; Feinberg, supra note 181, at 3. Discussing the matter in psychological terms, see
FRIEDMAN & LACKEY, supra note 55, at 11-12; Feldman, supra note 86, at 366-67.
184. A disabling restraint may serve "to withhold the capital of the trust until [the beneficiary]
should reach such years of discretion that he would be likely to safeguard his own interest ... [and
thus] might profit by experience and by the ripening judgment which age usually brings." Jones v.
Harrison, 7 F.2d 461, 465 (8th Cir. 1925).
185. MARIE WINN, CHILDREN WITHOUT CHILDHOOD (1983); Jerry Adler, Kids Growing Up Scared,
NEWSWEEK, Jan. 10, 1994, at 43.
186. LARRY V. STOCKMAN & CYNTHIA S. GRAVES, ADULT CHILDREN WHO NVON'T GROW UP
(1989); SUSAN LITrwIN, THE POSTPONED GENERATION: WHY AMERICA'S GROWN-UP KIDS ARE
GROWING UP LATER (1986).
187. For a philosophical discussion, see KIEINIG, supra note 68, at 4, 74-75, 156-57. For related
discussions of the public policy of the twenty-one year period-in-gross under the Rule Against
Perpetuities, concerning the appropriate limits of dead hand control, see JOHN H. MORRIS & W.
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Whether such protection will operate, as critics charge, to stunt the moral
growth of the beneficiary is difficult to predict. To begin with, a spendthrift
trust does not cater unequivocally to the beneficiary's prodigality-it does
impose restraints, albeit artificial ones, from which habits might take
hold.18 The alternative sink-or-swim approach may fail as often as it
succeeds. And as far as self-fulfilling prophecies are concerned, several
recent researchers have argued that the targets of negative stereotyping
often respond by striving to overcome the stereotype, rather than submitting
to it."89 This rings true: surely, parental pessimism sometimes eggs a child
on to disappoint the prediction, to "prove that they were wrong about me."
Conceivably, a spendthrift trust, expressing gloom about a child's prospects
of responsibility, could prompt her to rebel against dependency-although,
admittedly, the object of her rebellion could also turn out to be the
financial restraint itself. 9°
BARTON LEACH, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES 68-69 (2d ed. 1962); SIMES, supra note 30, at 68-
70. Compare also mandatory saving under Social Security, whereby state paternalism persists throughout
the working years of citizens.
188. By analogy, it has been suggested that a Chapter 13 plan in bankruptcy, whereby a debtor is
obliged to follow a strict budget, has a salutary impact: "Administrators of Chapter XIII proceedings
observe the beneficial effect upon debtors of learning to live within their means." James Angell
MacLachlan, Puritanical Therapy for Wage Earners, 68 COM. L.J. 87, 89 (1963). See also supra note
69; Thaler & Shefrin, supra note 77, at 399 (predicting that a mandatory pension plan will not prompt
compensatory spending with unencumbered assets, because nondiscretionary savings entails no "psychic
cost"); Shefrin & Thaler, supra note 105, at 621-22 (same, because people "allow themselves" mentally
to associate mandatory saving with reduced income in order to accomplish its purpose of future
support). By analogy, empirical evidence suggests that mandatory pension plans increase total saving
and may even increase discretionary saving. PILP CAGAN, THE EFFEcr OF PENSION PLANS ON
AGGREGATE SAVING: EVIDENCE FROM A SAMPLE SURVEY (1965); GEORGE KATONA, PRIVATE PENsIoNs
AND INDIVIDUAL SAVING (1965); Laurence J. Kotlikoff et al., Annuity Markets, Savings, and the Capital
Stock, in ISSUES IN PENSION ECONOMICS 211 (Zvi Bodie et al. eds., 1987); Alicia H. Munnell &
Frederick 0. Yohn, What Is the Impact of Pensions on Saving?, in PENSIONS AND THE ECONOMY 115
(Zvi Bodie & Alicia H. Munnell eds., 1992); Shefrin & Thaler, supra note 105, at 622-24; Thaler, supra
note 58, at 199-200; Thaler & Shefrin, supra note 77, at 399-400. One student hypothesizes that
discretionary saving rises with forced saving because "[p]ension coverage draws attention to the
problems of providing for retirement," a phenomenon he terms "a 'recognition' effect." But he adds:
"I have purposely avoided the term learning effect, as misleading, since pension plans do not appear
to teach households much that they did not already know or could not easily find out." CAGAN, supra,
at 53.
189. EDWARD E. JONES Er AL., SOCIAL STIGMA 179-84 (1984); Dale T. Miller & William Turnbull,
Expectations and Interpersonal Processes, 37 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 233, 238 (1986) (citing to studies);
Mark Snyder, When Belief Creates Reality, 18 ADvANCEs EXPERIMmNTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 247,285-92
(1984) (same).
190. On reaction against paternal restraints and dependency, see BECKER, supra note 55, at 298;
BOULDING, supra note 131, at 99-100; ELStR, supra note 69, at 22, 111-12; KLEn iG, supra note 68,
at 143-44; MILL, supra note 39, at 150; Douglas, supra note 179, at 175; Feldman, supra note 86, at
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The criticism that spendthrift trusts will transform beneficiaries into
laggards is one that could just as well be made of inheritances generally.
By virtue of eventual succession to property, the productivity of one
generation can always dampen the industry of the next. 9' Spendthrift
trusts, at least, do not create perverse incentives to relax efforts. Unlike,
say, discretionary trusts and support trusts, which distribute larger sums to
those in greater need, and hence which affirmatively encourage indolence,
a spendthrift trust simply generates a fixed income stream, irrespective of
how much or little the beneficiary earns for herself. For some donees
poverty pays, but not for the beneficiary of a spendthrift trust. If anything,
impressing an inheritance with a disabling restraint should increase the
beneficiary's impetus to labor for her present consumption.'92
At any rate, whether beneficiaries typically alter their productive
activities in response to gratuitous transfers is far from clear. Persons
choose to labor for many reasons, including the nonmercenary satisfaction
that it provides, and mere habit (of which we are all, to a greater or lesser
extent, creatures). Studies of welfare recipients offer little evidence that
beneficiaries of state aid slacken their efforts to become productive.
93
Needless to say, the typical spendthrift trust beneficiary inhabits a different
region of the indifference curve between leisure and income than the usual
welfare recipient, and the behavior of trust beneficiaries has never been
365-67; see also Robert A. Burt, Commentary on Schelling's "Enforcing Rules on Oneself," I J.L.
ECON. & ORGANIZATION381 (1985) (suggesting that paternal restraints against one impulse may prompt
a different, possibly equally deleterious impulse, a behavioral phenomenon known as "symptom
substitution").
191. For some recent anecdotal evidence, see Tom Cunneff, The Sons Also Rise, GOLF DIG., May
1994, at 102, 108. This is, in fact, one of the traditional arguments against the institution of inheritance.
Hirsch & Wang, supra note 3, at 9 & n.29. But is the existence of a leisure class an unmitigated curse?
For discussions, see BERTRAND RUSSELL, In Praise of Idleness, in IN PRAISE OF IDLENESS AND OTHER
ESSAYS 11, 30-33 (1935); and the sources cited in Hirsch & Wang, supra note 3, at 41 n,158.
192. To the extent that a spendthrift trust limits a beneficiary's present consumption options, she
has an incentive to produce her own wealth to meet her additional present needs. See supra note 165
and accompanying text.
193. GOODIN, supra note 42, at 233-35, 338-41; THEODORE R. MARMOR ET AL., AMERICA'S
MISUNDERSTOOD WELFARE STATE 57-69, 141-44, 219-22 (1990); Gary Burtless & Robert A. Moffitt,
The Effect of Social Security Benefits on the Labor Supply of the Aged, in RETIREMENT AND ECONOMIC
BEHAVIOR 135 (Henry J. Aaron & Gary Burtless eds., 1984); Sheldon Danziger et al., How Income
Transfer Programs Affect Work, Savings, and the Income Distribution: A Critical Review, 19 J. ECON.
LrERATURE 975 (1981) (synthesizing earlier studies). For sociological studies on the general disposition
to labor, see THE NATURE OF WORK: SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTnVES (Kai Erikson & Steven P. Vallas
eds., 1990); LANE, supra note 109, at 235-422; F. Thomas Juster, Preferences for Work and Leisure,
in TIME, GOODS, AND WELL-BEING 333 (F. Thomas Juster & Frank P. Stafford eds., 1985); Curt
Tausky, Work is Desirable/Loathsome: Marx Versus Freud, 19 WORK & OCCUPATIONS 3 (1992).
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tested empirically. But studies of lottery winners, who also receive
substantial long-term income streams, are suggestive. Though some winners
search for more rewarding employment, few leave the labor force."9 a All
told, it seems problematic to infer that spendthrift trusts will impair the
moral well-being or productivity of beneficiaries. 95
There is, I think, another possible escape route from Gray's moral
critique: that is to notice that, oftentimes, a spendthrift trust is not
paternalistic at all, that in many if not most instances it can be reconciled
with the beneficiary's ostensible moral right to autonomy. The point is
simply that beneficiaries frequently will not be averse to spendthrift
protection. They may welcome it or even entreat the benefactor to provide
it. The benefits to them are manifest in connection with restrictions against
involuntary alienation, as will shortly be detailed. 96 But beneficiaries
may be equally thankful for restrictions against voluntary alienation. They
may recognize in themselves a tendency to overspend and so may accept
the need for externally imposed financial discipline. Though some critics
have supposed that spendthrift trusts are "necessarily humiliating" to their
beneficiaries,'97 how humiliating to citizens is the mandatory savings
component of Social Security?'98 To the extent that beneficiaries do
approve of disabling restraints, their autonomy remains intact.'99
194. Itzhak Harpaz, Non-Financial Employment Commitment: A Cross-National Comparison, 62
J. OCCUPATIONAL PSYCHOL. 147 (1989); H. Roy Kaplan, Lottery Winners and Work Commitment, J.
INST SOCIOECONOMIC STUD., Summer 1985, at 82; Kaplan, supra note 133, at 173-76. But see
KAPLAN, supra note 133, at 68-115 (reporting initial finding of little work commitment, based on a
relatively small sample of lottery winners).
195. Professor Bogert concludes:
The question whether spendthrift trusts prejudicially affect the character of their beneficiaries
cannot, of course, be answered with any certainty. There are no statistics.... From a reading
of many cases one is impressed with the weak or undesirable character of many of the
beneficiaries. Whether these qualities were caused or encouraged by the spendthrift trusts
established for them is another matter.
BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 2, § 222, at 387-88; and in a similar vein, see 2A ScoTr, supra note
2, § 152, at 91.
196. See infra notes 203-14 and accompanying text.
197. Nunn v. Titche-Goettinger Co., 245 S.W. 421, 423 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1922, opinion
adopted).
198. "The Social Security system, perhaps the most popular social policy of this century, is an
example of legislated self-control." Thaler, supra note 58, at 195. Perhaps this is a false analogy, for
Social Security does at least apply to everyone; whereas, it could be the invidious distinction between
beneficiaries that causes the object of a disabling restraint to feel humiliated. Still, as will be discussed
hereafter, many persons, acting individually, do take steps to protect themselves from their own
financial irresponsibility. See infra notes 322-32 and accompanying text.
199. "To the extent that bans on cigarette advertisements stem from the actual or potential
customers themselves,... one should not talk about paternalism." ELsTER, supra note 59, at 84; cf.
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Like moral analysis generally, it is all a bit muddy. So let us press on to
the second half of the spendthrift trust problem.
II. INVOLUNTARY ALIENATION
Along with the public policy of permitting benefactors to limit a
beneficiary's power to accelerate a stream of income, we have also to
consider the merits of allowing them to block her creditors from drawing
on that stream. At first glance, restraints against involuntary alienation
appear problematic, for they enable benefactors to tamper not only with the
rights of the beneficiary (who, if unhappy with the terms under which a gift
is offered, can always disclaim it), but also with the rights of third parties,
strangers to the transaction that resulted in the trust's creation.2"
Nevertheless, this fact alone is insufficient to condemn involuntary
restraints. Though some courts have maintained that any attempt by way
of testamentary writ to modify the legal rights of creditors, "tak[ing] such
property out from under the operation of. . . statutes and pro tanto
repeal[ing] them," is void per se,2"1 this assertion-at least from the
standpoint of policy analysis-begs the question. The real problem lies in
assessing what powers the legislature ought to grant benefactors to qualify
creditors' rights in the first place.
That protection of this sort could serve the interests of beneficiaries is
readily apparent. Consider the case of a beneficiary who is already indebted
when her inheritance arrives. If she intends to pay off her debts, she might
well be indifferent as to whether she receives her inheritance subject to
restraint. Even were creditors immediately to swallow up her whole
resources, including those she inherits, her future resources would thereby
be liberated for further consumption. On the other hand, if an indebted
beneficiary were insolvent and anticipated a workout or a bankruptcy
proceeding that would free up her future resources anyway, then she would
Elster, supra note 181, at 47 (suggesting, by contrast, that the decision of the welfare state to provide
food stamps instead of money does not reflect the will of the recipients).
200. Those commentators alert to the distinction have considered disabling restraints on involuntary
alienation more problematic from the standpoint of public policy than those preventing voluntary
alienation. E.g. BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 2, § 222, at 387. On the diselaimability of spendthrift
trusts, see supra note 120.
201. Swan v. Gunderson, 215 N.W. 884, 885 (S.D. 1927). Another court characterized spendthrift
trusts as "almost a scom of the law": "[T]he right to seize property ... is not a quality of property, but
is wholly external thereto.... It is a public regulation of property beyond private control.... If [the
benefactor] may bar seizure, why may he not as well bar taxability?" Brahmey v. Rollins, 179 A. 186,
191, 192, 194 (N.H. 1935).
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gain materially from a disabling restraint. She could then have her financial
cake and eat it too, receiving a discharge from her debts but keeping her
inalienable assets in the bargain.2"' Herein lies the preservative function
of an involuntary restraint.
Even if a beneficiary were not presently indebted, a restraint against
involuntary alienation could benefit her and her family in other ways. Once
again, such a restraint could serve both a paternal and a socializing function
by inhibiting witless and parasitical borrowing along with spending: an
individual with fewer alienable assets will have smaller access to credit.
But even beneficiaries of a provident bent might find virtues in involuntary
restraints: for these can also serve a security function, limiting the debtor's
future financial risk.20 3 By squirreling away this nest egg, benefactors
give beneficiaries a measure of protection against subsequent financial
embarrassment, though again at the cost of more expensive and elusive
credit. Whether this type of protection would appeal to the individual
beneficiary will depend upon her personal preferences, of course, which she
can communicate to the benefactor.2" Given the collective propensity
toward financial risk aversion, the balance of probabilities would, at any
rate, be in its favor.2" 5 In light of the security they provide, restraints
against involuntary alienation should find favor with a wider audience of
202. Avoidance of satisfaction of a beneficiary's prior debts has been a common motive for adding
disabling restraints to bequests. For some early expressions of this aim, see Easterly v. Keney, 36 Conn.
18, 19 (1869); Holdship v. Patterson, 7 Watts 547, 548-49 (Pa. 1838); Ashhurst v. Given, 5 Watts &
Serg. 323, 324 (Pa. 1843). For a recent example, see In re McCombe, 93 B.R. 597, 597-98 (Bankr. S.D.
Ohio 1988).
203. For an early estate plan setting out this motive, see Lampert v. Haydel, 9 S.W. 780, 780 (Mo.
1888) (involving a spendthrift trust created to protect beneficiaries from "the accident of fortune"). For
discussions, see Costigan, supra note 18, at 487; Friedman, supra note 7, at 577-78; Lowell & Abel,
supra note 126, 1 1606; Nancy S. Roush & Robert K. Kirkland, Spendthrift Trusts Not Limited to
Protection of Immature Dependents, 18 EST. PLAN. 16, 16 (1991).
204. See supra text accompanying note 196. Again, a beneficiary found to be in no need of paternal
protection from overborrowing arguably should be permitted to undo a restraint against involuntary
alienation by court order. Such would enable her to borrow more easily and at lower cost (though with
less security), if that is her preference. See supra notes 161-68 and accompanying text. If the trust only
restrained involuntary alienation, leaving the beneficiary free to alienate her interest herself (a so-called
"quasi-spendthrift trust," see supra note 23), then she would stand in a position to convert the property
and thereby indirectly to avoid the involuntary restraint anyway.
205. See supra note 95. By analogy, commentators have justified the discharge in bankruptcy
(securing the debtor's subsequent earning capacity), pension inalienability, and corporate limited liability
on this basis. POSNER, supra note 20, § 14.3, at 394-95; Margaret Howard, A Theory of Discharge in
Consumer Bankruptcy, 48 Onto ST. LJ. 1047, 1067 (1987); Richard A. Posner, The Rights of Creditors
of Affliated Corporations, 43 U. CaH. L. REV. 499, 503 (1976); Weiss, supra note 78, at 1292 (citing,
but not subscribing, to the argument).
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beneficiaries than restrictions on their own right to accelerate interests in
a trust. (It is, however, a distinction that needs emphasizing within the
applicable estate planning literature.)20 6
In another way, restraints against involuntary alienation of a trust interest
might carry broad appeal: irrespective of the beneficiary's concern for risk,
they ensure that the property interest in question will not be sold forcibly
under circumstances disadvantageous to the owner.0 7 When a benefactor
creates a life estate, she gives something of enhanced worth to her
beneficiary: not merely an amount of property, but also an annuity, which
has additional value as a hedge against actuarial risk."' But a potential
buyer of the annuity will not compensate her for this value, for it vanishes
once it passes out of her hands-a life estate pur autre vie is not a
hedge.0 9 What is worse, life estates and other future interests upon forced
sale typically fail to fetch even their full risk-adjusted value, given the
absence of an established market in these nonhomogeneous assets.
210
When the smoke clears, creditors may be left with deficiency judgments
diminished by far less than the beneficiary's loss. For this reason,
contingent future interests have been held exempt from creditors' claims as
206. Estate planners have been insufficiently careful to separate the appeals of voluntary and
involuntary restraints. Whereas one pair of students posit that beneficiaries who are "prudent money
managers ... may still be subject to unexpected claims and so may need the protection of a spendthrift
trust," Roush & Kirkland, supra note 203, at 16, it is more precise to say that prudent beneficiaries
could benefit from involuntary restraints, not voluntary ones. As a matter of law, the two may not need
to go together, see supra note 23, and as a matter of estate planning they often might be better left
uncoupled, see infra notes 265-66 and accompanying text.
207. This attribute of spendthrift trusts has not been discussed in either the theoretical or estate
planning literature, though it is a long-standing legal concern, as will appear hereafter. Compare the
related paternal interest in ensuring that a beneficiary does not voluntarily liquidate a trust interest for
less than its full value, discussed supra note 134 and accompanying text.
208. Whereas life insurance protects against the risk of dying too soon, an annuity protects the
annuitant against the risk of living too long. For a further discussion, see Hirsch & Wang, supra note
3, at 36.
209. Indeed, a life estatepur autre vie is affirmatively risky from a buyer's perspective; for this risk
she will demand a premium, unless she can negate the specific risk by purchasing at low transaction
cost the remainder interest also and thereby merge the two estates into a risk-free fee simple. For a
fuller discussion of the market for future interests in light of portfolio theory, see Hirsch & Wang, supra
note 3, at 35-36.
210. In Great Britain, formal markets in future interests have developed. See Robert D. Hershey,
Jr., Birthrights Upfor Auction As Investments in London, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 1978, at Dl; Speculation:
Betting on Death, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 25, 1971, at 66. For a (facetious) proposal to establish such a market
in the United States, see Cullen Murphy, Great Expectations: Acquiring Tomorrow Today, ATLANTIC,
Dec. 1990, at 24.
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a matter of law in some jurisdictions;2 t though vested interests (such as
life estates) are everywhere fully alienable, the same difficulty in fact
applies to them as well. The benefactor can enlist a spendthrift trust to
protect the beneficiary in this respect. Thus, along with their other
functions, involuntary restraints can serve a value maintenance function,
ensuring that beneficiaries can enjoy fully property interests that others tend
to underappraise and hence avoiding the waste of beneficial utility.212
Absent involuntary restraints, beneficiaries could seek to maintain
security and value by bargaining to limit creditors' recourse to their trusts.
In ordinary consumer credit transactions such bargains are unheard of,
however, presumably because of offsetting transaction costs and other
considerations.213 In this respect, a spendthrift trust can function to avoid
transaction costs. 214
Furthermore, disabling restraints against involuntary alienation can
benefit society, to the extent that they impede debtor destitution. The
211. 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 32, §§ 4.64-.72; 2A POWELL, supra note 8, §§
274-79; 2A SCOTr, supra note 2, § 162; Edward C. Halbach, Jr., Creditors' Rights in Future Interests,
43 MINN. L. REv. 217 (1958); and the cases cited in Hirsch & Wang, supra note 3, at 35 n.136.
212. See Jones v. Harrison, 7 F.2d 461, 465 (8th Cir. 1925) (construing an ambiguous trust to be
spendthrift on the theory that the benefactor had created the trust to avoid the waste of its beneficial
interests on forced sale). Similar structural purposes can be observed in other legal doctrines, such as
the discharge in bankruptcy (ensuring that human capital is fully utilized), and exemption rights in
personal property and life insurance. For discussions, see Hirsch, supra note 8, at 209-10 & n.106, 220
& n 143; Vukowich, Debtors' Exemption Rights, supra note 44, at 787-88, 811 & n.185; Note,
Bankruptcy Exemptions: Critique and Suggestions, 68 YALE L.J 1459, 1502 (1959); Woodson v.
Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. (In re Woodson), 839 F.2d 610, 618 (9th Cir. 1988).
Given the widespread utility of involuntary (as opposed to voluntary) restraints in terms of
preservation, security, and value maintenance, a stronger case can be made for a rule of construction
implying that all trusts are intended to be quasi-spendthrift, invulnerable to levy but subject to deliberate
sale, than can be made for a rule of construction that all trusts are intended to contain both voluntary
and involuntary restraints. Cf supra notes 145-47 and accompanying text. Such a modified rule of
construction presently exists in two states. See supra note 9.
213. See Jackson, supra note 44, at 1401 n.24 (suggesting by analogy that debtor negotiation for
a discharge, were it optional, would signal to a creditor that the debtor anticipated default; thus,
signaling theory suggests that no debtor who bargained for a limited recourse loan could obtain credit);
cf Weiss, supra note 78, at 1292 (failing to acknowledge these difficulties in the context of pension
inalienability).
214. By analogy: "by endowing every corporation with limited liability the law obviates the need
for a lot of cumbersome express contracting on the scope of liability." POSNER, supra note 20, § 14.3,
at 396. Another alternative would be for the debtor to purchase (in a single transaction) insurance
against financial calamity. Such may be difficult to obtain, however, due to problems of moral hazard
and adverse selection. See the related discussions in FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL,
THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 47-49 (1991); GOODIN, supra note 42, at 157-59;
POSNER, supra note 20, § 14.4, at 402.
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opportunity for public relief creates a social cost externality that spendthrift
trusts help to avoid. 15 We have already addressed this point from the
standpoint of voluntary restraints.216 Where involuntary restraints are
concerned the issue becomes more complex, however, in that a legal
regime permitting benefactors to confound creditors also entails social
costs: creditors shift part of the their bad debt losses onto the public by
deducting them from their taxable income.21 7 Which outcome is worse as
a matter of social efficiency is unclear and could vary from case to
case.
218
Given the potential advantages to beneficiaries (and assuming a wash,
more or less, from the state's point of view), what of the creditors? Do they
sustain any injury when a benefactor restricts the involuntary transfer of a
gratuity?
One aspect of this problem that I will dispose of in short order-or
perhaps short shrift-is the suggestion that spendthrift trusts encroach upon
the moral rights of creditors. If one returns to the pages of Gray, one finds
that his moral criticism of disabling restraints extended from their effect on
beneficiaries as individuals to their impact on beneficiaries' relations with
others. "If there is one sentiment," he penned, "which it would seem to be
the part of all in authority, and particularly of all judges, to fortify, it is the
duty of keeping one's promises and paying one's debts." This principle,
Gray continued in the language of his age, is "fit to produce a manly race,
based on sound morality and wise philosophy."219
215. But cf. Note, supra note 212, at 1497-98 (asserting, in the context of exemption law, that
shifting risk from creditors to society is beneficial in that "[s]tate welfare programs, financed from
general tax receipts, would spread the costs of economic misfortune more widely"). Society surely is
a superior risk bearer to private creditors, though debtors, who will also share in the extra risk if.less
property is inalienable, in all likelihood are not. See infra note 256-58 and accompanying text.
Furthermore, society will bear part of the risk in any event, as will appear hereafter.
216. See supra notes 37-44 and accompanying text.
217. I.R.C. § 166 (1986).
218. Large spendthrift trusts may provide more protection than is necessary merely to hold the
beneficiary off the welfare rolls. On the other hand, the larger the inalienable trust the greater the
creditor's risk and hence the greater the cost associated with the tax deductibility of bad debts.
219. GRAY, supra note 16, at iii, v-vii, §§ 258,262,264. For other moral criticism, see Overman's
Appeal, 88 Pa. 276, 281 (1879); Seidenberg v. Seidenberg, 126 F. Supp. 19, 21 (D.D.C. 1954); Smith
v. Towers, 15 A. 92, 93 (Md. 1888) (dissent); Tillinghast v. Bradford, 5 RI. 205, 212 (1858); Utley
v. Graves, 258 F. Supp. 959, 960 (D.D.C. 1966), rev'd sub noma. American Sec. & Trust Co. v. Utley,
382 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1967). Some critics have spoken more vaguely of spendthrift trusts as
contravening "the values of a commercial society." Myres S. McDougal, Future Interests Restated
Tradition Versus Clarification and Reform, 55 HARV. L. REV. 1077, 1113-14 (1942); Summary of
Events, supra note 17, at 595.
60 ' [VOL. 73:1
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol73/iss1/1
SPENDTHRIFT TRUSTS AND PUBLIC POLICY
It is submitted that this vision fundamentally distorts the typical debtor-
creditor relation. On the one hand, persons may under some circumstances
extend credit involuntarily to others, and these transactions do take on a
moral tone." But where ordinary commercial lenders are concerned, the
matter is quite different. Credit, after all, is a business. Commercial lenders
loan money for profit, fully cognizant that some debtors will default. The
rate of interest they demand compensates them for their risk, and they will
gain in the aggregate, notwithstanding incidental default. The debtor-
creditor relation is essentially contractual in nature: it is an arm's length
bargain between economic actors whose entitlements and expectations stem
from naught other than the text of their agreement and the context provided
by the surrounding legal landscape. 1 Once this is acknowledged,
creditors can voice no moral outrage when debtors enjoy the protection
offered by a spendthrift trust. Aware that the law sanctions these devices,
creditors have no authority to rely on them as a source of satisfaction in the
first place.' If the upshot is that "children of rich men.., live in debt
and in luxury at the same time" (to again quote Gray),' so be it; the
parties to the bargain creating the debt knew what they were getting into.
Indeed, if there is moral blame to apportion in such a case, much of it
might well fall upon lenders, who frequently extend credit carelessly and
aggressively. This other side of the moral coin was spotted by contemporar-
ies of Gray, who complained in defense of disabling restraints that trade
220. For a further discussion, see infra notes 288-91 and accompanying text. Lending undertaken
for reasons of friendship or family obligation (as opposed to profit) also arguably implicates moral
considerations. Hirsch, supra note 114, at 611. Relational business contracts (not involving spendthrift
trusts) could also present a case for special moral pleading, though the literature has yet to address this
issue directly. See generally Symposium, Law. Private Governance and Continuing Relationships, 1985
Wis. L. Rav. 461.
221. A classical exposition of this vision is to be found in Holmes, supra note 118, at 460-62. For
a brief historical discussion of the moral philosophy of debtor-creditor relations, see Hirsch, supra note
8, at 226-30.
222. "Creditors cannot complain because they are bound to know the foundation upon which they
extend their credit." Buckman v. Wolbert, 9 Phila. Rep. 207, 207 (Dist. Ct. 1874); see Broadway Nat'l
Bank v. Adams, 133 Mass. 170, 173 (1882) (making the same point); Nichols v. Eaton, 91 U.S. 716,
726 (1875) (same). The argument has echoed within the realm of exemption law: "No credit is extended
•. on the faith of [exempt property], for all persons dealing with [the debtor] are bound to know the
law." Fox v. Swartz, 51 N.W.2d 80, 85 (Minn. 1952); Vukowich, Exemption Rights in Bankruptcy,
supra note 44, at 771. For a further discussion and related references, see Hirsch, supra note 8, at 191-
92 & nn.47-48.
223. GRAY, supra note 16, § 263; see also, eg., Tillinghast, 5 R.I. at 212: "Certainly, no man
should have an estate to live on, but not an estate to pay his debts with. Certainly, property available
for the purposes of pleasure or profit, should be also amenable to the demands of justice."
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creditors "are ready to tempt the weak and improvident and to take
advantage of extravagence [sic] and folly." 4 It is a criticism that
continues to resonate today.' But the whole question, still much
puzzled, is incapable of resolution at this juncture. 6
Putting morals to one side, there are also economic points to be made
here. Consider first the situation where an already-indebted person receives
an inheritance qualified by a disabling restraint. The potential advantage of
this restriction to the beneficiary is clear. Are pre-inheritance creditors
harmed? Not really: they extended credit without any expectation of
satisfaction from this source and set the price of credit accordingly.227 To
224. Note, supra note 35, at 767; and slightly later, Costigan, supra note 18, at 492.
225. For modem discussions, offered in connection with other aspects of debtor-creditor law, see
John D. Ayer, How to Think About Bankruptcy Ethics, 60 Am. BANKR. L.J 355, 369 (1986); Vein
Countryman, Improvident Credit Extension: A New Legal Concept Aborning?, 27 ME. L. REv. 1, 2-7
(1975); Karen Gross, Preserving a Fresh Start for the Individual Debtor: The Case for Narrow
Construction of the Consumer Credit Amendments, 135 U. PA. L. Rv. 59, 102 (1986); Charles G.
Hallinan, The "Fresh Start"Policy in ConsumerBankruptcy. A Historical Inventory and an Interpretive
Theory, 21 U. RICH. L. REV. 49, 67-68 (1986). Debtors themselves have sometimes made the assertion
in their own defense. In re Goodson, 130 B.R. 897, 903 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1991). Professor Costigan
also argued that beneficiaries of spendthrift trusts have stronger moral obligations to their families than
to creditors, a theme that the Supreme Court recently alluded to in order to justify pension inalienability.
Costigan, supra note 18, at 472,478; Guidry v. Sheet Metal Workers Nat'l Pension Fund, 493 U.S. 365,
376 (1990); see also Seidenberg v. Seidenberg, 126 F. Supp. 19, 23 (D.D.C. 1954) (emphasizing this
duty in the converse situation where family members are the creditors seeking access to the trust).
226. Some modem theorists do posit that debtors owe moral obligations to their creditors. See
generally P.S. ATIYAH, PROMISES, MORALS, AND LAW (1981); CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE
(1981); JAMES GoRDLEY, THE PHILOSOPHICAL ORIGINS OF MODERN CONTRACT DoCTINE (1991);
RAWI.s, supra note 69, at 342-50; J. Raz, Promises and Obligations, in LAW, MORALrrY AND SOcIETY
210 (P.M.S. Hacker & J. Raz eds., 1977); Philip Shuchman, An Attempt at a "Philosophy of
Bankruptcy," 21 UCLA L. REV. 403, 455-58 (1973). For a further discussion in connection with the
discharge in bankruptcy, which also tampers with the enforceability of obligations, see Hirsch, supra
note 8, at 224-30.
If we grant that debtors are not morally bound to creditors, could it be asserted in the alternative that
debtors have moral ties to each other? To the extent that debtors act in ways that enhance the risk of
default, arguendo, they impose costs on other debtors, who must pay higher rates of interest when
creditors aggregate their risk. On the other hand, those other debtors do assume this cost voluntarily:
in a sense, then, their relation with their fellow debtors is again mediated through an arm's length
bargain. The possibility of moral rights among debtors inter se has not been addressed in the theoretical
literature, but it merits exploration.
227. "As to antecedent creditors, no harm could come to them, because their debts were contracted
before the will became operative." Matthews v. Van Cleve, 221 S.W. 34, 37 (Mo. 1920). And again,
"[t]he existing creditor has no right to complain if his debtor should acquire a certain interest, which
has cost the creditor nothing, but which is walled against his depredation." Spann v. Carson, 116 S.E.
427, 434 (S.C. 1923); McColgan v. Walter Magee, Inc., 155 P. 995, 997 (Cal. 1916); see also How v.
How, 63 N.W. 627, 627 (Minn. 1895) (analogous argument concerning gifts of exempt property). For
a modem recapitulation, see Scott v. Bank One Trust Co., 577 N.E.2d 1077, 1083 (Ohio 1991).
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have the right to reach it would from their perspective constitute a
windfall-or, more aptly, a mirage, for were disabling restraints not
permitted, few benefactors would bequeath to insolvent beneficiaries in the
first place.22
But what of the case where a person solicits credit with a spendthrift
trust already in hand? Of course, debtors could again respond that lenders
extend credit with their eyes open and that they are savvy enough to
distinguish exempt from nonexempt property when they see it. 9 But one
criticism of disabling restraints (which like most others originated with
Gray, although it has been often repeated since) is that spendthrift trusts
operate to hoodwink creditors. Because they clothe potential debtors with
the "appearance" of affluence, lenders are led to believe that beneficiaries
are creditworthy, when in truth they are not. Apart from testamentary trusts,
whose terms are public once the wills that create them mature, trusts
executed inter vivos or under nonprobate will substitutes are private
documents; their terms are inaccessible to creditors. Even the terms of
testamentary trusts will in practice often prove obscure, catalogued by the
name of the benefactor and recorded in whatever happened to be her
domicile. As a consequence, creditors may fail to recognize that a debtor's
assets are inalienable." In other words, spendthrift trusts are said to
Discussing creditor nonreliance on expectancies in general, see Hirsch, supra note 114, at 613-14.
228. This point is discussed more fully infra notes 259-64 and accompanying text. Certainly, it
cannot be asserted that benefactors have a moral obligation to provide for their beneficiaries' creditors.
Even Professor Gray conceded that much. GRAY, supra note 16, § 261; Summary of Events, supra note
17, at 595; Hirsch, supra note 8, at 245-46 nn.235, 238; Scott, 577 N.E.2d at 1083.
229. In other words, creditors do not rely on spendthrift trusts because the law does not allow them
to do so. For discussions, see Broadway Nat'l Bank v. Adams, 130 Mass. 170, 173-74 (1882); Buckman
v. Wolbert, 9 Phila. Rep. 207, 207 (Dist. Ct. 1874); Jourolman v. Massengill, 5 S.W. 719, 728 (Tenn.
1887); Matthews, 221 S.W. at 37; McColgan, 155 P. at 997; Nichols v. Eaton, 91 U.S. 716, 726 (1875);
Spann, 116 S.E. at 434; Steib v. Whitehead, 111 I11. 247, 252 (1884); supra note 222. This reasoning
has also been put forward to justify the effectiveness of spendthrift trusts in a federal bankruptcy
proceeding, per I 1 U.S.C. § 541(c)(2) (1988). Bankruptcy Act Revision: Hearings on H.R. 31 andH.R.
32 Before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong.,
2d Sess. 1659 (1976); Bankruptcy Reform Act: Hearings on S. 235 and S. 236 Before the Subcom. on
Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 575
(1975).
230. CHESTms, supra note 15, at 136-37 (pointing to the increased popularity of private will
substitutes as heightening the difficulty of credit investigation); Wicker, supra note 9, at 3 (same);
GRAY, supra note 16, § 258 & n.l; GRISWOLD, supra note 1, § 555, at 637; Bushman, supra note 7,
at 315-16; Utley v. Graves, 258 F. Supp. 959, 960 (D.D.C. 1966), rev'd sub nom. American Sec. &
Trust Co. v. Utley, 382 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1967); cf. cases cited supra note 229. Several commentators
have responded by suggesting the establishment of recording systems for spendthrift trusts. Costigan,
supra note 18, at 492-93; Richard H. Oplinger, Spendthrift Trusts in Arizona, 1974 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 129,
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implicate what modem theorists would term an "ostensible ownership" or
"secret lien" problem,"' leading to offers of credit at an economically
inappropriate interest rate.
Once upon a time, this problem was pervasive. Before the days of credit
ratings, merchants had little choice but to rely on instinct when deciding
whether or not to sell on credit. In his London journal, Boswell set the
scene unwittingly but tellingly. Feeling bored and in a playful mood,
Boswell decided one day to make a test of how others perceived him. He
strolled into a shop that he had not previously patronized, selected an
expensive item of merchandise, and sought leave to purchase it on credit.
To Boswell's delight, the shopkeeper agreed. This confirmed to Boswell
that his "external appearance and address," was that of a man of substance.
When on the following day he returned to the shop to settle the bill, he
revealed what he had been up to and warned the shopkeeper against
extending credit to total strangers. The shopkeeper was unperturbed. "[W]e
know our men," he replied, "I would have trusted you with the value of a
hundred pounds." As Boswell chortled at the end of the entry, "This I think
was a good adventure and much to my honor." 2
Suffice it to say that were Boswell delivered into our own time to
reenact his little adventure, the story would have taken a different (and, for
Boswell, mortifying) turn. I have located a critic of spendthrift trusts
making the claim that creditors lend on appearance as late as 1964,233 and
rumors circulate of a grand old hotel in St. Moritz that continues to operate
in this way. But in the computer age, when a credit check is just a demon-
dialed phone call away (or, in more technical parlance, where the
technology of credit information has drastically reduced information costs),
merchants and commercial lenders need no longer rely on dress and
deportment when they size up a potential debtor.1 4 The modem question,
137.
231. See generally Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, Possession and Ownership: An
Examination of the Scope of Article 9, 35 STAN. L. REv. 175 (1983)[hereinafter Baird & Jackson,
Possession]; Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, Information, Uncertainty, and the Transfer of
Property, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 299 (1984); Charles W. Mooney, Jr., The Mystery and Myth of
"Ostensible Ownership" and Article 9 Filing: A Critique of Proposals to Extend Filing Requirements
to Leases, 39 ALA. L. REV. 683 (1988).
232. The story is related in, and the quotations taken from, Paul H. Haagen, Imprisonment for Debt
in England and Wales 105-06 (1986) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Princeton University).
233. Gary P. Kxeider, Note, Spendthrift and Other Protective Trusts in Ohio, 33 U. CIN. L. REV.
281,285 (1964).
234. Rejecting the assertion that creditors any longer lend on appearance, see Bartelme, supra note
31, at 10 (1894!!); Costigan, supra note 18, at 488 (19341). And for a dash of political v6rt6: "The
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then, is whether a spendthrift trust is affirmatively deceptive: whether the
inalienability of this asset will escape notice by a credit rating agency.
And the answer to that, most assuredly, is no. Critics of the spendthrift
trust have missed what would seem a rudimentary point: the inalienable
interest here, whether or not recorded in a readily accessible public
document, is not in the possession of the debtor. What the debtor does
possess-the income from the trust-is freely alienable. But the inalienable
corpus of the trust remains in the hands of the trustee, not the beneficiary!
The beneficiary, then, is the ostensible nonowner, for the fact that the
property is possessed by another suffices to avoid the appearance of
ownership. Like the ancient possessory pledge (and its modem vestige, the
pawn transaction), the sacrifice of possession by the beneficiary serves as
an implicit notice to the world, alternative to recordation, that her interest
in the property is encumbered (in this instance not by a priority lien, but
by a disabling restraint). 5 Likewise, under Article 9 of the Uniform
Commercial Code, a security interest in personal property can be perfected
by transfer of possession, as well as by filing. 6 There is nothing
deceptive about the arrangement-what the creditor sees, the creditor gets.
This whole criticism of spendthrift trusts is a red herring. 7
As an aside, I might point out one possible exception to this analysis:
where the spendthrift trust beneficiary doubles as trustee of the trust, which
is permissible under some circumstances, 8 the corpus as well as the
paucity of statutes restricting spendthrift trusts suggests that creditors do not regard them as a serious
problem." McGovERN ET AL., supra note 8, § 8.7, at 343-44. On modem credit-checking tecmology,
see Digital Credit, THE ECONOMIST, Sept. 25, 1993, at 91 (noting, inter alia, the programming of credit
information into the credit card itselj). The advent of such technology has even raised privacy concerns
in the minds of some commentators, see Vein Countryman, The Diminishing Right of Privacy: The
Personal Dossier and the Computer, 49 TEX. L. REV. 837, 839-46, 868-71 (1971); Ken Gormley, One
Hundred Years of Privacy, 1992 Wis. L. REV. 1335, 1440-41.
The modem resources and resourcefulness of creditors is well enough known to have provoked
parodies within popular culture. In the delightful 1991 feature film L.A. Story, Steve Martin seeks to
make a reservation at an expensive French restaurant, only to be asked what he might be interested in
ordering. When Martin expresses a preference for the duckling, the maitre d', poring over banking
records, replies that it is out of the question: "You can have the chicken," he sniffs.
235. DOUGLAS J. WHALEY, PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS ON SECURED TRANSACTIONS 11 (2d ed.
1989).
236. U.C.C. § 9-305 & cmt. (1990).
237. No one has thought to make the "ostensible ownership" argument in connection with ERISA
pension benefits, Social Security benefits, or other inalienable welfare rights, though these afford a
direct analogy.
238. Someone who is the sole beneficiary of a trust cannot serve as her own trustee, but she may
be permitted to do so if more than one beneficiary is named. BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 2, § 129;
2 ScoTr, supra note 2, §§ 99-99.5. Cases have upheld the power of one of several beneficiaries of a
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income will reside in her hands. But even then, fiduciary law requires the
beneficiary qua trustee to segregate and earmark the corpus: an emperor
who wears trust clothing is obliged not to remove the label. Again, no
ostensible ownership problem should arise.239 While the investment
account need only be denoted as a trust account, without delineating its
terms, this signal should still suffice to put creditors on their guard, for
spendthrift clauses today are scarcely exceptional.240
Another long-standing argument against involuntary disabling restraints,
made both by courts and commentators, is that they encourage debtors who
have them to take excessive credit risks. Because spendthrift trust
beneficiaries have fewer (alienable) assets to lose, they have a greater
incentive to borrow more. They can enjoy the upside benefits of borrowing,
safe in the knowledge that their downside liability remains limited to their
out-of-trust assets. Thus, as early courts put it, spendthrift trusts "smooth
the ways of improvidence, 241 making the beneficiary "habitually reck-
less. 2 42 Again translated into the modem language of economics,
spendthrift trusts aggravate moral hazard by reducing the cost of engaging
in risky activities, and thereby creating a perverse incentive to engage in
them.
My response to this argument is that it is correct so far as it goes, but
that in truth it has not taken us anywhere an economist would not want us
to go. Yes, a debtor whose assets are shielded by a spendthrift trust has a
greater incentive to engage in risky borrowing. 243 But that incentive
exploits no externality and hence causes no inefficiency. Turn the tables for
a moment, and consider the problem from the outlook of a prospective
spendthrift trust to wear the hat of trustee as well. GRISWOLD, supra note 1, § 283; 2A Scorr, supra
note 2, § 151, at 83-84. Likewise, where a spendthrift trust corpus is composed of land and the
beneficiary has possession, the disabling restraint remains valid. GRIswoLD, supra note 1, § 285.
239. 2A ScoTr, supra note 2, §§ 179.1, 179.3. These fiduciary duties were developed precisely for
this purpose (among others). BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 2, § 596, at 444-48.
240. See Baird & Jackson, Possession, supra note 231, at 190-94 (arguing generally that common
knowledge of nonownership and alternative notice systems may efficiently substitute for consolidated
filing systems). On the frequency of spendthrift clauses within trusts, see supra note 7.
241. Brahmey v. Rollins, 179 A. 186, 194 (N.H. 1935).
242. Smith v. Towers, 15 A. 92, 96 (Md. 1888) (dissent); Hutchinson v. Maxwell, 40 S.E. 655, 658
(Va. 1902); and of course GRAY, supra note 16, § 262, at 247. The same point has also been made of
the discharge in bankruptcy, by analogy. Hirsch, supra note 8, at 208-09.
243. That incentive is tempered, however, by the debtor's anticipation of repeated transactions with
the same creditor. Cf J. Fred Weston, Some Economic Fundamentals for an Analysis of Banknptcy,
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1977, at 47, 59-61 (discussing debtor incentives stemming from
the discharge).
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lender. Knowing that a spendthrift trust beneficiary has a smaller equity
cushion, and hence is a greater credit risk, the rational lender will demand
a higher interest rate, consensual lien, or guarantee, or will refuse to lend
at all. By contrast, those debtors lacking disabling restraints, with a larger
equity cushion, will be offered credit at lower cost. Just as a spendthrift
trust aggravates the debtor's moral hazard, so by the same token, and to the
same extent, does it enhance (so to say) the creditor's "moral caution."
Spendthrift trust beneficiaries will want to borrow recklessly but will be
denied the opportunity. No inefficiency will result, because the premium
demanded for such credit as is made available to her will reflect her
heightened risk of default.2"
Or will it? In a Coasian world of perfect information and costless
transactions, certainly: creditors will then negotiate each contract for credit
individually with each borrower, taking spendthrift trusts into account. But
in the real world, information and transactions come at a price.245
Spendthrift trusts are not akin to secret liens, they are discoverable; still,
their discovery costs money. Creditors may find it more cost efficient to
pool risk among debtors, offering credit to all at the same "prepackaged"
rate.246 In that event, creditors will spread the spendthrift trust premium
among all borrowers, taking into account the actuarial risk that they
create.247 Such a strategy reduces transaction costs and so may raise the
244. CfEASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 214, at 49-52 (discussing the economics of corporate
limited liability); POSNER, supra note 20, § 14.3, at 395-96 (same); LANDES & POSNER, supra note 38,
at 13 (discussing liability insurance); Theodore Eisenberg, Bankruptcy Law in Perspective, 28 UCLA
L REy. 953, 981 (1981) (discussing the discharge). See generally Daniel R. Fischel, The Economics
of Lender Liability, 99 YALE L.J. 131, 133-36 (1989).
245. Coase himself is perfectly aware of the limitations of his famous theorem: "while consideration
of what would happen in a world of zero transaction costs can give us valuable insights, these insights
are, in my view, without value except as steps on the way to the analysis of the real world of positive
transaction costs." RH. Coase, The Coase Theorem and the Empty Core: A Comment, 24 J.L. & ECON.
183, 187 (1981); see also Robert C. Ellickson, The Case for Coase andAgainst 'Coaseanism, '99 YALE
L.J. 611 (1989).
246. On patterns of rate-setting, see REPORT OF THE NAT'L COMM'N ON CONSUMER FIN.,
CONSUMER CREDIT IN THE UNITED STATES 112-13 (1972). Debtor differentiation is a much simpler
matter than it once was, given modem computer techniques. For an early discussion, see Bentham,
supra note 56, at 5; and more recently, see William P. Boggess, Screen-Test Your Credit Risks, 45
HARV. Bus. REv., Nov.-Dec. 1967, at 113.
247. Or, at least, the cost will be spread within categories of default-probability that can be
efficiently differentiated. Cf William H. Meckling, Financial Markets, Default, and Bankruptcy: The
Role of the State, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1977, at 13, 23-24 (discussing the impact of
bankruptcy discharge).
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creditor's aggregate profit.248 But because debtors who do not enjoy
spendthrift trust protection will now have to bear part of the costs of those
who do, a wealth transfer from the first to the second group will result.
Add to this the empirical fact that trust assets contribute to the concentra-
tion of wealth in American society; spendthrift trust beneficiaries as a class
almost certainly are richer than their trustless counterparts.249 The upshot
is that, when creditors engage in rate pooling, spendthrift trusts cause
poorer debtors to subsidize the credit costs of wealthier ones."0
In fact, this apparently inequitable subsidy proves to be an efficient
subsidy. The key to its efficiency lies in the preexisting market imperfec-
tion caused by the cost of debtor differentiation. When creditors set a
prepackaged rate of interest for all borrowers, an interdebtor wealth transfer
already occurs. Poorer debtors, who are more apt to default, have to pay
less for credit than they otherwise would, because the standard rate reflects
in part the lower likelihood of default of richer debtors with whom they are
pooled. On that account, poorer debtors also have an incentive to borrow
more (a phenomenon known technically as adverse selection). By contrast,
more affluent debtors pay an interest rate that is higher than it would
otherwise be, carried upward by the greater risk of default among poorer
debtors in the pool. Among the better heeled, demand for credit will
consequently drop."s
Thus in the first instance, it is wealthier debtors who subsidize the cost
of credit to poorer debtors, not the other way around. 2 This subsidy
248. Still, as discussed hereafter, the cost to creditors of rate pooling is that it drives better credit
risks out of the market.
249. While empirical studies of trust wealth have appeared, no minute data have been compiled on
the subset of trusts that comprise spendthrift trusts. Still, it is safe to assume that most trusts include
disabling restraints as boilerplate. See supra note 7. For discussions of trust wealth, see BARLOW ET AL.,
supra note 116, at 20-22; CHESTER, supra note 15, at 125; 4 POWELL, supra note 8, %9J 502-03; CAROLE
SHAMMAS ET AL., INHERITANCE IN AMERICA FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO THE PRESENT 13943, 186-91
(1987); Oplinger, supra note 230, at 136; Powell, supra note 174, at 135.
250. See Bushman, supra note 7, at 316 (noting that creditors pass the cost ofuncollectible debts
from spendthrift trust beneficiaries "on to the public in the form of higher prices"). By comparison, see
the discussion of the interdebtor consequences of the discharge (which is open to everyone, unlike
spendthrift trusts) in Hirsch, supra note 8, at 205 n.94.
251. Given adverse selection, some creditors find that they can raise their return by holding down
their standard credit price, enticing better credit risks to remain in the market, and then rationing the
available credit. Joseph E. Stiglitz & Andrew Weiss, Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect
Information, 71 AM. ECON. REV. 393 (1981).
252. Reaching this conclusion, see William C. Dunkelberg & Robert H. Smiley, Subsidies In the
Use of Revolving Credit, 7 J. MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 469 (1975).
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induces a decline in aggregate borrowing."
Now consider again the spendthrift trust. By sheltering the assets of some
wealthier debtors, the credit risk of wealthier and poorer debtors will be
brought closer into line, thereby alleviating market distortion. The subsidy
from poorer to richer debtors caused by spendthrift trusts in fact constitutes
a cross-subsidy, helping to neutralize the distortion caused by pooling, and
thereby spurring aggregate demand for credit. Though the case is unusual,
it can be reduced to a general proposition: when a market causes the price
of its goods to become identical, we improve market efficiency by making
the cost of those same goods identical. Spendthrift trusts serve this end,
making debtors of unequal means more equally likely to default. 4 In a
world where differentiation of debtors is costly, spendthrift trusts provide
a second-best solution to the problem of credit rate-pooling.
Furthermore, moving a portion of the risk of borrowing from trust
beneficiaries to their creditors is efficient if creditors are the superior risk
bearers. 2" This should be true for one (or possibly two) reasons. First,
creditors almost certainly can insure against (added) risk more cheaply,
either by purchasing bad-debt insurance or by risk-spreading. Debtors
cannot easily acquire comparable insurance. 6 Second, creditors may be
in a better position than debtors to lessen efficiently the probability that the
(added) risk borne will result in a loss, and thereby to reduce the overall
cost of the credit transaction." Of course, it is debtors who ultimately
253. See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 96, at 66-67 (discussing risk pooling by insurance
companies).
254. An equivalent argument could be made forpension inalienability under ERISA: pension wealth
also contributes to wealth concentration in the United States. For an empirical study, see Edward P.
Lazear & Sherwin Rosen, Pension Inequality, in ISSUES IN PENSION ECONOMICS, supra note 188, at
341 I have made a similar argument in the related context of inheritance disclaimer law. Hirsch, supra
note 114, at 614-17. Indeed, the argument could be offered as a theoretical justification for making all
inherited wealth exempt per se from creditors' claims, given its tendency to concentrate wealth (see,
for example, MAuRo BARANzINi, A THEORY OF WEALTH DISTRmTION AND AccuMuLATION 3n, 4n,
216-24 (1991) (citing also to earlier studies of the effect of inheritance on wealth distribution)), but to
make all inherited wealth exempt from creditors' claims would, absent an effective notice system, raise
creditor-deception and tracing problems. See also infra notes 279-80 and accompanying text.
255. See generally Richard A. Posner & Andrew M. Rosenfield, Impossibility and Related
Doctrines in Contract Law: An Economic Analysis, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 83, 90-91 (1977). Again, this
result cannot efficiently be achieved via individual negotiation, see supra notes 213-14 and accompa-
nying text.
256. Howard, supra note 205, at 1064; Samuel A. Rea, Jr., Arm-Breaking, Consumer Credit and
Personal Bankruptcy, 22 ECON. INQUIRY 188,191-92 (1984); butsee Eisenberg, supra note 244, at 982.
257. That is, creditors may be able to take steps that reduce the useless hazard of a particular risk
and do so at lower cost than the hazard thereby averted.
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control their own fate and who must act so as best to avoid a default. But
consumer debtors may lack the expertise necessary to know how to do so.
Creditors, being in the business, may be better equipped to abate risk both
by monitoring debtors and by regulating more closely their extension of
credit. But on this point, at least, the case is ambiguous."
A final, secondary argument that can be made on behalf of disabling
restraints (and I have alluded to it already) is that their abolition would not,
in the end, be of much assistance to creditors. The policy analyst must
always bear in mind that legal rules have ex ante consequences: they affect
the world both after and before the fact. 9 If spendthrift trusts did not
exist, benefactors would have to invent them-and in fact little inventive-
ness is required to imagine informal substitutes for the spendthrift trust that
would work almost as well.260 Most simply, a benefactor could bequeath
the corpus to a trusted (and solvent) family member, with precatory
instructions to apply the income on behalf of the intended beneficiary. The
de facto trustee would face strong extralegal pressures within the family to
carry out the benefactor's wishes.2 6' To be sure, such a device is not
258. Discussing the discharge by analogy, compare Eisenberg, supra note 244, at 981-83; Howard,
supra note 205, at 1063-65; Jackson, supra note 44, at 1399-1400. Discussing corporate limited liability
by analogy, compare POSNER, supra note 20, § 14.3, at 394-95; EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note
214, at 51-52; Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Limited Liability and the Corporation, 52 U.
CHI. L. REV. 89, 91 (1985). Discussing pension inalienability by analogy, see Weiss, supra note 78,
at 1292-93. A further complication arises from the fact that society bears part of the debtor's risk (by
virtue of welfare support), and also part of the creditor's risk (by virtue of the tax deductibility of bad
debts). And society, though in a poor position to influence the conduct of either debtor or creditor, is
(almost by definition) the ideal risk spreader. See also supra notes 215-18 and accompanying text.
259. For a general discussion, see Frank H. Easterbrook, The Supreme Court, 1983
Term-Foreword: The Court and the Economic System, 98 HARV. L. REV. 4, 10-12, 19-33 (1984).
260. There also exist formal alternatives to spendthrift trusts: discretionary trusts and forfeiture
restraint (or "protective") trusts, both of which are inalienable, voluntarily or involuntarily, at law.
Beyond trusts law, a general power of appointment in most jurisdictions is immune to involuntary levy
until the donee exercises the power. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY, supra note 34, § 13.2.
Thus, a general power has the attributes of a "quasi-spendthrift trust," discussed supra note 23 and
accompanying text Still, a rule barring involuntary inalienability could be extended from spendthrift
trusts to these devices as well: forfeiture restraints could be deemed void to the extent that they operate
to thwart involuntary liens, and creditors could be permitted to levy against discretionary trusts to the
greatest extent that the trustee could make distributions to the indebted beneficiary (as is already the
case when forfeiture restraints and discretionary trusts are self-settled, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TRuSTS §§ 150 illus. (2), 156(2), 159 (1955)). Likewise, general powers could be made subject to levy,
as they have been under several state statutes. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY supra note 34,
§ 13.2 statutory note. In short, formal alternatives to the spendthrift trust could easily be neutralized,
were legislators minded to do so.
261. Some estate planners see advantages in such arrangements over formal trusts, even where the
benefactor has the luxury to choose between them. LAWRENCE A. FROLIK & MELISSA C. BROWN,
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foolproof,262 but professional estate planners, furrowing their brows more
intently, doubtless could conjure up more ingenious alternatives.263 All
told, there is reason enough to suppose that a rule barring direct spendthrift
trusts would mainly cause benefactors to implement the same or similar
provisions by indirection. Creditors would gain next to nothing, and
benefactors would be driven to suboptimal solutions to their estate planning
problems.2"
To take stock of where we stand: disabling restraints against both
voluntary and involuntary alienation appear independently compatible with
public policy. Accordingly, both ought to be permitted, either separately or
in combination. Though quasi-spendthrift trusts allowing beneficiaries to
ADVISING THE ELDERLY OR DISABLED CLIENT § 12.5[2][b] (1992). See also Sanford J. Schlesinger et
al., Medicaid Planning Ideas: What Works and What Doesn't, 20 EsT. PLAN. 331, 335 (1993)
(discussing, by analogy, the advantages and disadvantages of informal devices to maintain a
beneficiary's Medicaid eligibility); Atkinson, supra note 31, at 1125-34 (discussing, by analogy, the
ability of benefactors informally to constrain charitable trustees). The formal trust itself originated out
of such informal arrangments. J.H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 210-13 (2d
ed 1979).
262. Despite extralegal influences, a de facto trustee might breach the terms to which she was not
formally bound, or she might eventually become insolvent and face an involuntary levy against the de
facto corpus by her own creditors (who could not reach a formal trust, see 4 Scor, supra note 2,
§ 308), or she might die unexpectedly.
263. One possibility would be a so-called "secret trust," wherein the benefactor fails to formalize
a trust arrangement for the benefit of another, but the secret trustee explicitly agrees to carry out its
terms. Such an arrangement could be memorialized by a private document in the hands of the secret
beneficiary. Courts in general have given effect to secret trusts (by recourse to an equitable constructive
trust) on suit by the secret beneficiary, where proof of the benefactor's intent and acquiescence by the
secret trustee is sufficient. McGOVERN ET AL., supra note 8, § 6.2, at 247-48; RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TRUSTS § 55 & cmts. (1955). By resort to this device, the secret beneficiary would enjoy a ftirther
measure of protection both against a breach of secret trust by the secret trustee or a levy by the secret
trustee's creditors, because the secret beneficiary could bring suit formally to recover the secret corpus
whenever she liked; whereas creditors of the secret beneficiary would in practice be unable to prove
the existence of the secret trust (given concealment of the evidence) and hence would have no recourse
against the secret trustee, so long as the secret beneficiary forbore to bring suit herself.
264. See Little, supra note 37, at 433-34 (arguing that the then-existing statutory ban on spendthrift
trusts in Kentucky was ineffective and accordingly should be repealed). This also appears to have been
the basis for the decision overturning the prior judicial ban on spendthrift trusts in Ohio, Scott v. Bank
One Trust Co., 577 N.E.2d 1077, 1083 (Ohio 1991); see also How v. How, 63 N.W. 627, 627 (Minn.
1895) (making an analogous argument for permitting gifts of exempt property). Compare Professor
Gray, who argued that "evasion is not so easy," and that testators will be disinclined to substitute for
a spendthrift trust more discretionary arrangements. GRAY, supra note 16, §§ 260-61; see also BOGERT
& BOGERT, supra note 2, § 222, at 388-89 (asserting that alternatives to the spendthrift trust are not
identical to it); McGOVERN ET AL., supra note 8, § 8.7, at 344 (speculating that the absence of creditor
opposition to spendthrift trusts stems from the alternative of "protective" trusts); Summary of Events,
supra note 17, at 596 (asserting that the existence of means of "evading just obligations" does not
justify "the invention of new ones").
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reach the corpus yet simultaneously holding creditors at bay sound
gimmicky and may appear inequitable at first sight,2 65 the fact remains
that they can be grounded in sound estate planning. Where a beneficiary
does possess the acumen and character to make her own financial choices
but faces outstanding liabilities or forthcoming economic hazards to which
she is risk averse, a quasi-spendthrift trust fits her needs precisely. Here,
what I earlier termed the preservative, security, and value maintenance
functions of disabling restraints can be fulfilled without tacking onto them
the paternal and socializing functions unnecessarily. Though compatible,
these functions are independent and so need not invariably accompany one
another. At the same time, involuntary restraints cause no hardship to
creditors, for they do not rely on inalienable property coming into a debtor-
beneficiary's possession either before or after they make their loans. Nor
does the severance of voluntary from involuntary restraints make the
slightest difference to lenders, for the former are of no legal consequence
to them. 26
6
Ill. EXCEPTIONS
Thus far we have addressed the overall virtues and vices of disabling
restraints. Thus far is not quite the end of our journey, however: we have
finally to consider whether any particular limitations ought to be placed on
the spendthrift trust's general effectiveness. In his treatise on the subject,
Dean Griswold submitted that "[t]he difficulty comes not so much from the
existence of spendthrift trusts as from their generally unrestrained
extent,"" an opinion shared by many modem lawmakers. In recent
decades, they have ringed about the spendthrift trust a wide array of
caveats, varying in their details from jurisdiction to jurisdiction; no latter-
day estate planner can look to statutory warrants for this device without
265. Professor Scott rejected quasi-spendthrift trusts as "seem[ingly] ... against public policy,"
though without analysis. 2A SCOTT, supra note 2, § 152.3, at 113. For the current state of the law, see
supra note 23.
266. If anything, creditors will prefer that a trust contain only a freestanding involuntary restraint:
as a practical matter, they then have a chance to convince the debtor voluntarily to alienate her interest
in the trust so that they can satisfy their claims. BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 2, § 222, at 398; see
also Douglass G. Boshkoff, The Bankrupt's Moral Obligation to Pay His Discharged Debts: A Conflict
Between Contract Theory andBankruptcy Policy, 47 IND. L. 36, 36-37 (1971) (noticing, by analogy,
the high frequency with which debtors voluntarily reaffirmed their debts following discharge in a
bankruptcy proceeding, a practice since brought under judicial supervision, I1 U.S.C.A. § 524(c)-(d)
(1993 & Supp. 1995)).
267. GRISWOLD, supra note 1, § 556, at 639-40; see also his alternative model acts, id. §§ 565-66.
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reading the fine print.2 Is there sound policy back of the current
m6lange of legal constraints, or ought lawmakers to rethink them?
One restriction found in some jurisdictions involves the sort ofproperty
interest susceptible to a disabling restraint. While virtually all states permit
the benefactor to attach a spendthrift clause to life and term estates in trust,
her right to make a vested or contingent remainder inalienable prior to the
time when it becomes possessory is accepted far less widely." 9 In unison,
commentators have voiced opposition to enlarging the scope of disabling
restraints to remainders, observing that these interests are not created in
order to assure the beneficiary's long-term support."0 True enough, at
least in some cases, though not all; at any rate, the argument reads too
narrowly the potential functions of a disabling restraint even in those cases
where it is true.
Where the benefactor couples an estate for years in a spendthrift trust
with a remainder in the same beneficiary, she does intend to look out for
the beneficiary's long-term support. Here the benefactor follows what I
argued earlier is the morally superior estate plan for the prodigal beneficia-
ry-namely, the mandate of a disabling restraint for part of her life, as
opposed to her whole life, on the assumption that maturity will accompany
age.27' To strike down disabling restraints on remainders is to foreclose
this option, for the benefactor who fears transient irresponsibility will wish
to withhold from the beneficiary immediate access to the residual interest
along with future installments out of the term estate. One is simply the
natural culmination of the other.
Even where the benefactor provides for a life or term estate in one
beneficiary followed by a remainder in another, her motive may be similar.
She may wish to give priority to the first beneficiary for life or years and
at the same time to postpone the remainder in a younger beneficiary until
the second beneficiary has grown sufficiently mature to look out for her
268. Noting this trend, see supra note 11.
269. See supra note 12.
270. 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 32, § 26.100, at 545-46; BOGERT & BOGERT,
supra note 2, § 222, at 390; GRISWOLD, supra note 1, §§ 105-06, at 104-05. For more general criticism
of this doctrinal expansion, see 4 POWELL, supra note 8, § 42.25[5][a][iv]; Powell, supra note 135, at
701-04; Recent Cases, 29 HARv. L. REV. 557 (1916). Easily the best and most thorough discussion,
drawing the same general conclusion, is Niles, supra note 134. But see Recent Cases, 26 WASH. L.
REv. 141, 142 (1951) (approving the expansion on grounds of testamentary intent effectuation).
271. See supra notes 184-87 and accompanying text.
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own long-term support.272 Whether the benefactor disables alienation of
a present or a future interest, her aim can remain the same-for both have
present value and unless restrained could be rapidly dissipated by a
beneficiary who does not (yet) know better.
In refusing to set aside the voluntary transfer of a remainder interest in
1916, Judge Learned Hand had this to say:
We have no public concern for the preservation of family inheritances, and
ought, I believe, have no tenderness towards expectants of rich reversions.
... I find it hard to have patience with the waterish sentiment which seeks
to make such a man the court's ward, and to protect him against the
consequences of his own folly. If he is to have the enjoyment of great wealth,
let him share its responsibility. If the prospect of a dollar so teased his
appetite that the future ceased to be a reality, either let him be regarded as
an incompetent and put in ward, or let us treat him as a person in a world of
persons, and let him weave his fate as he will.273
But for its elegance of expression, the statement is unexceptional as a
criticism of paternal restrictions on beneficial autonomy generally. The
same logic is equally pertinent, and impertinent, to disabling restraints over
life or term estates and might as easily be directed to, or deflected from,
them as to and from the remainders that follow them. As structural
analogues, the two cases should stand or fall together.
Furthermore, restraints on the involuntary alienation of a remainder
interest may serve a socializing, preservative, security, or value mainte-
nance function, as previously discussed.274 Again, life or term estates and
272. See the discussion in In re Estate of Vought, 250 N.E.2d 343, 348 (N.Y. 1969) (Breitel, J.).
Judge Fuld, dissenting in that case, doubted whether "the policy considerations in favor of permitting
a restraint upon the alienability of property until stich time as the beneficiary is believed to be equipped
to manage it wisely... operate where a remainderman is given an absolute and unqualified right to
dispose of the property as he chooses, subject only to the prior life estate of another." Id. at 349. In
other words (one presumes he meant), a benefactor so concerned would place an age contingency on
the remainder (to any age she liked if the remainderman were already born, or to the age of 21 if the
remainderman were unborn, as permitted with precisely this end in view under the Rule Against
Perpetuities, see, e.g., SudEs, supra note 30, at 68-69) and then apply the disabling restraint to the age
contingency (i.e., making the interest inalienable prior to the age at which it vests in interest) rather than
to the remainder itself. That approach might well be sounder estate planning; still, it remains possible
that a benefactor might simply guess at the life expectancy of the life tenant and assume that the
remainderman would then be, roughly speaking, old enough.
273. Provident Life & Trust Co. v. Fletcher, 237 F. 104, 110-11 (S.D.N.Y. 1916). On the issue of
wardship, cf. supra note 143.
274. See supra notes 139-42, 202-12 and accompanying text.
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remainders are analogous in these respects.275 Again, symmetry demands
that they be legally amalgamated.
Another restriction imposed in a number of jurisdictions caps the amount
of property that a benefactor can safeguard within a spendthrift trust276
an approach endorsed by a number of commentators.2" If our only
concern were to protect the state from public charges, we would have no
reason to condone spendthrift trusts generating incomes above the level of
welfare support; but as we have seen, additional interests lie at stake. The
amount in question has no bearing on the paternal, socializing, protective,
security, or value maintenance functions of voluntary and involuntary
restraints." (In this respect, spendthrift trust policy arguably differs from
the policy underlying exemptions, which have also been criticized when left
uncapped.279) Nor do creditors gain when restraints against involuntary
alienation are curtailed, because interest rates will adjust accordingly.
Expanding the scope of involuntary restraints may even hold out social
benefits. If spendthrift trusts enhance the efficiency of a credit market that
275. Cf Boston Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Collier, 111 N.E. 163, 165 (Mass. 1916) ("Whether
income or principal is placed beyond the power of alienation or of attachment, the result to creditors
of the beneficiary is merely a question of degree."). In another opinion, Judge Breitel adverted to the
value maintenance function: had the court struck down a disabling restraint upon a remainder, "the
creator's wishes would be completely frustrated, the beneficiary not only getting the funds the creator
had intended be delayed, but the beneficiary receiving a fraction, after discount, of what was eventually
intended." Vought, 250 N.E. at 349. The problem of value maintenance has often been raised in
connection with contingent remainders (indeed, more frequently than in connection with life estates).
See the cases cited in Hirsch & Wang, supra note 3, at 35 n.136.
276. Restrictions of this sort take several forms: limiting disabling restraints either to a set sum or
to a set fraction of the corpus of a trust, or to a variable amount the court deems adequate for the
beneficiary's support. See supra note 10.
277. GRISWOLD, supra note 1, § 556, at 640, § 565, at 648; Costigan, supra note 18, at 484, 487,
497-98; Emanuel, supra note 15, at 206-09; Powell, supra note 135, at 704-06; Note, supra note 135,
at 1328.
278. Nor, of course, does the background policy of giving effect to testamentary intent, see supra
notes 27-28 and accompanying text.
279. Voicing objection to uncapped exemptions on the ground that they are intended only to ensure
subsistence, see Vukowich, Exemption Rights in Bankruptcy, supra note 44, at 770-71; Vukowich,
Debtors' Exemption Rights, supra note 44, at 782-88, 876-78. Some commentators have pointed to
capped exemptions as a justification for corpus limits on spendthrift trusts, see 6 AMERICAN LAW OF
PROPERTY, supra note 32, at 547; Read, supra note 9, at 843-46, 851-52, though at least one court
looked to uncapped exemptions as aprecedent for spendthrift trusts, see Nichols v. Eaton, 91 U.S. 716,
726 (1875); see also GRAY, supra note 16, at vii (noting the equation). Recognizing policy distinctions
between spendthrift trusts and exemptions, see Vukowich, Debtors' Exemption Rights, supra note 44,
at 790-92.
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aggregates risk among differently situated debtors,28 ° corpus limits would
interfere with the process of making debtors more equal credit risks. Hence,
corpus limits impede market efficiency.
Still another type of restriction debated now and again involves the sort
of beneficiary eligible to receive a spendthrift trust. Some theorists have
proposed limiting disabling restraints to members of the benefactor's
family, and one jurisdiction (at present) does take this approach.281 The
argument in its favor is that a benefactor knows her family members best
of all; restrictions imposed on nonrelatives are less likely to reflect their
individual needs. Yet, the fact that the benefactor wishes to provide at all
for a nonrelative-certainly an exceptional desire2 ---is in itself indica-
tive of familiarity. The love and affection that prompts gratuitous transfers
almost invariably follows from knowledge. To limit spendthrift trusts to
beneficiaries bound to the benefactor by ties of affinity or consanguinity,
as opposed to close association, appears unduly formalistic from a
sociological point of view.
Other theorists have proposed limiting spendthrift trusts to beneficiaries
of diminished capacity, an approach once (but no longer) taken in a handful
of jurisdictions.283 The argument here is that a spendthrift trust is worse
than useless when imposed on a person of financial ability, a point not
without force. Nevertheless, commentators have been insufficiently precise
in framing this idea. A restraint against voluntary alienation benefits only
the financially intemperate or unsophisticated. A restraint against involun-
tary alienation also functions to preserve gratuitous transfers from prior
creditors, to provide security against future credit risk, and to maintain the
value of a life estate or future interest, irrespective of the beneficiary's
personal qualifications. A suitability-based restriction on spendthrift
provisions should apply only to the first, not to the second, type of
disabling restraint. It could be implemented simply by empowering capable
beneficiaries to petition for their removal, as previously discussed.284
A pervasive restriction on spendthrift trusts, found in some measure in
280. See supra notes 245-54 and accompanying text. Here too may lie a justification for the
uncapped exemptions which drew fire in supra note 279.
281. For commentary and statutory references, see supra note 179.
282. Hirsch & Wang, supra note 3, at 41 & n.161.
283. For prior commentary and statutory references, see supra note 167.
284. See supra note 167 and accompanying text. Once again, however, a suitability-based standard
should be read broadly to encompass diminished capacity and overall need of the family, in order to
take into account the socializing function of spendthrift trusts.
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virtually every jurisdiction,28 involves the type of creditor against whom
they are effective. Alimony creditors, child support creditors, furnishers of
necessary services, tax authorities, and (in a few jurisdictions) tort
victims' 6 may be permitted to reach a spendthrift trust, though the
precise scope of the exception and the rights accorded under it depend upon
state law. In some jurisdictions, excepted creditors can levy against the
corpus of the trust; in others they can only garnish the income from the
trust, and in still others they must exhaust all other remedies before doing
even that; furthermore, the extent of the invasion permitted to the creditor
lies at the discretion of the court in some jurisdictions. 7
In common, creditors who have achieved favored status under these
various state laws hold claims that fail to arise out of a bargain with the
debtor. They become creditors "involuntarily," and hence stand in a
different position, both ethically and economically, from ordinary
commercial lenders. Here, we cannot blithely dismiss the creditor's moral
claim as submerged by the stipulations of their transaction. There has been
none. On this moral basis many commentators have defended the right of
involuntary creditors to reach a spendthrift trust.2"' Yet the issue is by no
means simple to resolve. Arguendo, the strength of a debtor's moral
obligation to involuntary creditors will depend on the extent of her
285. Statutes in Delaware, Montana, and Nevada are exceptional in making no exceptions. BOGERT
& BOGERT, supra note 2, § 224, at 456 n.2; MoNT. CODE ANN. § 72-33-301 & cmts. (1993).
286. Only two jurisdictions--Georgia and Louisiana-presently permit tort victims to reach a
spendthrift trust. BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 2, § 222, at 416 n.59, 421 n.59. See also id. § 222,
at I I n.59 (Supp. 1994) (citing California law permitting felony victims to reach spendthrift trusts, in
the court's discretion, to satisfy restitution judgments).
287. The statutory provisions and case law are discussed in id. § 224; GRiSWOLD, supra note 1,
§§ 331-52, 364-65; McGovERN ET AL., supra note 8, § 8.7, at 345-46; 4 POWELL, supra note 8,
§ 42.26[3]-[7]; 2A ScoTr, supra note 2, § 157; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 157
(1955); Deborah M. Ezatoff, Case Note, 13 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 433, 440-41, 443 (1985) (discussing
the rule, found occasionally, that invasion of a spendthrift trust by an excepted creditor is allowed only
as a last resort).
These excepted creditors' rights may be compared with the rights of certain creditors to reach
inalienable pension rights, exempt property, the assets of a discharged debtor following a bankruptcy
proceeding, and the assets of an undercapitalized corporation, see Emanuel, supra note 15, at 205; Janet
A. Flaccus, A Potpourri of Bankruptcy Changes: 1994 Bankruptcy Amendments, 47 ARK. L. REv. 817,
830-34 (1994); Hirsch, supra note 114, at 621 & nn.163-65; Sherman, supra note 14, at 271-85.
288. Professor Scott thought it would be "shocking indeed" to give effect to a spendthrift trust
against such creditors, for "[t]hey are in quite a different position from ordinary creditors who have
voluntarily extended credit." 2A SCOTT, supra note 2, § 157, at 186, § 157.1, at 192, § 157.5, at 220.
Professor Bogert referred in similar fashion to "[the strong equity behind these claims." BOGERT &
BOGERT, supra note 2, § 224, at 456, 478-79; see GRIsWOLD, supra note 1, § 365, at 443; Oplinger,
supra note 230, at 138.
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culpability in placing creditors in that position and on the strength of her
independent moral ties to the creditor. An intentional tortfeasor seemingly
has a stronger moral obligation than a negligent one;289 by similar token,
the child-support debtor's moral obligation appears more compelling than
that of a delinquent taxpayer." Still, that obligation, to the extent we
acknowledge its existence, entails no more (but could it entail less?) than
doing all the debtor can to restore the status quo. In the context of a
spendthrift trust, that means using payments as they become due to right
the situation, not invading a corpus that the debtor lacked power to dip into
for her own consumption. The benefactor, after all, owes no moral duty to
the debtor's involuntary creditors and so remains ethically free to fetter the
corpus--or, for that matter, not to transfer it to the debtor in any way,
shape, or form. Yet that reasoning can be taken a step further: if the
benefactor has sought to establish a trust that is invulnerable to levies of
execution or to garnishment, does not the benefactor's moral right not to
satisfy a claim for which she bears no responsibility suffice to neutralize
the debtor's moral obligation to do so even with income distributions as
they become due to her?29' The issue is truly enigmatical.
Turning to another dismal science, we may consider whether the decision
to bestow special rights on involuntary creditors will serve the ends of
economic efficiency. This it may, for several reasons. First, granting
involuntary creditors the right to reach a spendthrift trust could operate to
negate the need for state support of the creditor, as opposed to the debtor.
By permitting invasion of the private trust, lawmakers can reduce
dependence on the costly public welfare apparatus.292 Second, rendering
289. Cf II U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) (1988) (rendering claims arising out of intentional torts, but not
negligent torts, nondischargeable in bankruptcy). See also 11 U.S.C.A. § 523(a)(13) (Supp. 1995)
(rendering restitution judgments for crime under 18 U.S.C. nondischargeable in bankruptcy).
290. See Seidenberg v. Seidenberg, 126 F. Supp. 19,23 (D.D.C. 1954) ("The duty of a married man
to support and protect his wife and children is inherent in human nature.... It is a responsibility far
superior to that of paying one's debts .... ).
291. Opinions denying involuntary creditors the right to reach a spendthrift trust have made the
point:
[T]he testatrix was under no obligation to her son's wife and children.... She was at perfect
liberty to give it all to a stranger had she so desired. Being thus empowered, it is difficult to
ascertain by any ordinary process of reasoning, how or why she should be precluded from
disposing of it as she did. The wife and children were not damaged-they were no worse off
than before.
Schwager v. Schwager, 109 F.2d 754,760 (7th Cir. 1940) (footnote omitted); Erickson v. Erickson, 266
N.W. 161, 164 (Minn. 1936).
292. Here economies of scale are of no significance. The question is simply whether private funds
will be available to substitute for funds flowing through an expensive agency. Cf. supra note 42 and
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trust assets vulnerable to involuntary creditors' claims deters potential
debtors from incurring involuntary liabilities. To the extent that a debtor is
otherwise judgment-proof, she can incur such liabilities without bearing the
cost; placing more of her assets at risk mitigates this externality. Finally,
invasion of a spendthrift trust may serve to impose an involuntary liability
on the party better able to bear it.
These rationales are of varying relevance to different sorts of involuntary
claims. Consider alimony and child support. 93 Here deterrence plays no
part; lawmakers do not assign these costs in order to reduce the incidence
of divorce. But by allowing alimony and child-support creditors to bypass
a disabling restraint, those costs may be better distributed294 and (in cases
of indigence) assigned in a manner calculated to avoid welfare eligibili-
ty.29 These are acknowledged goals of the system of liability within
family law.2" By contrast, liability for tort is premised primarily on
deterrence,297 and an argument for trust susceptibility to tort claims can
accompanying text
293. For prior commentary, see Carolyn L. Dessin, Feed a Trust and Starve a Child: The
Effectiveness of Trust Techniques Against Claims for Support and Alimony, 10 GA. ST. U.L. REv. 691
(1994); Ezatoff, supra note 287; Robert A. Seligson, Note, 44 CAL. L. REv. 615 (1956).
294. Better distributed in a welfare sense, on the assumption that social welfare is enhanced when,
ceteris paribus, costs are borne by the deeper pocket. We cannot in the process assume that total utility
will be enhanced, however, due to the infeasibility of interpersonal utility comparisons. For related
discussions, see GUIDO CALABRESI, THE CosTs OF ACCIDENTS 39-45 (1970); Hirsch & Wang, supra
note 3, at 12 n.41, 34 n.129. Here, the question of who is the superior insurer has no relevance, for
insurance against the costs of divorce is not commercially available to either party. Cf. supra notes 255-
58 and accompanying text.
It is possible to argue that alimony creditors are in fact voluntary creditors, given that they enter
upon the marriage willingly. McGovERN ET AL., supra note 8, § 8.7, at 345-46. In this sense, a
disabling restraint in the hands of one spouse could be deemed simply an implicit term of the marital
contract agreed to by the other. Still, this does not change the fact that a divorce generates costs that
require efficient distribution. A commercial lender can spread the risk caused by spendthrift trusts and
profit in the aggregate despite them; whereas, a marital contract is not (at least ordinarily) entered into
for profit and the risk involved (at least in a monogamous society) is not susceptible to being spread.
Discussing generally the frailty of the contract analogy in the marital setting, see Ira M. Ellman, The
Theorv of Alimony, 77 CAL. L. REV. 1, 13-33 (1989).
295. This second point has been emphasized in several opinions upholding the rights of alimony
and child support creditors to reach a spendthrift trust. Shelley v. Shelley, 354 P.2d 282, 286-87 (Or.
1960); Hurley v. Hurley, 309 N.W.2d 225 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981); see also Schlaefer v. Schlaefer, 112
F.2d 177, 185 (D.C. Cir. 1940) (same, in connection with exempt insurance benefits).
296. HOMER H. CLARK, JR., THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES §§ 7.1-.2,
17.5. 18.1 (practitioner's ed., 2d ed. 1987).
297. Efficient cost distribution and avoidance of welfare costs are secondary goals of the tort
liability system. For discussions, see CALABRESI, supra note 294, at 26-28, 283 & n.9; William R.
Keeton & Evan Kwerel, Externalities in Automobile Insurance and the Underinsured Driver Problem,
27 JL. & ECON. 149 (1984) (justifying compulsory liability insurance to avoid welfare costs). See
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be made on that alternative basis29 and, in the same vein, on the
tortfeasor's status as the superior insurer.299 In either event, a rule
permitting invasions of the corpus (despite the debtor's powerlessness to do
so herself) appears warranted as a response to efficiency concerns."
An economic justification for the susceptibility of spendthrift trusts to tax
claims is less manifest.301 Incurring tax liability is hardly something
lawmakers want to deter, and the public fisc is (in the scientific sense) the
ideal cost bearer. To the extent that a tax debtor depends on her trust for
basic support, the state would be picking its own pocket, extinguishing a
private resource only to throw the beneficiary upon less efficient means of
public support. Still, the exception for state claims can be premised, not
unpersuasively, on a theory of collateral consequences: subjecting
generally IZHAK ENGLARD, THE PHILOSOPHY OF TORT LAW (1993); LANDES & POSNER, supra note 38;
STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYsIs OF ACCIDENT LAW (1987).
298. The same argument has been made in the adjacent province of corporate limited liability,
though veil-piercing involves considerations extraneous to spendthrift trusts (such as jurisdictional
conflicts and effects on capital markets) which dull the analogy. For a discussion, see Robert B.
Thompson, Unpacking Limited Liability: Direct and Vicarious Liability of Corporate Participants for
Torts of the Enterprise, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1 (1994) (see also the earlier references cited therein). For
other relevant analogies, see Hirsch, supra note 114, at 618-21 & n.165.
Making the related point that allowing tort victims to reach spendthrift trusts would serve to restore
injured parties and prevent them from becoming public charges, see Laurene M. Brooks, Comment, A
Tort-Creditor Exception to the Spendthrift Trust Doctrine: A Call to the Wisconsin Legislature, 73
MARQ. L. REV. 109, 133-41 (1989); Frank A. Gregory, Note, Trusts: Tort Claims as an Exception to
the Spendthrift Trust Doctrine, 17 OKLA. L. REv. 235, 237-38 (1964); Wicker, supra note 9, at 18.
Other commentators have focused on the moral rights of tort creditors, see William N. Antonis, Note,
Spendthrift Trusts: Attachability of a Beneficiary's Interest in Satisfaction of a Tort Claim, 28 NOTRE
DAME LAW. 509, 515 (1953); Weston C. Overholt, Jr., Note, Tort Liability of the Beneficiary of a
Spendthrift Trust, 57 DICK. L. REV. 220, 221-22 (1953); and the references in supra note 288.
299. I base this conclusion on the assumption that the tortfeasor can at lower cost prevent the
accident from occurring than can the victim. Assuming as well that an insurance company can monitor
the insured's behavior efficiently, the tortfeasor should then be able to obtain liability insurance at a
lower cost than the victim can obtain accident insurance. Compare the related discussion in POSNER,
supra note 20, § 6.14, at 204-06.
300. Professor Scott commended the rule, found in some jurisdictions, that gives courts discretion
over the amount ofproperty involuntary creditors can extract from a spendthrift trust. 2A ScoTr, supra
note 2, § 157.1, at 194-95. On the other hand, if we can presume that the amount awarded to
involuntary creditors is reasonable per se, such discretion is unnecessary. Cf. Shelley v. Shelley, 354
P.2d 282, 287 (Or. 1960); Emanuel, supra note 15, at 207; Ezatoff, supra note 287, at 443-44.
301. Case law in the area has focused on federal preemption, which of course merely passes the
deliberative buck on to a higher authority. E.g., United States v. Grimm, 865 F. Supp. 1303, 1312 (N.D.
Ind. 1994); United States v. Riggs Nat'l Bank, 636 F. Supp. 172, 177 (D.D.C. 1986); United States v.
Rye, 550 F.2d 682, 685 (1st Cir. 1977); cf. Mercantile Trust Co. v. Hofferbert, 58 F. Supp. 701, 705
(D. Md. 1944). According to Professor Bogert, decisions holding spendthrift trusts vulnerable to federal
or state tax claims "are not based on public policy but rather on legal impossibility." BOGERT &
BOGERT, supra note 2, § 224, at 474. Non sequitur!
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spendthrift trusts to tax liability enhances tax equity, which is vital, or at
least valuable, to a system of tax collection founded on voluntary
compliance.'a 2
The case for subjecting spendthrift trusts to liability for necessary
services, such as emergency medical care and other nondeferrable
assistance, is also uneasy. 3 Though services of this nature are often
tendered without a bargain, their providers (assuming a modicum of
prudence) can factor the risk of default into the price demanded and hence
profit in the aggregate, just like ordinary commercial lenders, notwithstand-
ing spendthrift trusts.3 Unlike commercial lenders, however, providers
who choose to withhold necessary services exact external costs. 30 5 Were
spendthrift trusts enforceable against them, providers might simply grow
more reluctant to make their services available absent a prior showing of
creditworthiness, with consequent harm to the beneficiary. A rule
permitting invasion of spendthrift trusts to pay for necessary services
functions to offset this externality. The problem, in fact, structurally
resembles that of tort liability, except that here it is the incentives of the
creditor, not of the debtor, that need to be altered for the sake of efficien-
cy. 306
If we are to grant involuntary creditors some nature of right in the
otherwise inalienable assets of a debtor, however, we should also hear the
special pleadings of one other class of creditors, hitherto denied relief.
302. See I OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY, U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, TAX REFORM FOR FAIRNEms,
SIMPLICITY, AND ECONOMIC GROWTH: THE TREASURY DEPARTMENT REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT 3
(1984) (discussing the importance of perceptions of tax equity generally). This argument may
presuppose a higher salience of legal rules than empirical evidence warrants, however. See infra note
360. For a related discussion, see Hirsch, supra note 114, at 622.
303. Case law defending this exception has emphasized that it is compatible with the benefactor's
ostensible purpose of providing support for the beneficiary in spite of her improvidence. 2A SCOTT,
supra note 2, § 157.2, at 201-02; e.g., American See. & Trust Co. v. Utley, 382 F.2d 451, 453 (D.C.
Cir. 1967); Sisters of Mercy Health Corp. v. First Bank of Whiting, 624 N.E.2d 520, 522 (Ind. App.
1993). This analysis fails, however, to apply to cases where the benefactor has other purposes in mind,
such as value maintenance (or, for that matter, the hope of getting involuntary benefits free of charge
for the beneficiary).
304. This is true of purchase-money creditors in general. For an early discussion, see Bentham,
supra note 56, at 6.
305. These being: leaving beneficiaries untreated or leaving it to government to fill the gap
inefficiently.
306. See the related economic analysis of good samaritans, justifying their restitution, in LANDES
& POSNER, supra note 38, at 142-48; POSNER, supra note 20, § 6.9; William M. Landes & Richard A.
Posner, Salvors, Finders, Good Samaritans, and Other Rescuers: An Economic Study of Law and
Altruism, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 83 (1978); see also Hirsch, supra note 114, at 622.
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These are the unsophisticated trade creditors-plumbers and kindred small-
scale service providers-who may, even today, be no better equipped than
Boswell's shopkeeper to determine efficiently the debtor's creditworthiness
and who may have no idea how to factor the risk of default into the price
of the services they perform.3 These gentle souls arguably cannot
operate their businesses other than on trust, and so they too may reasonably
be categorized as involuntary creditors upon default. A rule permitting such
creditors, at least at the court's discretion, to ignore a disabling restraint
could again serve to fix liability on the party better able to bear it.3" 8
Against all of the efficiency justifications for permitting involuntary
creditors to pierce a spendthrift trust must still be weighed the ex ante
consequences of such exceptions, however. Once again, benefactors might
be moved to substitute for formal (but leak-prone) trusts more informal (but
watertight) arrangements for the protection of vulnerable beneficiaries.
Creditors' victories might thus prove fleeting, as benefactors maneuvered
around legal obstacles, and hence also Pyrrhic from the perspective of
lawmakers seeking after elusive efficiency.
To make allowance for ex ante consequences, I would permit involuntary
creditors in general to reach spendthrift trusts, but at the same time permit
benefactors to name in the instrument of trust specific involuntary creditors
who are nonetheless barred from tapping into it. This "exception to the
exception" would apply where the benefactor is aware of an existing claim
or anticipates a claim by an individual creditor whom she specifically
desires not to satisfy-hence, where a rule permitting satisfaction by that
creditor is most likely to induce the benefactor to take preemptive
measures.0 9 I hasten to add that not a single jurisdiction follows this
approach today, but a pervasive analogy can be found in a close relative of
the spendthrift trust, known as the "supplemental needs trust." If a trust
307. But see Howard, supra note 205, at 1064 & n.134 (arguing, in the context of the bankruptcy
discharge, that even small-scale sellers set their prices with the risk of default in mind).
308. Were we to treat unsophisticated trade creditors as equivalent to involuntary creditors, we
would also face the more mundane difficulty of arriving at a suitable definition of the category. One
approach would be to delineate by statute an exclusive list of qualifying service providers, but an
alternative might be to permit courts to invade a spendthrift trust simply where they find under all the
circumstances that a credit check prior to the extension of credit was unreasonable. The appeal of such
a standard is that it addresses the general moral and economic problem at issue here in an equally
general (and hence precise) way. The associated danger, of course, is that the vagueness of the standard
would invite burdensome litigation.
309. Many benefactors have indicated a desire to avoid satisfying existing debts of a beneficiary
as the primary motive for adding disabling restraints to their bequests. See supra note 202 and
accompanying text.
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instrument so specifies, a beneficiary can receive support supplemental to
publicly provided institutional care or Medicaid benefits without in the
process forfeiting those benefits, even though the state, as a public creditor
and furmisher of necessary support services, could in most jurisdictions
ignore with impunity a disabling restraint.31 Once again, one gathers
from judicial discussions, the idea is to encourage benefactors to make
gratuitous transfers that they would otherwise almost certainly choose to
divert from the intended beneficiary, given the state's financial claims
against her.31
A final restriction on the effectiveness of spendthrift trusts, presently
enforced in every single American jurisdiction, is the bar on their self-
settlement. Nowhere can an individual effectively create a spendthrift trust
for herself (and collusive arrangements with third parties to make reciprocal
transfers have been avoided by the courts). 31  This restriction makes no
sense. 13 The benefits of a spendthrift trust are the same, irrespective of
310. BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 2, § 224, at 470 & n.26; 2A ScoT, supra note 2, § 157.2,
at 204-08, § 157.4, at 214.
311. "A contrary conclusion would totally frustrate the settlor's intent.... It would also invite
anyone, finding himself in the position of [the settlor] in the future, to make no testamentary provision
for a handicapped child." Tidrow v. Director, Mo. State Div. of Family Servs., 688 S.W.2d 9, 12 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1985). "We know of no public policy to prohibit a person who is not liable for the support
of a charity patient in a public institution to give to the patient extra comforts or luxuries ... nor do
we find a public policy to seize such gifts before the patient has received them.... [T]o grant the
department's petition destroying the trust would destroy also [the benefactor's] purpose to save his son
from a pauper's grave." In re Wright's Will, 107 N.W.2d 146, 149 (Wis. 1961). On the general
effectiveness of supplemental needs trusts, see Clifton B. Kruse Jr., Welfare Without Guilt: Benefiting
from a Supplemental Needs Trust, PROB. & PROP., May-June 1991, at 33. But see Act of May 7, 1993,
ch 108, 1993 Minn. Laws 298 (amending MINN. STAT. § 501B.89 (1992)) (limiting supplemental needs
trusts to basic needs for which public funding is insufficient, among other restrictions). The rationale
of encouraging benefactors to make transfers may also underlie a Wisconsin statute barring the state
from reaching a spendthrift trust to satisfy claims for public support only in those instances where the
beneficiary suffers from a long term disability. BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 2, § 222, at 445 n.59.
In such cases, lawmakers can anticipate the benefactor's anticipation of claims for public assistance.
312. See supra note 13. This rule is surrounded by a penumbra within which the status of a trust
as self- or other-settled is unclear, see supra note 14 and accompanying text, and several cases have
also carved out limited exceptions to the ban on self-settlement. See infra notes 322, 338, 346. On
collusion, see McGovERN ET AL., supra note 8, § 8.7, at 347.
313. To some extent the restriction may be a vestige of history. Professor Scott asserted that "[t]he
principle [was] embodied" in a British statute dating to the reign of Henry VII (alas, not the IVth, cf.
Holmes, supra note 118, at 469) restricting the creation of any self-settled trust, 3 Hen. VII, c. 4 (1487),
a statute spawning analogues in many American jurisdictions. 2A ScoTr, supra note 2, § 156, at 168-
69 But see Joseph G. Porter, Spendthrift Trusts for Settlors, 68 TR. & EsT. 102, 103 (1939) (asserting
that the analogous spendthrift trust rule was a judicial construct, developed independently of statutes).
For a different sociohistorical explanation for this restriction, see Friedman, supra note 7, at 581-82.
Minimizing the distinction between self- and other-settled trusts, but not in order to advocate the
extension of authority to self-settle them, see Brahmey v. Rollins, 179 A. 186, 192 (N.H. 1935);
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who creates it; if anything, when a trust is self-settled, those benefits are
bound to be greater. At the very least, self-settled spendthrift trusts ought
to be treated no differently from other-settled ones. But before I proceed to
argue this point, let me begin by retracting it-or rather part of it.
The customary argument against permitting persons to self-settle
spendthrift trusts is that, unlike the other-settled sort, they operate
affirmatively to remove assets that would otherwise be available to
creditors." 4 This is in part a valid point: were debtors able to convert all
of their assets into inalienable form, the supply side of the market for
general credit could easily crumble. General creditors in these circumstanc-
es would be making, in effect, no recourse loans, which might not be viable
at a finite interest rate.r 5
Again, however, analytical rigor requires us to sever the dual elements
of a spendthrift trust in order to discern exactly what is at stake here. If an
individual self-settles a trust barring only voluntary alienation, creditors
suffer not at all. The instant criticism has no bearing on such a trust.
31 6
Only self-imposed restraints against involuntary alienation operate to the
detriment of creditors, by reducing the assets available for levies of
execution. Yet in this connection, we have in place already a tried and
tested legal regime serving to protect creditors from asset withdrawals and
thereby to preserve a robust market for credit. Under the law of contracts,
debtors and creditors can bind themselves to abide by whatever restrictions
they see fit to include in their agreement; 37 and under the law of fraudu-
Sherrow v. Brookover, 189 N.E.2d 90, 93 (Ohio 1963).
314. MCGOVERN ET A.., supra note 8, § 8.7, at 347; McColgan v. Walter Magee, Inc., 155 P. 995,
997 (Cal. 1916).
315. In this respect, the preservative function of spendthrift trusts can assume a substantively
different, and affirmatively deleterious, form when accomplished via self-settlement. Cf. supra notes
202, 227-28 and accompanying text. If allowed without limit, creditors would then have to resort to
security interests or extralegal mechanisms of debtor control in order to protect their interests. See
generally Anthony T. Kronman, Contract Law and the State of Nature, I J.L. ECON. & ORGANIZATION
5 (1985).
316. Nonetheless, the bar on self-settlement applies to voluntary, as well as to involuntary,
restraints. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRuSTS § 156(1) (1955). Still, the utility to the beneficiary of
a trust barring only voluntary alienation would not be very great. See supra notes 24-26 and
accompanying text.
317. Several limitations on the rights of bargaining parties to restrict their conduct do exist: a debtor
cannot waive ex ante her right to petition for bankruptcy relief, for example; nor can she bind herself
not to grant security interests to subsequent creditors (a so-called "negative pledge"). 11 U.S.C. § 524(a)
(1988); U.C.C. § 9-311 (1990). In these situations, public policies apart from the interests of the
bargaining parties come into play. For discussions, see Hirsch, supra note 8, at 209-10; RAY D.
HENSON, HANDBOOK ON SECURED TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 193-94
(2d ed. 1979).
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lent conveyances, certain "boilerplate" limitations on debtor conduct are
also read into every contract for credit.
If a debtor transfers assets while insolvent or in anticipation of
subsequent insolvency, thereby depriving creditors of the opportunity to
recover what is in effect the corpus of the loan itself, fraudulent convey-
ance law provides that creditors can reach the transferred property;
likewise, creditors can set aside any transfer made with intent to hinder the
satisfaction of their claims.3"' Presumably, no creditor in the ordinary run
of situations would grant a debtor leave to render herself spontaneously
judgment-proof; nor would creditors readily consent to acts performed by
debtors with the intention of evading their contractual obligations. By
saving creditors the trouble of drafting these restrictions into loan contracts,
fraudulent conveyance law reduces transaction costs. But beyond these
points, the parties' wishes are more difficult to anticipate, and so it is left
up to them expressly to introduce further restraints (or unrestraints) on
conduct into each contract; additional presumptions of intent would fail to
promote transactional efficiency.3" 9
From the perspective of creditors, the self-settlement of a spendthrift trust
closely resembles a conveyance to third parties: whether property is
alienated or simply rendered inalienable, creditors lose their opportunity to
levy against it, which is all that matters from their point of view. With this
observation comes a simple solution to the problem at hand. In order to
sidestep the hazard indicated by critics of self-settled spendthrift trusts,
lawmakers need only deem the creation of an involuntary disabling restraint
a "transfer" for purposes of fraudulent conveyance law.3 20 In that event,
the limits on self-settling construed into contracts for credit will match
precisely those covering outright gifts to others; creditors surely would no
sooner (and no later) allow a debtor to render inalienable the corpus of
property that was loaned to her than they would allow her to give the
corpus away. But beyond this point, so long as the debtor lacks fraudulent
intent and remains solvent, gifts as well as self-imposed involuntary
restraints do no immediate injury to creditors; hence, we cannot anticipate
318. U.F.C.A. §§ 4, 6, 7, 7A U.L.A. 474, 507, 509 (1918); U.F.T.A. §§ 4, 5, 7A U.L.A. 652-53,
657 (1984).
319. For a discussion of the public policies underlying fraudulent conveyance law, see Douglas G.
Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, Fraudulent Conveyance Law and Its Proper Domain, 38 VMAD. L. REV.
829 (1985); cf. David G. Carlson, Is Fraudulent Conveyance Law Efficient?, 9 CARDOZO L. REv. 643
(1987) (criticizing Baird and Jackson).
320. Cf. Weiss, supra note 78, at 1293 (arguing that the opportunity to self-settle ERISA pensions
in anticipation of insolvency provides a justification for making pensions subject to creditors' claims);
see also infra note 347.
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creditors' level of tolerance for those restraints. A contractual ban on
involuntary restraints, as on gifts, by solvent debtors should be enforceable,
but it should not be implicit. The two problems are structurally analogous
and should be treated alike.
In his celebrated treatise on the law of trusts, Professor Bogert asserted
that fraud was the only credible explanation for self-executing a spendthrift
clause. When a person does so, fraudulent intent should be conclusively
presumed, as in effect it is under current law.32" ' I take issue with this
hypothesis.
Why might an individual wish to disable herself and her creditors from
reaching a portion of her property other than to defraud them? One possible
motive corresponds with that of a paternal benefactor-just as a parent may
recognize in her child a propensity to overspend or overborrow, so might
an individual recognize this same propensity in herself. By creating her
own voluntary and involuntary disabling restraints, an individual can
deprive herself of the opportunity to overspend or overborrow, and thereby
shield herself from financially destructive impulses that she anticipates
having to contend with in the future. As a consequence, she spares herself
from eventual regret. 22 This strategy, known today as precommitment or
self-paternalism, is of course the same one that Ulysses followed when he
lashed himself to the mast of his ship, lest he succumb to the song of the
Sirens. 3 It is a strategy adopted often enough in everyday life.324 To
321. BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 2, § 223, at 448-49; see also RESTATEMNT (SECOND) OF
TRUSTS § 156 cmt. a (1955) (deeming proof of fraudulent intent unnecessary in a creditor's challenge
to a self-settled spendthrift trust).
322. One case ruling that an individual could self-settle a spendthrift trust-i he Is a convict
awaiting confinement-acknowledged this motivation: "It takes no great foresight on [the self-settlor's]
part ... to foresee that his wealth and his unfortunate situation will result in efforts being made by
those who have access to him to obtain his wealth. It takes no great foresight on his part to foresee that
imprisonment, which is punishment, will weaken his will, and that his desire for liberty will make him
credulous." Booth v. Chadwick, 154 S.W.2d 268, 274 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941). For prior commentary
asserting that self-settlement should be available for "the man who realizes that he is a spendthrift," see
Costigan, supra note 18, at 492; Note, supra note 135, at 1332.
323. For general discussions, see ELSTER, supra note 59, at 1-111; THOMAS C. SCHEMuING, CHOICE
AND CONSEQUENCES 57-112 (1984); Mary E. Deily & W. Robert Reed, Temptation, Willpower, and
the Problem of Rational Self-Control, 5 RATIONALITY AND SOC'Y 455 (1993); Hoch & Loewenstein,
supra note 77, at 501; Bailey Kuklin, Self-Paternalism in the Marketplace, 60 U. CIN. L. REv. 649
(1992); Thomas C. Schelling, Self-Command in Practice, in Policy, and in a Theory of Rational Choice,
AM. ECON. REv. I (May 1984) (separately paginated Papers and Proceedings issue); Thomas C.
Schelling, Enforcing Rules on Oneself, I J.L. ECON. & ORGANIZATION 357 (1985).
324. Sometimes, even to the point of Ulyssian physical restraint. Drug addicts sometimes request
that others lock them up until they have gone cold turkey. E.g., Jeremy Lamer & Ralph Tefferteller, The
Addict in the Street, in GEMING BY: ILLUSTRATIONS OF MARGINAL LIVING, 131, 135-36 (Jerry Jacobs,
ed. 1972).
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pick an illustration that may resonate with the reader, why does a scholar
agree to present a paper at a professional conference? One reason is to gain
recognition, of course, and perhaps also to gain access to the reactions and
insights of his peers; but there may be more to it than that. An ulterior
motive may be to commit himself to write the paper at all!3" We
inhabitants of the academy are not, let us face it, the most disciplined folk
on earth; sometimes it helps to know that we have a deadline. Nor is it
only lazy professors, making academic choices, who follow this sort of
strategy. Politicians, thrown into the arena of public choice, do it too. My
favorite example is the proposed Balanced Budget Amendment (which
remains in limbo at the federal level, though it has already found its way
into several state constitutions326). Knowing that when the time comes
they may become enthralled by the sweet melodies of the lobbyists,
beckoning them to make expensive appropriations, many politicians would
rather lash themselves to the mast of legislative restraint. Homer no doubt
would have been delighted!
Are there any extant examples of precommitment in connection with
individual financial choices? Indeed there are.327 Some sport and enter-
tainment figures use intermediaries (often their attorneys) as receiving
agents for their salaries and then put themselves on an "allowance."
According to press accounts, Frank Sinatra, a legendary big spender, has
had resort to this device.328 More humble wage earners sometimes make
a practice of claiming too few exemptions on their W-4 forms in order to
force themselves to save during the year, a strategy formalized via
"contractual" saving devices such as payroll saving plans and, in the longer
term, by Individual Retirement Accounts and voluntary contributions to
ERISA-qualified pension plans.329
325. Perhaps drawing on personal experience, several students of self-paternalism have made this
point; see, for example, Thaler & Shefrin, supra note 77, at 397.
326. Eg., PA. CONST. art. 8, § 12.
327. Professor Schelling has decried the law's failure in general to enforce mechanisms of
precommitment, calling this "a gap in our legal institutions." SCHELLING, supra note 323, at 103; id.
at 79, 98-107. In fact, this supposition is inaccurate with regard to financial planning: both informal and
legal precommitment devices do exist in that regard, as will appear hereafter.
328. Jerry Adler et al., Frankie and Ronnie, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 19, 1981, at 20, 20. Noting the
practice among professional athletes, see Thaler & Shefrin, supra note 77, at 401.
329. KATONA, supra note 100, at 230-31 (coining the phrase "contractual saving!); KATONA &
MUELLER, supra note 133, at 131-43, 237-41; RICHARD THALER& H.M. SHEFRIN, PENSIONS, SAVINGS,
AND TEMPTATION (Graduate School of Business and Public Administration Working Paper No. 81-26,
Cornell Univ. 1981); Paul Taubman, Determinants of Pension Benefits, in PENSIONS, LABOR, AND
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Alternatively, persons may intentionally place assets out of easy reach,
for example, by converting them into illiquid forms. Thus did the ever-
observant Justice Holmes applaud whole life insurance as "one of the best
recognized forms of investment and self-compelled saving.' 33' A related
tactic is to make purchases or borrowing more difficult by intentionally
leaving behind most of one's cash or one's credit cards when going
shopping.31 But perhaps the classic example of financial precommitment
is the so-called Christmas club. Christmas clubs, which by tradition pay no
or low interest, lock in the deposits made to them until December of each
year. Participants have been willing to pay a premium (in the form of
forgone interest) to bind themselves not to spend by depositing moneys into
these, rather than into their regular, interest-bearing accounts. And banks,
recognizing this desire, have been canny enough to demand a premium for
a service that is already in their mercenary interest!332
INDIVIDUAL CHOICE 123, 155 (David A. Wise ed., 1985); Thaler, supra note 58, at 199-200; Thaler &
Sheflin, supra note 77, at 401; Gordon C. Winston, Addiction and Backsliding: A Theory of Compulsive
Consumption, 1 . ECoN. BEHAV. & ORGANIzATION 295, 315-16 (1981); infra note 347. Individual
retirement accounts and some pension plans do permit early withdrawal, though at some monetary
penalty. In such cases, precommitment takes the form of a "side bet" (as the theorists say), inhibiting
deleterious conduct by making it more costly. AINSLIE, supra note 77, at 153-54; Howard S. Becker,
Notes on the Concept of Commitment, 66 AM. L Soc. 32, 35-36 (1960).
In still another variation, consumers with liquid assets on which to draw may nonetheless prefer to
make purchases with installment credit, in order to force themselves to save (in effect) by making debt
payments; whereas, if they financed the purchase with their liquid assets, they might lack the willpower
to restore them. KATONA, supra note 100, at 277-78 (adding that "[a]mong installment buyers with
sizable liquid assets such an awareness of their own frailty was not uncommon"); Dolde & Tobin, supra
note 39, at 62.
330. Grigsby v. Russell, 222 U.S. 149, 156 (1911) (emphasis added).
331. Hoch & Loewenstein, supra note 77, at 501; Rook & Hoch, supra note 107, at 26. Other credit
card holders make a habit of using their cards only for emergencies, in order to avoid using them
excessively for ordinary consumption. R.Y. Awh & D. Waters, A Discriminant Analysis of Economic,
Demographic, and Attitudinal Characteristics of Bank Charge-Card Holders: A Case Study, 29 J. FIN.
973, 979-80 (1974). Such self-imposed habits are known in the technical literature of self-paternalism
as "rules of thumb." For other rules of thumb observed in connection with debt, see Thaler & Shefrin,
supra note 77, at 397-98 & n.5. For a general discussion, see AINSLIE, supra note 77, at 236-42.
Finally, of course, one may avoid having credit cards at all, a tactic often recommended by consumer
credit counselors. SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 107, at 178, 189; In re Goodson, 130 B.RL 897, 903
(Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1991).
332. SCHELLING, supra note 323, at 57-58; Loewenstein & Thaler, supra note 77, at 186; Thaler
& Shefiin, supra note 77, at 392-93; Winston, supra note 329, at 315-16, 322-23 (noting generally the
development of "anti-markets" in products or firms that consumers buy or employ in order to help them
not to consume). The child's version ofthe illiquid Christmas club account: the venerable piggy bank!
Richard H. Thaler, How to Get Real People to Save, in PERSONAL SAVING, CONSUMPTION, AND TAX
POLICY 143, 14546 (Marvin H. Kosters ed., 1992).
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Both from a moral and a utilitarian standpoint, self-paternalism appears
even easier to justify than parental paternalism. Self-paternalism entails no
interference with individual autonomy.333 And it is also more likely to
accomplish its aim of maximizing happiness over time, in that the self-
paternalist knows herself better than the other-paternalist does. In addition,
as we have seen, observers taking on the role of paternalist may fall prey
to a variety of attribution errors to which the actor herself is immune.334
This is not to say that all actors are infallible in their self-knowledge. Like
an observer, they too may miscalculate, failing to anticipate emergencies,
or they may succumb to "self-deception." '335 Once again, the safety valve
of a judicial petition to dissolve a self-imposed disabling restraint should,
I believe, remain available.336 Still, a self-settled spendthrift trust is, if
anything, more likely to redound to the beneficiary's ultimate advantage
than an other-settled one.
333. ELSTER, supra note 59, at 85; Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 39, at 1113; Gerald Dworkin,
Paternalism, in PATERNALISM, supra note 179, at 19, 23. On the other hand, it is possible to argue that
self-paternalism crowds the subsequent autonomy of the individual and thus presents a moral dilemma
similar to (actually a weak form of) self-enslavement See Gordon C. Winston, The Reasons for Being
of Two Minds: A Comment on Schelling's "Enforcing Rules on Oneself," 1 J.L. ECON. & ORGANIZA-
TION 375, 378 (1985) (viewing self-paternalism as akin to paternalism in a two-person model wherein
"we have the imposition of a rule or constraint on the future self by the present selfr). On the dilemma
of self-enslavement, see generally the references in Hirsch, supra note 8, at 204 n.91. Furthermore, self-
paternalism can be criticized on a basis analogous to a key criticism of other-paternalism, namely that
it forms the subsequent values of the object. See supra note 69. Just as an other-paternalist may impose
her own values on her object, so may a self-paternalist impose her early values on her later self. The
consequence in this context will be not external influence on character, but rather "excessive rigidity
of character." ELSTER, supra note 69, at 114-15 & n.12. Discussing various criticisms of self-
paternalism, see Kuklin, supra note 323, at 661-71.
334. See supra notes 152-56 and accompanying text
335. SCHELLING, supra note 323, at 104-05; Kuklin, supra note 323, at 664-65, 670-71. Whereas
self-deception is usually associated with wishful thinking, and hence tends in the direction of overly
optimistic self-assessments, the phenomenon sometimes takes the perverse form of excessive pessimism
and so could lead persons to seek to impose unwarranted restraints upon themselves. On self-deception,
see BARON, supra note 73, at 44-47, 294-302; ELsTER, supra note 69, at 148-57; ELSTEt, supra note
59, at 172-79; KAPLAN, supra note 154, at 109, 155; SELF-DECEPTION AND SELF-UNDERSTANDING
(Mike W. Martin ed., 1985); George A. Quattrone & Amos Tversky, Self-Deception and the Voter's
Illusion, in THE MULTIPLE SELF 35 (Jon Elster ed., 1986); David Pears, The Goals and Strategies of
Self-Deception, in THE MULTIPLE SELF, supra, at 59; Donald Davidson, Deception and Division, in THE
MULTIPLE SELF, supra, at 79; Jon Elster, Deception and Self-Deception in Stendhal: Some Sartrian
Themes, in THE MULTIPLE SELF supra, at 93; Am6lie 0. Rorty, Self-Deception, Akrasia and
Irrationality, in THE MULTIPLE SELF, supra, at 115. Suggesting that self-deception has adaptive value,
see Harold A. Sackeim, Self-Deception, Self-Esteem, and Depression: The Adaptive Value of Lying to
Oneself, in I EMPIRICAL STUDIES OF PSYCHOANALYTICAL THEORIES 101 (Joseph Masling ed., 1983).
336. See supra note 167 and accompanying text.
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Apart from exercises in self-paternalism, self-imposed restraints against
involuntary alienation hold out other, economic benefits. Conceivably, an
individual might wish to create an involuntary restraint for purposes of
value maintenance if she happened to inherit a life estate or other future
interest not yet clothed with such a restraint.337 More significantly, self-
imposed involuntary restraints would afford potential borrowers an
opportunity to modulate efficiently their credit risk-cost ratios. The larger
the corpus of property placed out of creditors' way, the safer the debtor
against the risk of default-but also the lower the availability of, and the
higher the price demanded for, any credit she seeks.338 The motive
identified here corresponds with the security function of disabling
restraints.339 In the case of self-settled trusts, however, the utility of that
function is once again amplified, for the debtor stands in a position to
apply this device to all her (net) property340 and to select a credit risk-
cost ratio that she deems personally optimal. In this respect, a self-imposed
involuntary restraint would be structurally analogous to a mortgage or an
Article Nine security interest, which enables creditors, in turn, to modulate
their risk-return ratios. 341 Again, the debtor could in theory accomplish
337. See supra notes 207-12 and accompanying text. Presumably, commercial annuities and
nonexempt pension accumulations do not pose a value maintenance problem, given that they have a
definite cash surrender value. But a disabling restraint might conceivably be applied to other items of
property that the individual happens to value subjectively above their objective value.
338. Once again, there is nothing deceptive to creditors about a self-settled spendthrift trust. These
require delivery to a third-party trustee or segregation in a labeled trust account. See supra notes 229-40
and accompanying text. Butsee Mackason's Appeal, 42 Pa. 330,337-38 (1862) (asserting the contrary);
cf Booth v. Chadwick, 154 S.W.2d 268, 274 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941) (suggesting, in a case permitting
prison inmates to self-settle spendthrift trusts, that the inmates' lack of opportunity to "defraud trusting
creditors" was exceptional).
339. Professor Griswold endorsed self-settled spendthrift trusts on this basis: "There is ample room
to argue, that a man while solvent should be able to lay by a moderate source of support for the
uncertain future." GIUSWOLD, supra note 1, § 557, at 644-45. In this regard, "A man who earns his own
way should have the same opportunity for protection from adversity as the man who takes his support
from others." Id.
340. That is to say, within the constraints set by fraudulent conveyance law, or so I would advocate.
See supra text at note 320.
341. Discussing the efficiency of security interests in this respect, see James J. White, Efficiency
Justiflcations for Personal Property Security, 37 VAND. L. REv. 473, 491-502 (1984). But cf. Alan
Schwartz, The Continuing Puzzle of Secured Debt, 37 VAND. L. REv. 1051, 1060-66 (1984); Alan
Schwartz, A Theory of Loan Priorities, 18 3. LEGAL STuD. 209 (1989) (setting forth a broader
discussion). Schwartz questions White's assumption that commercial lenders display disparate risk
preferences, thereby weakening the argument for the utility of security interests. Whereas White's
assumption may be problematic with respect to commercial actors, it is plainly applicable to consumers;
thus, by analogy, his argument gains strength in connection with debtor opportunities to tinker with risk.
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the same result by negotiating individual loan covenants to limit recourse
in separate credit transactions. But that approach would entail a higher
(almost certainly prohibitive) aggregate transaction cost. 342
It bears noticing that in a variety of contexts lawmakers already allow
persons unilaterally to enhance their financial security by insulating a
portion of their assets from creditors' claims. If an individual engages in
commercial activity, of course, she can protect nonbusiness assets from
business creditors by incorporating,343 or by forming a limited partnership
or a limited liability company.3" Within limits set by the law of
fraudulent conveyances, individuals can also protect assets from nonbusi-
ness creditors by converting them into exempt property,345 by conveying
separate property into a tenancy by the entirety,346 or by making volun-
tary contributions to an ERISA-qualified pension plan.347 In the wake of
342. See supra notes 213-14 and accompanying text.
343. On the utility of incorporation to achieve an optimal risk-return package, see POSNER, supra
note 20, § 14.4, at 397; Posner, supra note 205, at 503.
344. The point failed to dawn on some early critics of self-settled spendthrift trusts, possibly
because limited liability was not universal in the nineteenth century. But to a modem ear, the fear that
"fevery man about to engage in business where there was a chance of loss, would place himself under
the pupilage of trustees." has a delightfully ironic tone. Mackason's Appeal, 42 Pa. 330, 338 (1862);
see also Schenck v. Barnes, 50 N.E. 967, 968 (N.Y. 1898). On the historical rise of limited liability,
see STEPHEN B. PRESSER, PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL § 1.03(1] (1991). On the modem variant of
limited liability companies, see James W. Lovely, Agency Costs, Liquidity, and the Limited Liability
Company as an Alternative to the Close Corporation, 21 STETSON L. REV. 377 (1992); on their use in
estate planning, see Richard M. Horwood, Limited Liability Companies Provide New Planning Options,
21 EsT. PLAN. 266 (1994).
345. Alan N. Resnick, Prudent Planning or Fraudulent Transfer? The Use of Nonexempt Assets
to Purchase or Improve Exempt Property on the Eve of Bankruptcy, 31 RUJTGERS L. REV. 615, 620-43
(1978). Though exemption statutes typically place limits on the value of the items exempted from
creditors' claims, whole life insurance policies in some jurisdictions are exempt without limit under state
law. BUIST M. ANDERSON, ANDERSON ON LFE INSURANCE § 21.7 (1991); SCHWARZSCHILD, supra note
14. at 206-23; Brackney, supra note 14.
346. JESSE DUKEMINER & JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY 327, 374-75 (3d ed. 1993) (noting that
tenancies by the entirety are presently permitted in somewhat less than half the states); e.g., Sawada v.
Endo, 561 P.2d 1291 (Haw. 1977); In re Estate of Wall, 440 F.2d 215, 219-20 (D.C. Cir. 1971)
(applying fraudulent conveyance law to tenancies by the entirety). Because tenancies by the entirety are
exempt from creditors' claims, several courts have held valid spendthrift trusts that were self-settled
with entireties property. See supra note 14. This raises the possibility that, in jurisdictions where the
opportunity arises, a married person could self-settle a spendthrift trust in two steps rather than one.
347. MICHAEL J. CANAN, QUALIFIED RETIREMENT AND OTHER EMPLOYEE BENEFIT PLANS §§ 14.1-
.6 (1988) (noting additional statutory limits on voluntary contributions); Richard A. Montague, Jr. &
Gena R. Lentz, The Case of the Missing Footnote: Can Creditors Recover Fraudulent Transfers from
ERISA-Qualified Pension Plans?, 13 MISS. C. L. REv. 91 (1992). Still another expedient of growing
popularity among the well-to-do is the offshore asset protection trust, which is effectively shielded from
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these venerable contrivances, the prohibition against self-settled spendthrift
trusts appears all the more unthematic.
CONCLUSION
And yet, and yet. When we have cleared our minds of all the theoretical
chatter, spendthrift trust laws may still leave us feeling troubled, in much
the same way as the old English game laws were troubling. Each in their
respective age created an asymmetry between the legal rights of different
socioeconomic groups." 8 The spendthrift trust beneficiary, racking up
debts on her American Express card, can dodge her obligations free and
clear; whereas the impoverished wage earner, borrowing on her Sears card,
finds her wages garnished when she runs into difficulty settling her
account. 49 The law is at its old business of fortifying the Haves (some
would say) and leaving the Have-nots to their own devices. 5
Of course, it is easy to respond that spendthrift trusts are open to
everyone in the abstract; unlike the game laws, modem trust law does not
nakedly discriminate between the rights of different individuals on the basis
of social status.3"' That is too facile, however, for spendthrift trusts are
creditors' claims. Discussing offshore trusts and the challenge they pose to the traditional policy against
self-settled spendthrift trusts, see Elena Marty-Nelson, Offshore Asset Protection Trusts: Having Your
Cake and Eating It Too, 47 RUTGERS L. REv. 11 (1994).
348. On the game laws, see infra note 351.
349. I have exaggerated the point slightly for rhetorical effect: assuming she has no other
unencumbered assets, the spendthrift trust beneficiary should have no easy time obtaining an American
Express card. Still, the potential benefits of a spendthrift trust to those in a position to acquire them are
clear. See supra notes 200-214 and accompanying text.
350. In this regard, it has sometimes been suggested that spendthrift trusts tend to concentrate
wealth in society. Professor Gray spoke of the spendthrift trust as establishing an "aristocracy," and he
dipped back beyond the game laws, to the Statute de Donis Conditionalibus of 1258, establishing the
fee tail estate, for a comparable symbol of the times. GRAY, supra note 16, at vi, § 262. For similar
assertions, see 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 32, § 26.3, at 413; Friedman, supra note
7, at 576-77, 582-83; Manning, supra note 18, at 403-04; Scott, supra note 35, at 644; Vukowich,
Exemption Rights in Bankruptcy, supra note 44, at 770. Spendthrift trusts may indeed redound to the
financial advantage of their beneficiaries, as we have seen; nevertheless, they do not function like future
interests to hold together fortunes across generations; hence, they do not contribute (other than
incidentally) to the intergenerational transmission of inequality. In that sense, the suggestion that
disabling restraints foster "aristocracy" or "plutocracy" appears inapt.
351. The English game laws of the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries limited hunting only
to those persons who enjoyed a sufficient annual income. This legal distinction grew even starker after
1723, when the Black Act made violations of some of the game laws a capital offense. Douglas Hay,
Poaching and the GameLawson Cannock Chase, in ALBION'S FATAL TREE 189, 189-93 (Douglas Hay
et al. eds., 1975); E.P. THOMPSON, Wmos AND HuNrEs: Tim ORIGIN OF THE BLACK ACT (1975). At
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol73/iss1/1
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of concrete use only to the recipients of a particular sort of income (to wit,
the passive sort), which amounts to the same thing.352 Indeed, the sense
of social injustice flowing from this reality can only be heightened by the
fact that some individuals, rightly or wrongly, deem inherited wealth
morally illegitimate to begin with. 3 The point was noticed long ago, in
an obscure opinion by an obscure judge, who in 1911 pronounced that "it
would be very unfortunate if we were constrained to hold that the income
from property held in trust ... should be more secure than that income
which a man produces by his own toil and efforts." '354 More recently,
critics of the spendthrift trust have returned to this theme, assailing the
doctrine for creating "inequality before the law."'355 A certain Professor
Callahan, writing two decades ago in the Wayne Law Review, concluded his
critique of the spendthrift trust with the rallying cry, "Workers of Michigan
arise!" '356 Should we, as policy analysts, hearken to Professor Callahan's
call to arms.357
one time, however, spendthrift trust law was as nakedly discriminatory in some jurisdictions as any
edict of the House of Lords. Within jurisdictions permitting creditors to reach surplus income from
spendthrift trusts above the amount necessary for their beneficiaries' support, courts examined the
beneficiaries' station in life in order to assess how much of the income was necessary and how much
was surplus. Professor Gray was vexed enough by the general validity of disabling restraints; the
station-in-life rule drove him past anger, to the brink of apoplexy. GRAY, supra note 16, at xi. But the
station-in-life rule, at least, has since become extinct in the United States. BOGERT & BOoERT, supra
note 2, § 227, at 516-19; C.R. McCorkle, Annotation, Surplus Income of Trust, in Excess of Amount
Required for Support and Education of Beneficiary, as Subject to Claims of Creditors, 36 A.L.I.2d
1215 (1954).
352. See Stewart E. Sterk, Restraints on Alienation of Human Capital, 79 VA. L. REv. 383 (1993)
(arguing by analogy that because of their disparate impact, rules rendering human capital inalienable,
such as the discharge in bankruptcy, are suspect on egalitarian grounds).
353. Kenneth V. Greene, Inheritance Unjustified?, 16 J.L. & ECoN. 417, 418-19 (1973). This
sentiment, of course, does not hold among the well-heeled. See VEBLEN, supra note 86, at 37 (asserting
that "wealth acquired passively by transmission from ancestors or other antecedents [has become] even
more honorific than wealth acquired by the possessor's own effort").
354. Brearley School, Ltd. v. Ward, 201 N.Y. 358, 373 (1911) (Bartlett, J.).
355. Bushman, supra note 7, at 312,316-18 (quotation at 318); CHESTER, supra note 15, at 135-38;
JESSE DuEMINiER & STANLEY M. JOHANSON, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 548-49 (4th ed. 1990)
(voicing concern about the "symbolic impact" of the spendthrift trust).
356. Kenneth R. Callahan, Trusts and Succession, 22 WAYNE L. REV. 663, 695 (1976); see also
id at 692-95.
357. Legislators in at least one jurisdiction have responded to this concern. In California, the statute
authorizing spendthrift trusts is modelled after garnishment law, so that each respectively accords to
income from trusts and income from wages the same degree of protection against creditors' claims.
Compare CAL. PROB. CODE § 15306.5 (a-c) (West 1987) with CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE §§ 706.050-.051
(West 1987) and 15 U.S.C. § 1673 (a) (1988). This legal symmetry was intentional. See Legislative
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At the end of the day, I will venture to say that the answer is no. In
connection with spendthrift trusts, we may implement the rules dictated by
economic "theory with equanimity, heedless to any perceptions or
misperceptions of injustice they may generate.
• Law and economics has its limitations, but it also has its place. On the
one hand, for a Richard Posner or a Gary Becker to examine racial
discrimination as a problem in efficiency,"8 apart from being vaguely
distasteful, seems almost to trivialize the issue. Surely, one's willingness to
pay in connection with racial discrimination wanes insignificant beside
one's willingness to fight for fundamental ideals of human dignity. But
when it comes to issues that fail to stir us in this way, we may with
propriety give vent to economic concerns.3 9 Spendthrift trusts, of all
things, surely fall into this second category. Professor Callahan's exhorta-
tion to the workers of Michigan thus ultimately strikes me as ironic (and
I strongly suspect it was intended to be so). The image of outraged wage
earners, flaming torches in hand, converging on state capitals to protest the
spendthrift trust appears little short of ludicrous. 360 At most, one can
imagine jury revolt against technical private law rules that strike them as
viscerally unjust. That has happened on occasion (Texaco v. Pennzoil being
a good example).36' But juries will rarely sit in spendthrift trust cases.
And for persons not called upon to participate in the judicial process, the
issue will remain essentially invisible.
Committee Comment-Assembly 1984 Amendment, reprinted after CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 709.010
(West 1987) (discussing prior, substantively equivalent law).
358. POsNER, supra note 20, §§ 26.1-.5; GARY S. BECKER, THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION
(2d ed. 1971).
359. Conceivably, we could weave into a welfare analysis the loss of utility that results when those
who lack spendthrift trusts experience envy of those who do. Whether lawmakers ought to acknowledge
envy as a morally legitimate policy determinant, absent manifest social repercussions, seems doubtful,
however. See the modem discussion in RiCHAM A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTiCE 82-83 (1981);
and a bit earlier, Exodus 20:17.
360. See Alan Hyde, The Concept of Legitimation in the Sociology ofLaw, 1983 WiS. L. REv. 379,
408-09 (surveying studies suggesting widespread public ignorance of legal rules and judicial
pronouncements not personally affecting those surveyed). But see GRAY, supra note 16, § 263a
(anticipating that spendthrift trusts would "inflame" class jealousy and prompt political agitation against
them). Historically, one can point to instances in which disaffected debtors actually took the law into
their own hands. See, for example, ROBERT A. FEER, SHAYS'S REBELLION (1988). An organized debtor
movement no longer exists in this country, however. For a related discussion, see Hirsch, supra note
8, at 245 n.236.
361. See the discussion in Michael Ansaldi, Texaco, Pennzoil and the Revolt of the Masses: A
Contracts Postmortem, 27 Hous. L. REv. 733, 835-40 (1990).
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Only in academic fora (such as these pages) will the question arise, and
there any offense caused by the outcomes of economic analysis carries no
social significance. Thirty years ago, a commentator opined that the "raging
controversy over spendthrift trusts [has] generated more heat than
light. 362 That controversy, such as it was, has since cooled, but even
were it to blaze anew, it would remain safely confined, as it has always
been, to a community of scholars who often seem to thrive on heat.
Perhaps it helps to warm their imagination.
362. Kreider, supra note 233, at 284. Asserting a different heat-to-light ratio, see Emanuel, supra
note 15, at 179-80. Gray himself admitted to feeling feverish: "While I was musing, the fire burned.
Vte mihi si non evangelizavero [woe unto me if I have not evangelized]." But Gray added, "I trust that
my strong opinion ... has not rendered me careless in collecting the authorities, or unfair in the
statement of them." GRAY, supra note 16, at iv, xi. Dubitatur
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